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Abstract
This paper uses the 1990–98 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS)
Panel to analyse the impact of worker voice on workplace closure and
employment growth among workplaces in Britain.
In general, worker voice had little effect on workplace closure in the
private sector as a whole. Workplace performance, market conditions,
workforce composition and structural features of the workplace, such as size
and ownership, were more important. However, union voice – and, in partic-
ular, unions with substantial bargaining power – was associated with lower
employment growth among continuing workplaces, the growth rate being
roughly 3–4 per cent lower than similar non-unionised workplaces. The
employment effect is still apparent once we account for workplace organisa-
tional and technical change, the concentration of unions in declining
industries, and the age of unionised workplaces. The findings are consistent
with the notion that unions will raise wages at the expense of potential new
workers, but not to the point where the firm is sufficiently unprofitable to go
out of business. Non-union worker voice had no significant effect, suggesting
that the union effect arose through wage bargaining.
Union effects differed markedly across the three broad sectors of the
economy: private manufacturing, private services and the public sector.
On average, unions increased the probability of closure in manufactur-
ing, the average impact being to increase the chances of closure by 15 per
cent relative to similar workplaces that were not unionised. However, the
effect varied with the nature of union representation. Unions representing
only manual workers at the workplace were the only ones that increased the
chances of closure. This effect can be mitigated by broadening the occupa-
tional scope of union representation at the workplace. Having a recognised
union representing non-manual workers reduced the likelihood of closure,
while those representing the broad spectrum of occupations, both manual
and non-manual, were neutral in their impact. Chances of closure were only
higher where there was a single union: multi-unionism had no effect. Again,
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this suggests that it is unions representing a narrow range of occupations that
increase the chances of plant closure in manufacturing, perhaps through the
pursuit of sectional interests to the detriment of the plant as a whole. The
scope of bargaining was also important in determining closure chances.
Where unions had no role in determining staffing levels or recruitment the
likelihood of closure was higher. But where managements did allow unions a
role in determining these aspects of employment the chances of closure were
no different from those of non-unionised plants. This may be because unions
become more sensitive to the employment consequences of their wage claims
where management involve them in decisions over employment. Or it may be
that an involvement in the broader set of issues affecting the future of the
plant engenders a more constructive relationship between unions and
management.
Unionisation reduced employment growth rates by 3 per cent per annum
in private manufacturing workplaces relative to non-unionised workplaces.
The effect was only apparent where at least 80 per cent of workers had their
pay set through collective bargaining. Below this threshold there was no union
effect. This suggests unions required a certain degree of bargaining strength
to affect employment growth in manufacturing.
Worker voice had no effect on workplace closure in private services.
However, the annual growth rate of unionised workplaces in private services
was 4–5 per cent less than comparable non-union workplaces. This effect
was not apparent where bargaining coverage was low and among unions
representing manual workers. Furthermore, union effects were confined to
unions negotiating over wages but not employment. Where they negotiated
over staffing levels, growth rates were not significantly different from those
in non-unionised workplaces. This suggests unions modify their wage claims
where management involves them in decisions over employment. Non-union
worker voice had no effect on employment growth in private services.
In the highly unionised public sector, closure probabilities were greater
where workers were able to limit management’s ability to organise work, and
where there were unions representing non-manual workers at the workplace.
However, public sector workplaces with a single union were less likely to
close than workplaces without unions. Employment growth rates were not
generally affected by worker voice in the public sector. However, public sector
workplaces with single-table bargaining grew at a rate of 3 per cent per
annum less than other comparable workplaces.
6 / Alex Bryson
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1 Introduction
It is commonly accepted that workers should be able to make their voice
heard in the workplace, not simply because they have a right to expression as
citizens but because, in a pluralist democracy, the pursuit of improved terms
and conditions at work is regarded as a legitimate aim. It is further recog-
nised that worker voice can have both positive and negative implications for
productivity and profitability. On the one hand, by compelling employers to
offer better terms and conditions than those offered in its absence, worker
voice may reduce workplace competitiveness. On the other hand, worker
voice can enhance management’s ability to manage effectively and efficiently,
while the benefits of voice can feed through to improved worker productivity.
The balance between these two countervailing influences can determine the
effect of worker voice on the fortunes of a workplace. Taking this as our
starting point, this paper analyses the association between different forms of
employee ‘voice’ and employment change in the 1990s. We use outcome data
for 1998 on workplaces interviewed as part of the 1990 Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS90). These outcome data identify whether in the inter-
vening 7–8 years the workplace closed, shrank below the survey’s lower
employment threshold of 25 employees, or remained in the survey popula-
tion. We describe these outcomes as closure, shrinkage and survival
respectively. For ‘surviving’ workplaces we can also identify changes in
employment between 1990 and 1998.
In 1990, there were 22.5 million employees in employment. This fell by a
million during the recession of the early 1990s, only to rise to around 23
million by 1998.2 Changes in the total number of employees in employment
arise from two sources: the setting up of new workplaces and the closure of
existing ones; and the shrinkage and expansion of existing workplaces. In
this paper we consider the role played by unions in decisions to close
2 Based upon employees in employment for Great Britain, derived from the relevant Labour
Force Surveys, reported in Labour Market Trends.
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workplaces and expand or contract employment. Our focus is what happened
to workplaces in existence in 1990. However, new workplaces that came into
existence during the 1990s accounted for one-fifth of all workplaces by 1998,
and one-sixth of all employment, if we exclude the very small workplaces
excluded from the 1990–98 WIRS Panel. There are several reasons why we
do not give equal attention to the jobs created by newly established
workplaces during the same period. The first reason for omitting detailed
analysis of new workplaces is because the prospect of possible unionisation is
unlikely to deter managers from setting them up.3 This is especially so for
new small firms with a single workplace. Decisions to set up new workplaces
within multi-site organisations could be influenced by experiences of union
activity elsewhere in the same organisation, if it exists.4 However, there is no
survey dataset that could be used to address this issue through statistical
analysis. Secondly, even for new workplaces set up between 1990 and 1998,
there is no information in the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey
(WERS98) on the circumstances facing management at the time they set up
the new workplace, or indeed decided not to set up others. Consequently, we
can say nothing about any role unions might have in discouraging or encour-
aging the establishment of new workplaces. Thirdly, although we could say
something about employment growth among workplaces set up since 1990,
these workplaces are only a little younger than our 1990 sample. We think
the best guide to their employment changes is the pattern of employment
change of workplaces existing in 1990, as described in this paper.
As discussed in more detail below, we know from previous analyses of
the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) that unions had no impact
on workplace closure in the trading sector in the 1980s but, across the
economy as a whole, unionised workplaces grew at a slower rate than non-
unionised workplaces. We assess the effect of worker voice for the 1990s and,
for the first time in Britain, we extend the analyses to the public sector and
present results separately for private services and private manufacturing. The
motivation for the analysis is the profound change in British industrial
relations that has occurred since the early 1980s. The study comes at the end
of two decades of decline for trade unions, the traditional means by which
employees have sought to influence employers in Britain. The unionised sector
8 / Alex Bryson
3 The low level of unionisation in the private sector supports this view. Only one private sector
industry (electricity, gas and water supply) out of fourteen industries has over half of its
workforce belonging to trade unions (Bland, 1999).
4 A 1992 survey of large, multi-site companies showed that many of those with recognised
unions in their existing workplaces set up new workplaces without recognising unions in them.
This was more common where existing bargaining arrangements were decentralised (Marginson
et al, 1993).
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of the economy has shrunk due to a continual fall in union membership since
the early 1980s and, since the mid–1980s, a rapid drop in the number of
employers recognising unions for collective bargaining (Millward et al, 2000).
Even where unions continue to be recognised for bargaining purposes, their
bargaining power may have diminished with changes in the political and
economic climate, and declines in the proportion of employees whose terms
and conditions are set by collective bargaining (Millward et al, 2000; Bryson
and Wilkinson, 2001). Certainly, they appear to have lost influence over a
range of workplace outcomes (Stewart, 1995; Gallie and Rose, 1996: 47),
and their influence on workplace economic outcomes has become increas-
ingly conditional on their organisational strength and bargaining power
(Machin and Stewart, 1996; Menezes-Filho, 1997).
Employers, perhaps intent on regaining managerial prerogatives, seem to
be capitalising on changes in the labour market and the legal framework
which have strengthened their bargaining power vis-à-vis employees to refash-
ion their relationship with organised labour. Employers have hardened their
attitudes towards unions since the mid-1980s (Gallie et al, 1998: 107; Bryson,
1999a: 86) and there is growing evidence that unions are often by-passed in
managerial decision-making (Marchington and Parker, 1990; Darlington,
1994; Cully et al, 1999: 110, 207). These considerations may lead us to
suspect that managers are less constrained than they were in the 1980s in
pursuing corporate goals, sometimes at the expense of employees.
Consequently, other things being equal, employee representations to manage-
ment may be less influential in decisions concerning the loss, retention or
growth of jobs than they were in the 1980s.
However, to conclude that employees’ influence over corporate behaviour
may have diminished simply because unions may have lost influence, is to
overlook important changes in the nature of worker voice which have
occurred over the same period. Within unionised workplaces, there has been
a substantial shift from the use of single-channel union representation to
‘dual-channel’ voice involving increasing use of direct non-union methods of
communication with management (Bryson, 2000). Furthermore, in the
population of workplaces as a whole, there has been a shift to purely non-
union voice (Millward et al, 2000: 121–26). Although these trends may
simply reflect the decline in union influence, it is clear that non-union voice
mechanisms have their own impact on financial performance (Bryson, 1999b;
McNabb and Whitfield, 1998) and employee perceptions of management
behaviour (Bryson, 2000). It is therefore important to account for these alter-
native measures of employee voice when considering employee influence over
management behaviour in the 1990s.
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 9
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The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents our
analyses of workplace closure. First, we outline the theory relating to
employee influence on workplace closure. Then, having introduced our data,
we present descriptive analyses of workplace closure for the private sector as
a whole. This is followed by multivariate analyses of closure for the sector.
Section 2.5 presents similar analyses, but for private manufacturing and
private services separately. Finally in Section 2, we present our results for the
public sector.
Section 3 presents our analyses of employment change. It follows a similar
format to Section 2, with sections on theory and data before presenting results
in the same sequence as Section 2. However, Section 3 includes an additional
section which adjusts the private sector employment growth analysis to take
account of workplace survival.
2 WORKPLACE CLOSURE
The analysis of workplace closure is important to the analysis of employment
change. First, workplace closure is the most dramatic manifestation of a
management decision to reduce the number of jobs. If the voice of workers is
positively or negatively associated with the likelihood of closure, this is signif-
icant in itself. As we show below, there are grounds for supposing that the
rent-seeking behaviour of unions may threaten the long-term viability of
workplaces. On the other hand, some have argued that worker voice can
contribute to improved performance, for instance through better communica-
tions and employee involvement, and that unions can enhance productivity.
Therefore, the actual impact of voice is an empirical issue.
The second reason why the analysis of workplace closure is important is
that it lays the foundations for analyses of workplace survival in the survey
population, and hence of employment change. Models estimating survival are
used in Section 3 to adjust estimates of voice impacts on employment change
in our 1990–98 panel of continuing workplaces. Failure to take account of
this selection process could result in biased estimates of workers’ impact on
employment change.
Having outlined the theory linking employee behaviour to workplace
closure in Section 2.1 and our data in Section 2.2, Section 2.3 presents
descriptive data on closure, shrinkage and survival rates for different
measures of voice, workplace characteristics, workforce characteristics,
product market conditions and workplace performance measures. Section 2.4
presents results from models estimating the probability of closure in the
private sector as a whole, while Section 2.5 presents results for private services
10 / Alex Bryson
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and private manufacturing separately. Analyses for the public sector appear
in Section 2.6.
Both the descriptive and multivariate analyses indicate that voice measures
do not have a major role in explaining closure in the economy as a whole. We
identify some measures of voice that are significantly associated with subse-
quent closure but, in general, aspects of product market competition,
workplace performance, and to some extent, labour deployment, play a more
significant role in understanding closure. However, worker voice is important
in explaining closure in private manufacturing and the public sector.
2.1 Theory relating to employee influence on workplace closure
If firms are best able to maximise profits where management can pursue that
objective without modifying its behaviour in response to employees’ demands,
the viability of the firm may be compromised where management is
constrained to respond to the competing demands of employees.
In the short-term, enterprise survival depends on whether average variable
costs exceed average revenues at the profit-maximising output. When costs
are greater than revenue, management may be more inclined to shut the
workplace, although there may be sound economic reasons for ‘weathering
the storm’.5 Average variable costs depend on labour productivity and labour
costs – mainly wages and other worker benefits – both of which may be influ-
enced by unionism, as well as other factors which employees can not
influence.6 Average revenues will depend on market conditions that deter-
mine entry of competitive firms and market prices.
Unions may increase the likelihood of workplace closure by raising wages
above the rate that is optimal for profit maximisation, that is, above the
market rate that would be obtained in the absence of unions. It is usually
assumed that since unionism is often associated with higher wages and
benefits for workers (Forth and Millward, 2000; Freeman and Kleiner, 1990),
and lower profits for firms (Becker and Olson, 1992; Bronars and Deere,
1990; Hirsch and Connolly, 1987), unions may increase the likelihood of
workplace closure. If unions are successful in maintaining restrictive practices
that reduce labour productivity, this may also increase the likelihood of
closure. On the other hand, following Freeman and Kleiner (1999), there are
two reasons why this simple assumption may not hold.
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 11
5 For instance, if an employer foresees a change in market conditions which might enhance
profitability, it may be worthwhile holding on to labour (‘hoarding’ it) rather than incurring the
costs of lay-offs and rehiring.
6 For example, aspects of labour costs which employees can not influence, such as National
Insurance costs, and non-labour costs such as new plant and machinery and interest rates.
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First, the extra ‘surplus’ accruing to workers through improved wages
may come, not through normal profits, but through ‘excess profits’. Excess
profits may arise through the operation of unions in improving productivity,
thus increasing the size of the pie, permitting unions to improve their position
without it being at the expense of the employer. Excess profits may also arise
where employers operate in less competitive market places, or where they
dominate a particular market place, a position that allows them to be price-
makers rather than price-takers. In such circumstances, they may be able to
acquiesce to employees’ demands in the knowledge that they can simply pass
extra costs on to consumers without losing market share.7
The second reason why union-induced higher wages may not necessarily
translate into a higher probability of workplace closure is that unions may
care about the employment of existing members, as well as their wages. As
Freeman and Kleiner (1999: 512) note:
‘while unions have incentives to drive up the wages and benefits of
employees at the expense of potential new workers, they should seek to
protect the employment of current members as long as those members
earn a premium over their next best alternative employment. The
rational union will not raise wages to the point where the firm is suffi-
ciently unprofitable to go out of business and should grant wage
concessions to keep the firm afloat as long as the post-concession
compensation exceeds the next best alternative for the workers’.
Of course, unions may inadvertently bring about the demise of a business if it
makes wage claims on faulty or incomplete information. In some circumstances,
unions may deliberately compromise the viability of a ‘poor’ workplace in
pursuit of better standard terms and conditions within an industry.
Unions may also affect workplace survival in the longer-term, since this
depends on whether total revenues exceed total costs (including fixed costs).
In the long-term, if unionised workplaces in competitive markets raise wages
and costs, these workplaces will suffer declining employment and eventually
go out of business. Union-induced reductions in profits may also deter invest-
ment in unionised workplaces, damaging the long-term performance of
unionised workplaces.8 On the other hand, as Freeman and Kleiner (op cit,
12 / Alex Bryson
7 Empirical studies disagree on whether union-induced reductions in profits come out of
normal or excess profits. Some find unions reduce profits in concentrated sectors with high
profitability (Karier, 1985) while others find the opposite (Clark, 1984; Hirsch, 1991).
8 This may occur if lower research and development expenditure makes unionised plants less
able to adjust to market change (Hirsch, 1992), or if investors are deterred from investing by
the knowledge that unions may expropriate a share of rents associated with sunk capital invest-
ment (Grout, 1984).
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p512) point out, unions may confine their activities to workplaces most able
to pay union wages, namely those with sufficient economic rent to do so
without increasing the probability of long-run business failure. Freeman and
Kleiner also note that existing workplaces may benefit from union-induced
higher costs if they deter new entrants to the market who will have to attract
labour at union rates, while facing the risk that union concessions to existing
firms will protect their competitive advantage.
It is also possible that in the long term, unionised workplaces may outper-
form non-unionised workplaces if unionisation offers sustainable competitive
advantages, thus reducing the likelihood of workplace closure. There are at
least three routes by which this may occur. First, by giving ‘voice’ to workers’
concerns and grievances, and by helping to represent those concerns and
grievances to management, unions may significantly increase worker motiva-
tion and organisational commitment, thereby improving productivity and
performance (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Secondly, unions can reduce
employer ‘agency costs’ in maintaining and enforcing desired levels of worker
effort. Thirdly, if unions improve information flows to management, this may
enhance the effectiveness of managerial decision-making, leading to improved
prospects of survival.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) have argued that union voice is more effec-
tive than non-union voice in delivering benefits for workers. However, the
issue of whether union voice is superior to non-union voice in delivering
benefits to employers is an important issue, given the rise of non-union voice
since the mid-1980s. From the human resource management literature comes
the notion that worker representation, rather than efficiently and effectively
communicating workers’ wishes and concerns to management, may actually
create a barrier between management and workers. This barrier can be
breached if management eschews intermediaries and deals directly with
employees, either on a one-to-one basis or in groups (Lawler, 1986; Peters,
1988; Storey, 1992). Furthermore, the wishes and concerns of workers may
vary, and so management may be better able to understand them and respond
to them through direct voice channels (Lawler, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Storey,
1992). These propositions might lead one to argue that direct communication
channels offer the best prospects of sustainable competitive advantage
through better information flows, in which case we might expect non-union
worker voice to be associated with lower closure probabilities.
Finally in this section, it is worth returning to trends in unionisation since
the 1980s, discussed in the Introduction. It is often assumed that in a period
in which unions lost influence both within the national polity and within the
world of work, where management continued to deal with unions it was
largely a matter of form. There is case study evidence that in some instances,
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 13
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unions were reduced to the role of legitimising to the workforce the changes
that management wished to make (Brown et al, 1998). It is conceivable that
unions may have become so weak during the 1990s that they had little or no
influence over labour costs and workplace performance. One commentator
has suggested that collective bargaining ‘may at times constitute a hollow
shell’ (Hyman, 1997: 318) with unions increasingly ‘dominated by the
employer, with no independent representation of workers’ interests’ (Hyman,
1997: 314).
In fact, evidence from analyses of the Workplace Employee Relations
Survey 1998 (WERS98) for union effects on labour costs and performance is
mixed. By 1998, unions had no significant effect on workplace financial
performance (Addison and Belfield, 2000; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001).
However, Forth and Millward (2000) find evidence of a sizeable union wage
‘mark-up’ for some forms of unionism.9 These two findings are incompatible
if one starts from the premise that the wage mark-up comes at the expense of
normal profits, but it would be consistent with the hypothesis that unions
extract concessions when excess profits are available.
It appears that unions do continue to have an influence on workplace
outcomes in specific circumstances. This should not be so surprising. The
decline in unionisation in the economy as a whole does not necessarily entail
a loss of union influence where they continue to operate. As Millward et al
(2000: 179) note:
‘An alternative possibility was that it was the weakest examples of
workplace unionism that had disappeared; in this case, the unions’
“batting average” would have improved, since a higher proportion of
the surviving ones would be “strong”.’
What Millward et al (2000: 179–83) go on to show is that union strength
varies widely across unionised workplaces. It is therefore important for our
purposes to go beyond the average effect of union recognition on workplace
outcomes to explore variance in outcomes arising from the bargaining
strength of employers, unions and employees in general under different
circumstances. This leads us to consider the effect of unions according to
their strength on the ground, their coverage of workers, and the nature of
bargaining arrangements.
14 / Alex Bryson
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wages, or proxy the union mark-up at the workplace. Where we identify union effects on
closure we can only infer that the rent-seeking behaviour of unions is one possible cause.
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2.2 The data
To analyse the probability of workplace closure over the period 1990 to 1998
we use data from the 1990–98 WIRS Panel. The level of observation is the
workplace, namely a place of employment at a single address or site. All the
workplaces interviewed in WIRS90 were followed up to establish whether
they had closed by 1998 or survived. The WIRS90 cross-section survey from
which the panel is drawn is based on a nationally representative sample of
workplaces with 25 or more employees both at the time the sample was
drawn from the Census of Employment 1987, and at the time of interview in
1990. Workplaces that did not meet the 25-employee threshold at both these
points in time are excluded from the analysis. Consequently, the sample
generalises to a population of workplaces with at least 25 employees at the
beginning and end of the period 1987–90.10
Workplaces were selected for WIRS90 differentially from the 1987
Census of Employment across workplace size bands, where size is measured
by employment. Large workplaces were over-sampled and some industries
were under-sampled. To compensate for these inequalities in selection the
data are weighted in all analyses by a probability weight that is the inverse of
sample selection (Millward et al, 1992: 380–381).
Our analyses use four data sources. The first is the management interview
in 1990, conducted face-to-face with the most senior workplace manager
responsible for employee relations. This was supplemented by a pre-interview
self-completion questionnaire providing workforce data that might have
involved interrogating records. Interviews were conducted in 2061
workplaces with a response rate of 83 per cent.11
These two data sources provide most of our independent variables for
analysis, discussed in Sections 2.3–2.5. The third source was the sampling
frame based on the 1987 Census of Employment. This contains banded
workplace size (number of employees) in 1987 that has been used in the
analyses, together with information on sample stratification used in our
multivariate analyses (see below).
Our final data source is the information on workplace outcomes in 1998
compiled from survey interviewers’ contacts with workplaces as part of the
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 15
10 Research in the United States indicates that firms’ (as opposed to workplaces’) exit rates
peak at around three years, and decline steadily thereafter (Troske, 1992). More generally,
research indicates high ‘infant mortality’ among entrants and among small firms (Caves, 1998:
1954–59). This suggests that our sample of 1987–90 survivors with at least 25 employees will
understate closure rates in the economy as a whole.
11 Subsequent data checks revealed 27 observations that had mistakenly been identified as
workplaces when, in fact, they had been larger or smaller than a single workplace. These were
dropped from all analyses.
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second wave of the panel. The outcome codes provide the information to
identify workplace closure. A random sample of 1301 1990 workplaces was
issued for the panel follow-up in 1998. For these workplaces, information on
closure and shrinkage was collected by telephone inquiries prior to interview-
ers seeking interviews at those workplaces. The same telephone inquiry was
also conducted on 132 workplaces that formed part of the panel reserve
sample, and on the remaining 628 workplaces that were not selected from the
1990 cross-section data file. Contact with these 760 workplaces was limited
to establishing specific details relating to their survival status – namely, the
size of the workforce and whether the workplace had moved, changed owner-
ship, amalgamated with or split from another workplace since the 1990
interview (Airey et al, 1999). The details collected in the telephone inquiry
enabled each of the 2061 workplaces that took part in the 1990 cross-section
survey to be classified according to whether it continued in existence with 25
employees or more (1679 workplaces), was still in operation with less than
25 employees (123 workplaces) or had closed down (259 workplaces). We
defined a workplace as closed if it had not continuously employed employees
since 1990, and was not engaged in broadly similar activity to that which it
was undertaking in 1990, either at the original site or elsewhere.12
In his analysis of workplace closure, Machin (1995) used the 1984–90
WIRS Panel. Our analysis benefits from two features of the 1990–98 panel
which were not available to Machin. Firstly, whereas the 1984–90 data were
confined to the trading sector, ours cover all sectors of the economy. We there-
fore present results for the private sector (including analyses for
manufacturing and services separately) and the public sector. Secondly, our
data set is considerably larger: outcome data were only available for 704 of
the 1385 trading sector workplaces interviewed in 1984, whereas we have
outcome data for all respondents to the 1990 cross-section.
We begin by analysing workplace closure in the private sector, turning to
the public sector later.
2.3 Descriptive analyses of workplace closure in the private sector,
1990–199813
Between 1990 and 1998, 18 per cent of workplaces closed, 15 per cent shrank
below the 25-employee threshold, and the remaining 67 per cent survived
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12 See Forth (2000) Appendix A for an explanation of how various fieldwork outcome codes
were coded into closures, shrinkers, and survivors with 25 or more employees. The fieldwork
survey agency and the research team spent considerable time assessing the status of each work-
place, verifying its outcome status. We are therefore confident that our closure data are accurate.
13 All analyses are weighted to account for the probability of sample selection.
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with at least 25 employees at the end of the period.14 This section presents
descriptive information on closure rates in the private sector. Appendix Table
A1 presents closure, shrinkage and survival rates for workplaces according to
their characteristics. These characteristics are grouped as follows:
• measures of employee voice;
• workplace characteristics;
• workforce characteristics;
• nature of product market; and
• workplace performance.
Below we briefly introduce some of the independent variables used in the
multivariate analysis of closures presented later.15 We note some key findings,
focusing on closure rates, referring to characteristics in the order in which
they appear above. Explanations of terms used below appear in Appendix
Table A1.
Measures of voice
In general, the descriptive analysis indicates that the nature of worker voice
had little impact on closure rates in the private sector as a whole.
Union and non-union voice: where union voice was present, closure rates
were similar to those where there was no worker voice. They were a little
lower where there was non-union voice only.
Representative and direct voice: closure rates were lowest where there was
direct voice only. Where there was representative voice, closure rates were
similar to those in workplaces with no worker voice. This suggests that if
there was a productivity-enhancing or cost-reduction voice effect, it came
through mechanisms such as briefing groups, regular workforce meetings,
and problem-solving groups, not through the representation of worker inter-
ests to management through intermediaries.
Union presence: closure rates were marginally higher where unions were
recognised for pay bargaining, with closure rates particularly high (0.30, or
30 per cent) among workplaces with three or more recognised unions.
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 17
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15 Appendix Table A1 and our discussion is not exhaustive: it does not include our 11-category
region variable, local unemployment and vacancy rates, or disaggregated standard industrial
classifications, all of which have been used in the modelling and are discussed in the section
presenting multivariate results.
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Although strong unions may be best placed to extract higher wage premiums
from employers, thus raising their cost base and threatening their long-term
viability, there was no indication of a link between union strength and
workplace closure.16 Whether union strength was measured by the existence
of a closed shop, pre-entry closed shop, on-site union representation, higher
union density, or the presence of a formal agreement limiting management
ability to organise work, it was not associated with closure rates.17
The type of recognised union was associated with differing closure rates.
Where recognised unions only represented manual workers at the workplace,
the closure rate was 0.26, compared to a closure rate of 0.15 among
workplaces with unions representing non-manual workers only. Where a
recognised union contained manual and non-manual workers, the closure
rate was 0.20. Of course, a workplace may contain all three types of union,
or any combination. Closure rates were highest (0.32) where a workplace
contained all three types of union, reflecting the association with multi-
unionism noted above. Where the only unions present represented manual
workers only, the closure rate was 0.28, compared to 0.08 where the only
unions present represented non-manual workers. It is not immediately
obvious why this should be so, but there are several possibilities. Manual
worker unions are more likely to be present in traditional industries with
high concentrations of manual workers. These industries, including heavy
industries that have been in decline and industries characterised by lower
capital investment, had higher closure rates.18 In his descriptive analyses,
Machin (1995) found that trading sector workplaces with manual unions
and high percentages of manual workers had high closure rates in the 1980s,
although these effects were not statistically significant when controlling for
other factors.
Unionised workplaces may have a higher probability of closure than non-
unionised workplaces, not by virtue of their own union arrangements, but
because they are located in a highly unionised sector of the economy with
18 / Alex Bryson
16 In the main, union strength was not associated with closure or survival rates. This suggests
that the evolutionary model of union decline, in which the ‘fittest’ unions survived, is not appli-
cable.
17 In contrast, evidence for the United States indicates that although, on average, unionisation
does not increase the likelihood of firm closure, the likelihood of closure rises with the percent-
age of workers in union membership (Freeman and Kleiner, 1999).
18 So, for example, 21 per cent of workplaces with recognised manual-only unions were
located in the Metal Goods sector, and another 19 per cent were located in ‘Other manufactur-
ing’. These had closure rates of 0.23 and 0.31 respectively. By contrast, only 9 per cent of
workplaces with recognised non-manual-only unions were located in Metal Goods and 7 per
cent in Other Manufacturing. 40 per cent of those with non-manual-only unions were located
in Banking, Finance, Insurance and Business Services, where closure rates were only 0.10.
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high closure rates. To account for this possibility we constructed an indicator
of the proportion of workers in union membership at the two-digit standard
industrial classification level. Closure rates were identical for workplaces in
low and high-density sectors.
Bargaining arrangements: bargaining arrangements can affect the likelihood
of workplace closure because they reflect union bargaining power. If workers
are close substitutes for one another, they may do better by joining forces in
either a single union or joint bargaining arrangement, helping them to avoid
‘divide and rule’ tactics by the employer. However, if groups of workers are
highly complementary, each group could be more powerful under separate
bargaining if the employer needs all groups to maintain production.
Therefore, it is argued that complementary workers may choose separate
bargaining, while substitutable workers will choose joint bargaining (Horn
and Wolinsky, 1988). Machin et al (1993) found that in the early 1980s,
workplaces with multi-unionism and separate bargaining arrangements paid
higher wages than those with joint bargaining or single unions, and that
separate bargaining was associated with lower financial performance and
more strike-proneness. Forth and Millward (2000), using matched
employer–employee data from WERS98, found the union wage premium of
roughly 10 per cent attaching to multi-unionism. This did not differ signifi-
cantly between single-table and separate bargaining arrangements, but there
was no wage premium associated with single unionism, relative to non-union
workplaces. However, Bryson and Wilkinson (2001) found bargaining
arrangements had no significant effect on financial performance in 1998.
These findings suggest that bargaining arrangements are unlikely to have an
impact on workplace closure but, if they do, closure rates may rise in the
presence of multi-unionism. In fact, closure rates varied little with the number
of bargaining units at the workplace, but they were considerably higher where
unions bargain jointly. This is consistent with the hypothesis that unionised
workers are substitutable and that they therefore derive more bargaining
power through joint negotiation than by bargaining as separate groups.
Although unions may curb their wage demands where they are concerned
about the employment consequences of their claims, there is no indication
that workplaces in which unions bargain over staffing levels or recruitment
were any less likely to close than those who only bargain over wages. Indeed,
in the handful of private sector workplaces where unions negotiated over
recruitment but not staffing levels, closure rates were very high (0.41).19
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19 There were only 17 unweighted cases in the private sector where unions bargained over
recruitment but not staffing levels.
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Workplace characteristics
Closure rates were lower among larger workplaces, which is where unions
were more prevalent. They were much higher in manufacturing and extrac-
tion than in the service sector. Single independent workplaces had lower
closure rates than workplaces belonging to larger organisations. Despite
concerns about the ability of foreign-owned multinationals to relocate their
operations outside the UK with ease, UK-owned workplaces had higher
closure rates than foreign-owned workplaces. Workplace age was not associ-
ated with closure rates.
Workforce characteristics
Closure rates were lower among workplaces that use fixed-term and short-
term contract workers compared to those that did not, perhaps because it
provided workplaces with the ability to adjust employment levels at lower
cost.20 Closure rates fell with higher percentages of female employees and
part-time workers. Closure rates fell with higher proportions of non-manual
employees, a finding consistent with non-manual workers continuing to
increase their relative employment share (Machin, 1994).
Nature of product market
Workplaces will be more able to share rents with workers without a long-
term risk of closure where there are large rents available in their product
market. The low closure rates among workplaces dominating their market
with no other competitors support this contention. However, there was no
difference in closure rates between those with one to five competitors and
those with six or more. As might be expected if an organisation is heavily
reliant on revenue from a small range of products, closure rates were lower
among those with diversified products or services. Those selling or producing
a single product or service had the highest closure rates. Although closure
rates varied with the location of the market, it is not obvious why they should
be lowest among those operating in a local market yet highest among those
operating in regional markets.
Workplace performance
Performance in 1989–90 was strongly associated with subsequent closure
rates, with workplaces doing well in 1990 less likely to close. Closure rates
were lower in workplaces that reported financial performance above average
for their industry, compared to those reporting average or below average
20 / Alex Bryson
20 Workplaces using flexible labour were also less likely to reduce the size of their labour force:
shrinkage rates were 0.10 among those using short-term and fixed-term contracts, compared to
0.15 among those who did not.
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performance. Workplaces reporting operating at considerably below full
capacity were more likely to have subsequently closed than workplaces
reporting operating at full capacity or somewhat below full capacity. These
findings confirm Machin’s (1995) findings for the trading sector in the 1980s.
Where the value of sales had risen in the period 1989–90, closure rates were
lower than where sales were reported to be falling or stable. Finally, where
employment was reported to have risen by at least 5 per cent over 1989–90,
closure rates were much lower than where employment was reported to be
stable or falling.21
2.4 Multivariate analyses of workplace closure in the private sector,
1990–98
The descriptive analysis identifies some differences in closure rates according
to the nature and extent of worker voice present at the workplace. However,
the descriptive analysis showed other workplace characteristics were also
associated with closure rates. To establish whether voice effects have any
independent effect on closure, it is necessary to control for these other charac-
teristics using multivariate analysis.
The closure indicator is a discrete (0–1) variable, with 1 = closure and 0
= non-closure.22 We estimate a set of probit models of workplace closure to
establish the independent effect of worker voice on closure, controlling for a
range of other variables.23
Analyses take account of the complex survey design allowing results to be
generalised to the workplace population from which the sample was drawn.
Firstly, all models are run on data weighted by the inverse of the workplace’s
sampling probability. As well as allowing the results to be generalised to the
population from which the sample is drawn, the use of probability weights
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21 Other research has established links between employment trends in one period and closure
in the next period. Using data for Wisconsin, USA, for the period 1978–87, Troske (1996:
726–727) shows that in both manufacturing and services ‘firms experience a fairly steady
decline in the mean rate of growth starting six years prior to exit, with the biggest drop in
growth starting three years prior to exit’.
22 Non-closure is not synonymous with survival in our panel sample, since some workplaces
shrink below the 25-employee threshold necessary for inclusion in the panel in 1998.
Therefore, when we present selection adjusted models for employment growth in Section 3, our
first stage model estimates survival in the sample rather than non-closure (survival or shrink-
age).
23 The procedure assumes an unobserved, or latent, index – in this case the propensity for
workplace closure – which is a linear function of the explanatory variables in the model plus an
error term. The 0–1 indicator is modelled using the standard normal distribution function to
compute the closure probability, the probit ensuring that predictions of closure lie within the
0–1 interval (Kennedy, 1998: 237–239).
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also guards against estimation bias which can arise through differential
sample selection probabilities.24 Secondly, we employ the Huber-White robust
variance estimator that produces consistent standard errors in the presence of
heteroscedasticity.25 Thirdly, we obtain accurate standard errors by taking
account of sample stratification.
For simplicity, we present a selection of models focusing on a subset of
voice measures, but we comment on other models. The main text reports
changes in the estimated probability of closure for different types of
workplace arising from infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous
variable, and for changes in the probability of closure for switches in the
value of discrete variables. So, for example, we can see the marginal effect of
a change from non-union to union status for ‘like’ workplaces sharing the
mean characteristics of the estimation sample.26
Full models for the private sector are appended.
To test the robustness of results, we assess the significance of voice effects
in the presence of different sets of control variables. We use five specifications
described in Table 2.1. Initially voice measures were entered into models
alone. Then the model was built up with the gradual addition of control
variables. There are two reasons why voice effects may alter with the addition
of further controls. The first is that the new controls have an impact on voice
effects. The second is that since the addition of controls reduces the sample
for estimation, as workplaces with missing data are excluded from the
equations, voice effects may vary with different subsamples. We test for this
by rerunning the models where most observations have no missing data on
the more restricted samples.
These models are predictive in the sense that they use information
collected in 1990 to predict subsequent workplace closure. Controls measure
conditions at 1990 or, in the case of performance and employment change
measures, in the period 1989–1990. It is therefore reasonable to draw causal
inferences about the variance in workplace closure using these 1990 predic-
22 / Alex Bryson
24 Differential sampling fractions can result in standard estimator biases (Skinner, 1997). The
weights account for all variation in sampling probabilities, thus eliminating differential
sampling probability as a possible source of estimation bias.
25 This procedure uses pseudo-likelihood methods, the point estimates being those from a
weighted ‘likelihood’ which is not the distribution function for the sample. Thus, standard
likelihood-ratio tests are not valid (STATA Manual, Release 6, Volume 4, 1999). The F statistic
reported for each model is a Wald test based on the robustly estimated variance matrix.
26 The marginal union effects are derived from the probit model Pr[Ci=1]=Φ(Xiβ+δUi) where
Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function. Ui is the relevant union variable and  denotes
the other controls. The marginal effects are computed as ∆U = Pr[Ci=1] / Ui=1] – Pr[Ci=1 / Ui =
0] = Φ(Xiβ+δ) – Φ(Xiβ) with Xi evaluated at weighted sample means. Evaluating X at the
sample means gives a ceteris paribus union effect on the probability of workplace closure.
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tors. However, if we accept that workplace performance may be a function of
worker voice, as our discussion in Section 2.2 suggests, then the workplace
performance measures in Model 4 may be endogenous with respect to the
estimation of worker voice on closure; that is, workplace financial perform-
ance may not be wholly independent of union status. This may lead to bias in
estimating the effects of worker voice.27 Where the voice coefficients altered
markedly with their inclusion in the model, we comment on this.
Results
Union recognition and strength: we begin by focusing on union recognition
as an indicator of worker voice (Table 2.2). Across all five model specifica-
tions, the effect of union recognition is positive but not statistically
significant.28 Therefore, unionised workplaces were no more likely to have
closed than non-unionised workplaces during the 1990s. However, the
probability of workplace closure does rise significantly with higher industry-
level union density.29
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 23
27 Assuming unionisation damages workplace performance, incorporating workplace perform-
ance in our models would lead to an underestimation of any positive effect of unionisation on
workplace closure, since some of that effect is captured by the workplace performance variables.
28 Unionisation raises the probability of workplace closure by between 1.7 and 5.0 per cent
according to the model specification, but the effect is not statistically significant. In other
words, across ‘like’ workplaces sharing the mean characteristics of the estimation samples, the
effect of switching to union recognition is small and statistically non-significant.
29 Other controls have predicted effects. Closure probabilities are lower among larger
workplaces; those growing over the period 1989–90; where the workplace faces no other
competitors; where the workplace has diversified production; where the workplace is perform-
ing well in 1990; and where the workplace uses fixed-term contracts.
Table 2.1: Model specifications for private sector closure analysis
Model Controls used
Model 1 No controls
Model 2 Industry-level union density; log employment size in 1990; % non-manual
employees; whether workplace is single independent workplace or
belongs to larger organisation; region; two-digit standard industrial
classification (1980) 
Model 3 As Model 2 plus product market variables and labour deployment
variables: if use short-term or fixed-term contracts; if no single product or
service accounts for 25% or more of sales; if no competitors
Model 4 As Model 3 plus workplace financial performance in 1989–90: if financial
performance is above average for the industry; if current premises and
equipment are operating considerably below full capacity
Model 5 As Model 2 plus if employment rose by at least 5% between 1989 and 90
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Union recognition continued to have no effect when accounting for the
presence of a closed shop and on-site union representatives.
In the United States, there is evidence that union wage effects increase
with the percentage of the workforce organised (Freeman and Medoff, 1982).
This might account for Freeman and Kleiner’s (1999) finding that the proba-
bility of workplace closure rose with union density. However, in our analysis,
union strength measures (union density, an on-site worker representative, the
closed shop, a formal union agreement restricting management ability to
organise non-managerial staff) had no significant effects.30 These findings are
in line with the descriptive analysis.
Since the theory suggests that union activity is more threatening to
survival where union wage gains are at the expense of normal profits, we
sought to identify workplaces with and without access to excess profits. We
used two measures: workplace market share, and the degree of market compe-
tition.31 Closure probabilities did not differ according to workplace market
share, or the degree of market competition faced by unionised workplaces.
Union type: Table 2.3 distinguishes between three types of union: those only
representing manual workers at the workplace; those representing non-
manual workers only; and those with both manual and non-manual members.
Model 1, which contains no control variables, reflects the descriptive findings:
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30 In line with the descriptive information in Appendix Table A1, the probability of workplace
closure did rise significantly where workplace union density was within the range 20–49 per
cent, relative to lower union density, but the finding is difficult to interpret.
31 Market share is proxied by the employment share of the workplace within its 4-digit SIC.
The market competition variable distinguished workplaces with six or more competitors from
those with fewer than six competitors.
Table 2.2: The effect of union recognition on workplace closure in the
private sector
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
dummy only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
Union 
recognition 0.033 (1.08) 0.022 (0.67) 0.032 (0.92) 0.050 (1.20) 0.017 (0.47)
Industry-level 
union density – 0.008 (2.46)* 0.007 (2.08)* 0.010 (2.01)* –0.000 (0.01)
Mean closure rate 0.181 0.181 0.183 0.185 0.181
Sample size 1417 1413 1132 776 1223
Notes: (1) full models are appended in Appendix Table A2; (2) t-statistics for significance of marginal
effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%.
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those with manual unions had a significantly higher closure rate. However,
once controls are added in Model 2, the size of the marginal effect is halved,
so that the increased probability of closure for a workplace with mean sample
characteristics rises by 6.5 per cent if it has a manual workers’ union.
Although the magnitude of this effect does not differ much in Models 3, 4,
and 5, the effect loses statistical significance. By contrast, having a non-
manual workers’ union reduces the probability of closure by between 7 and 9
per cent. This effect is significant at a 95 per cent confidence level in three of
the five models.
Of course, these types of union are mutually exclusive categories.
However, it is possible for a workplace to have more than one of these types
of union. In fact, there are eight possible combinations of union status, includ-
ing having ‘no recognised union’. Replacing the three union dummies with
these combinations, we find that for comparable workplaces with the mean
characteristics of the estimation sample, having a manual workers’ union and
no other union increases the probability of closure by 8 per cent compared to
having no recognised union at all. However, the effect is only significant at a
90 per cent confidence level. This was the only union arrangement with any
significant effect on closure.
These findings are significant for two reasons. Firstly, the effect was not
apparent in the 1980s (Machin, 1995: 60–65). Secondly, since our models
control for industrial sector and industry-level unionisation, the increased
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Table 2.3: The effect of union type on workplace closure in the private
sector
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
variable only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
Manual union 0.133 (2.95)* 0.065 (1.79) 0.061 (1.57) 0.062 (1.36) 0.051 (1.35)
Non-manual 




non-manuals 0.024 (0.63) 0.006 (0.15) 0.035 (0.82) 0.093 (1.90) 0.004 (0.09)
Industry-level 
union density – 0.009 (2.73)** 0.009 (2.50)* 0.012 (2.41)* –0.000 (0.01)
Mean closure rate 0.181 0.181 0.183 0.185 0.181
Sample size 1417 1413 1132 776 1223
Notes: (1) t-statistics for significance of marginal effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%
(2) the reference for union type is no recognised union.
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likelihood of closure in the presence of manual unions cannot be explained
purely by industrial decline in traditional, heavily unionised sectors. Nor can
it be explained by the high incidence of manual workers within the workplace
– a proxy for lower technological advancement – since we control for the
percentage of employees who are non-manual workers. Instead, the effect is
particular to the incidence of manual unions, as opposed to manual workers
per se or unions per se. An exploration of the differences between workplaces
with manual and non-manual unions revealed manual unions were weaker.
Where they operated, fewer workers were union members, a lower propor-
tion were covered by collective bargaining, and management were less likely
to say that their ability to organise staff was constrained by workers. They
were also less likely to negotiate as separate groups, perhaps reflecting substi-
tutability among manual workers making unified bargaining more attractive.
But whatever the explanation, it seems that the effect can be mitigated by
broadening the scope of union membership at the workplace, since the
presence of unions representing only non-manual workers, and those repre-
senting a broad spectrum of occupations (both manual and non-manual),
nullified the effect.
Bargaining arrangements: the number of bargaining units at a workplace did
not affect closure rates, confirming the descriptive analysis. Models excluding
competition and performance variables indicated no significant effect for
joint versus separate bargaining arrangements. However, with the introduc-
tion of these variables, including potentially endogenous performance
measures, joint bargaining was associated with higher closure rates, as
indicated by the descriptive analysis. Evaluated at the mean sample charac-
teristics, joint bargaining increased the probability of closure over the period
1990–98 by 19.3 per cent relative to similar workplaces with no pay bargain-
ing (t=2.32).
Number of recognised unions: multi-unionism may reduce workplace
efficiency through demarcation disputes, jurisdictional disputes regarding
rights to represent, membership poaching disputes, and ‘competitive
militancy’. All of these may occur, irrespective of whether the unions bargain
jointly (Dobson, 1997). It is also possible that multi-unionism may increase
productivity among heterogeneous workers if it is a superior means of
diagnosing and articulating workers’ grievances (Metcalf, et al, 1993: 9).
Modelling closure without controls, the recognition of three or more unions
was positively associated with closure. However, this effect was no longer
significant on introducing control variables.
26 / Alex Bryson
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Union and non-union voice: in recognition of the changing nature of worker
voice in Britain since the mid–1980s, we incorporated measures of union and
non-union voice. Union voice either takes the form of a recognised union or
the appointment of union representatives to a joint consultative committee.
Non-union voice includes non-union appointment to a joint consultative
committee; the existence of briefing groups; regular meetings between senior
management and the workforce; problem solving groups; or the presence of
non-union representatives where there are no union members. Where union
and non-union voice are both present, this is often referred to as ‘dual
channel’ voice. Predicted closure probabilities did not differ significantly
between workplaces according to the existence or otherwise of union and
non-union voice. Thus the 5-percentage point lower closure rate in
workplaces with only non-union voice, apparent in the descriptive analysis,
proved non-significant when controlling for other factors.
Summary
Whereas manual unions were associated with higher closure probabilities in
some models, workplaces with non-manual unions had lower closure probabil-
ities than workplaces without non-manual unions. This is despite the fact that
non-manual unions tended to be ‘stronger’ than manual unions. Where unions
represented a broad spectrum of occupations at the workplace, they did not
raise the probability of closure. In some models, single-table bargaining was
associated with higher closure rates than other bargaining arrangements,
whereas multi-unionism was not. These effects are not easily comprehensible
within the theoretical framework set out earlier. But, in general, worker voice
had little effect on workplace closure in the private sector as a whole, a finding
consistent with Machin’s (1995) analysis for the 1980s.
Higher industry-level unionisation did affect workplace closure probabil-
ities, a finding consistent with the observation that unions are more heavily
concentrated in declining industries. Although our models also contain indus-
try indicators, we have no information on other industry-level indicators that
are also liable to affect closure and which may not be related to unions, such
as technological innovation. We should therefore be cautious in interpreting
the effect of industry-level unionisation as a union effect.
2.5 Analyses of workplace closure in private manufacturing and
private services
There are four reasons why separate analyses of closure in private manufac-
turing and services are merited. Firstly, the closure rate was much higher
over the period in manufacturing than in services (25 per cent against 15 per
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cent), a finding that partly accounts for the shift towards private services in
the British economy during the 1990s.32 Separate analyses of closure in the
two broad sectors may shed light on why this was so. Secondly, there are
theoretical grounds for believing that closure processes differ across
manufacturing and services. According to dynamic theories of firm entry
and growth, firms enter an industry endowed with an underlying ability to
produce output in the industry. If firms enter with an underlying high value
for this parameter, they have high costs and low profits (Jovanovic, 1982).
Although firms can invest to improve their competitiveness (Ericson and
Pakes, 1995), higher start-up costs in manufacturing relative to services
increase the potential for miscalculating their underlying competitiveness,
raising closure probabilities.33 Thirdly, the nature of worker voice differed
across the two sectors: in private services non-union and direct voice was
more common, while union voice was more common in manufacturing.
Higher unionisation in the manufacturing sector implies a reduced threat of
unionisation to workplace survival in that sector.34 This is because in a sector
with high bargaining coverage, there will be fewer non-union produced
goods to compete with the more costly union goods (Curme and
MacPherson, 1991).35 Alternatively, non-union employers in highly
unionised sectors may choose to match wages paid by unionised employers
to keep unions out, thus reducing the union wage premium in those sectors
(Podgursky, 1986). Fourthly, despite these differences in closure rates and
the likely determinants of closure across the two sectors, this analysis has
never been conducted for Britain.
In the remainder of this section, we present results from multivariate
analyses of closure for private manufacturing, followed by private services.
The modelling technique is the same as that used above. The independent
variables entering the models are identical to those used earlier. The manufac-
turing and service sector models only differ with respect to the industry
dummies they contain.
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32 The primary reason was the higher incidence of private service workplaces among new
entrants during the 1990s (Millward et al, 2000: 18–23).
33 This theory also predicts that manufacturers will require a longer period to reach their
steady-state size, and may be more prone to substantial growth adjustments. Consistent with
this is our finding that shrinkage rates were higher among manufacturers (16 per cent against
12 per cent).
34 In our sample, 44 per cent of private sector manufacturing workplaces had recognised
unions in 1990, compared to 36 per cent of workplaces in private sector services.
35 Although competition from abroad may increase sources of non-union output.
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Workplace closure in private manufacturing
Union recognition: once again, we begin by focusing on union recognition as
an indicator of worker voice. Descriptive analyses reveal that closure rates
were 5 percentage points higher among unionised manufacturing workplaces
than they were among non-union manufacturing workplaces (Appendix Table
A3). If we turn to the models presented in Appendix Table A4, this difference
is not statistically significant in the absence of control variables (Model 1).
However, once basic controls are added, the effect of unionisation is signifi-
cant. Among ‘like’ workplaces with the mean characteristics for the
estimation sample, union recognition increased the likelihood of closure over
the period by 14.4 per cent (Table 2.4, and Appendix Table A4, Model 2).
The size of the effect drops a little with the introduction of controls for the
product market and labour deployment, but remains significant (albeit at a
90 per cent confidence level). The effect is also robust to the inclusion of
employment change between 1989 and 1990. The effect becomes statistically
insignificant with the introduction of workplace performance controls.
Although financial performance is significant, and may be capturing some of
the effect of unionisation, further checks revealed that it was the drop in the
sample size associated with the introduction of these extra controls that elimi-
nated the union effect.
Closure rates did not rise with the strength of unions. Although high
market share and operating in less competitive markets (those with fewer
than six competitors) reduced the probability of closure for non-unionised
workplaces, these made no difference to the likelihood of closure among
unionised manufacturing workplaces.
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Table 2.4: The effect of union recognition on workplace closure in private
manufacturing
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
dummy only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
Union 0.053 0.144 0.126 0.093 0.145
recognition (0.92) (2.11)* (1.79) (1.19) (2.08)*
Industry-level – –0.008 –0.007 –0.016 –0.007 
union density (1.45) (1.33) (2.59)* (1.13)
Mean closure 
rate 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.240 0.244
Sample size 626 626 536 381 569
Notes: (1) Full models are appended in Appendix Table A4; (2) t-statistics for significance of marginal
effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%
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Union type: the probability of manufacturing workplaces closing rose in the
presence of unions representing manual workers only in the workplace, and
fell in the presence of unions representing only non-manual workers. The
effects are more pronounced than they were for the whole private sector.
Among ‘like’ workplaces with mean characteristics for the estimation sample,
depending on the model specification, closure probabilities rose by between
12 and 19 per cent in the presence of a manual union, and fell by between 13
and 17 per cent in the presence of non-manual unions (Table 2.5).
We also analysed the combined effects of having more than one of these
types of union. We find that for comparable workplaces with the mean
characteristics of the estimation sample, having a manual workers’ union and
no other union increases the probability of closure by 27 per cent compared
to having no recognised union at all. Having a non-manual workers’ union
and no other union reduced the probability of workplace closure by 19 per
cent compared to having no recognised union at all.36 All other combinations
of unions had no significant effect on closure. So it is clear that in private
manufacturing, although the average effect of union recognition is to increase
the likelihood of closure, different types of union can both increase and reduce
the chances of closure.
30 / Alex Bryson
Table 2.5: The effect of union type on workplace closure in private
manufacturing
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
variable only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
Manual union 0.104 0.191 0.185 0.121 0.187
(1.59) (2.72)** (2.65)** (1.69) (2.62)**
Non–manual –0.135 –0.141 –0.161 –0.167 –0.137 
union (2.16)* (2.61)** (2.95)** (2.70)** (2.44)*
Union with 
manuals and 
non–manuals –0.030 (0.51) –0.023 (0.36) –0.034 (0.54) 0.117 (1.54) –0.031(0.47)
Industry–level 
union density – –0.008 (1.48) –0.008 (1.45) –0.015 (2.43)* –0.008 (1.20)
Mean closure rate 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.240 0.244
Sample size 626 626 536 381 569
Notes: (1) t-statistics for significance of marginal effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%;
(2) reference category for union variable is no recognised union.
36 These marginal effects are derived from a model containing the base controls (Model 2) and
the eight-category union combination variable. The effects are nearly identical with Model 3
controls which incorporate market characteristics (+26 per cent and –18 per cent respectively).
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Bargaining arrangements: closure probabilities in private manufacturing
varied with bargaining arrangements. Descriptive data presented in Appendix
Table A3, column two, suggest closures were most likely where unions
bargained with their employer as a single bargaining unit. This is born out by
the modelling. Ceteris paribus, evaluated at the mean sample characteristics,
having a single negotiating unit raised the probability of closure over the
period 1990–98 by 19 per cent relative to workplaces with no pay bargain-
ing.37 Further analysis revealed that this was a single-union bargaining effect,
rather than the result of joint negotiation among multiple unions.38 The
closure probability of private manufacturing workplaces with multiple unions
was not significantly different from the closure probability of non-unionised
workplaces, whether they negotiated jointly or separately.
So, bargaining arrangements are important in understanding closure in
private manufacturing in the 1990s. But so too was the scope of bargaining.
The union effect on closures in manufacturing was confined to instances in
which unions had no role in negotiating staffing levels or recruitment (Table
2.6). Where unions negotiated over wages but not employment, the chance of
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Table 2.6: The effect of bargaining over employment on workplace
closure in private manufacturing
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
variable only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
No negotiation 
on employment 0.082 (1.16) 0.189 (2.38)* 0.169 (2.08)* 0.097 (1.07) 0.188 (2.31)*
Negotiate 
staffing levels 0.052 (0.55) 0.134 (1.21) 0.110 (0.90) 0.224 (1.71) 0.132 (1.11)
Negotiate 
recruitment 0.048 (0.29) 0.068 (0.37) 0.044 (0.27) –0.060 (0.37) 0.071 (0.40)
Negotiate 
both –0.016 (0.19) 0.075 (0.77) 0.062 (0.61) 0.097 (0.85) 0.089 (0.85)
Industry-level 
union density – –0.008 (1.49) –0.007 (1.34) –0.018 (2.91)** –0.007 (1.23)
Mean closure rate 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.240 0.244
Sample size 626 626 536 381 569
Notes: (1) t-statistics for significance of marginal effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%;
(2) Reference category for negotiation is no union recognition
37 This effect is derived from the model with basic controls (Model 2) and is significant at a 5
per cent confidence level. With Model 3, the effect is 16.7 per cent.
38 Single-union workplaces made up 81 per cent of private manufacturers with a single
bargaining unit.
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closure was 17–19 per cent higher than a ‘like’ workplace sharing the mean
characteristics of the estimation sample but with no recognised unions.
Where unions negotiated over staffing levels, recruitment, or both,
manufacturing workplace closure probabilities were not significantly differ-
ent from those of non-unionised manufacturers. This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis that unions moderate their wage claims where their role
in bargaining over staffing and recruitment makes them more sensitive to the
employment consequences of those claims.
Number of recognised unions: we have already noted the increased likelihood
of workplace closure in private manufacturing associated with single-union-
ism, and the non-significance of bargaining arrangements where multiple
unions operate. This is confirmed when we replace the bargaining arrange-
ment variable with a variable identifying the number of recognised unions at
the workplace. Where there was a single recognised union, the chances of
closure were significantly higher than for comparable non-union workplaces.
But where there were two or more unions the likelihood of closure was no
different.39 It is difficult to account for this single-union effect, but single-
unionism is not a proxy for union strength. In fact, the reverse is the case.
Single-union workplaces had weaker unions than multiple-union workplaces:
they had lower union membership, fewer employees covered by collective
bargaining, and the union was less likely to have a representative on- or off-
site. Together with results on the effects of different types of union, this result
suggests that it is unions representing a narrow range of occupations that
increase the chances of workplace closure in manufacturing, possibly by
pursuing sectional interests to the detriment of the workplace as a whole.
Union and non-union voice: there is a further qualification to the association
between workplace closure in the private manufacturing sector and unionisa-
tion. Union voice, whether in isolation, or in combination with non-union
voice, did not significantly increase the likelihood of closure relative to
manufacturers with no worker voice (Table 2.7). However, ‘dual channel’
arrangements did raise the probability of closure relative to non-union voice
only. This is a significant finding, nevertheless, since nearly four-fifths of
unionised workplaces had ‘dual channel’ voice by 1998 (Bryson, 2000).
It is not obvious why dual channel voice is most strongly associated with
an increased likelihood of closure. There may be some incompatibility
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39 In Model 2, compared to having no recognised unions, the marginal effect associated with
single-unionism is 19 per cent (t=2.34) and 18 per cent (t=2.18) in Model 3. Among
workplaces with two or more recognised unions the corresponding effects were 0.08 (t=0.94)
and 0.06 (t=0.70).
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between these two types of voice regime, although research on the impact of
voice on employee perceptions of management points in the other direction
(Bryson, 2000). This might occur, for instance, if unions were antagonistic to
non-union voice and operated differently in its presence – for example, by
diverting their energies to undermining it, rather than focusing attention on
the needs of its members and the workplace. Alternatively, the presence of
two voice channels may be cumbersome, leading to lower efficiency, increas-
ing the rate of closure.
The association between non-union voice only and lower workplace
closure may partly account for the increased incidence of this type of
workplace arrangement by 1998, though the main reason for its increased
incidence is its adoption by new workplaces (Millward et al, 2000: 121–6).
The models confirm the descriptive findings that manufacturers with non-
union voice only were less likely to close than those with ‘dual channel’ voice,
and those with no worker voice at all, although this second finding is only on
the margins of statistical significance in one of our models with controls.
Among comparable workplaces with the mean characteristics of the estima-
tion sample, a switch from ‘dual channel’ to non-union voice would reduce
the likelihood of closure by between 18 and 28 per cent, depending on the
model specification.40
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Table 2.7: The effect of union and non-union voice on workplace closure
in private manufacturing
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
variable only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
Union voice 
only 0.600 (0.68) 0.140 (1.47) 0.122 (1.26) 0.227 (1.95) 0.116 (1.18)
Dual channel 0.179 (2.49)* 0.282 (3.16)** 0.253 (2.74)** 0.117( 1.33) 0.283 (3.08)**
No voice 0.165 (1.65) 0.171 (1.72) 0.117 (1.20) –0.006 (0.04) 0.139 (1.37)
Industry union 
density – –0.008 (1.56) –0.007 (1.38) –0.017 (2.80)** –0.006 (1.14)
Mean closure rate 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.240 0.244
Sample size 623 623 534 379 566
Notes: (1) the reference category is non-union voice only; (2) t-statistics for significance of marginal
effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%; (3) Non-union voice includes appointments to a
JCC, other than through the union; briefing groups; regular meetings between the workforce and
senior management; problem solving groups; the presence of non-union representatives where there
are no union members; (4) reference category for union voice is non-union voice only.
40 The non-significance of the effect in Model 4 is accounted for by the reduction in the
sample size, rather than the introduction of the workplace performance measures.
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Workplace closure in private services
The descriptive analysis in Appendix Table A3 suggests that whereas worker
voice played an important part in explaining workplace closure in private
manufacturing, this was not the case in the private service sector. Closure rates
did not vary very much across the range of voice indicators, although they were
higher in the presence of three or more recognised unions, and a little higher
where the union represented only manual workers. Closure rates also varied
with bargaining arrangements, with joint bargaining associated with signifi-
cantly higher closure rates than separate bargaining and single-union bargaining.
None of these differences remained significant when controlling for other
factors.41 One reason for this is the lower incidence of unionisation in the
private service sector. Thus, for instance, only 5 per cent of private service
workplaces had three or more unions (compared to 10 per cent of manufactur-
ing workplaces), and only 1 per cent had joint negotiations (compared to 5 per
cent in manufacturing). Consequently, it is difficult to estimate precisely the
impact of these practices on closure in the private service sector.42 The technical
difficulty in deriving precise estimates is also exacerbated by the relatively low
incidence of workplace closure in private services mentioned at the beginning
of this section. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the private service sector
models is actually greater than that for private manufacturing.
However, this is by no means the whole story. As Appendix Table A6
shows, over one-third of private service sector workplaces had recognised
unions, seven in ten had some form of non-union voice, and direct worker
voice was present in two-thirds of cases. Why was it that voice effects on
closure were largely absent in private services? Since the theory referred to
above implies that workplace unionisation in a lowly-unionised environment
might damage competitiveness more than being unionised in a highly-
unionised environment, one might have expected unionised service sector
workplaces to face higher chances of closure. One possibility is that workers
are less able to push up wages in the service sector. Although our data indicate
that unions in the service sector appeared to have bargaining power equiva-
lent to that in the manufacturing sector,43 there is some evidence to support
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41 Appendix Table A6 presents models estimating the effect of union recognition on closure in
private services to illustrate effects in the sector. These models are comparable to those for
private manufacturing presented in Appendix Table A5. The models confirm our expectation
that determinants of closure differ markedly across the sectors.
42 With few observations, estimates are subject to large standard errors so that even large
coefficients do not reach statistical significance.
43 Where unions were recognised, mean workplace union density was almost identical across
the two sectors (64 per cent in manufacturing and 63 per cent in services). Bargaining coverage
was actually higher in unionised private sector workplaces (75 per cent against 69 per cent).
This suggests that where they did exist, service sector unions had a similar potential to
influence bargaining outcomes.
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this contention from Hildreth (1999). Using individual-level data, he finds
that during the first half of the 1990s, the union wage premium declined in
the private service sector, but ‘was maintained and may even have increased’
(p29) in the production sector. If there is a larger wage differential in
manufacturing arising from unionisation, this could explain the greater
impact of unions on closure in manufacturing relative to services.
An alternative hypothesis is that private service sector workplaces are
only unionised where employers can afford unionisation, that is, where they
can command high rents. There is little support for this possibility, since the
incidence of union recognition did not vary significantly with workplace
market share.
One union-related effect is worthy of comment. Workplace closure proba-
bilities rose where service sector workplaces commanded a low market share
(whereas market share was not a significant factor in private manufacturing).
Where workplaces with low market share recognised unions, their probabil-
ity of closure was between 11 and 17 per cent higher than the closure
probability for workplaces with the mean characteristics of the estimation
sample that recognised unions but had a high market share (Table 2.8). This
finding suggests that where excess profits are available, service sector employ-
ers can ‘afford’ unions without increasing the chances of workplace closure.
Where the workplace is in a weaker market position, there is an increased
likelihood that unions will threaten service sector workplace survival.
However, as Table 2.8 also shows, workplace closure probabilities increased
with low market share, irrespective of the presence of unions.44
Summary
On average, union recognition increased the probability of closure for
manufacturing workplaces. However, the actual impact of unionisation
depends on the nature of union representation. While the decision as to
whether or not to recognise a union is important in determining the
workplace’s future, the precise nature of arrangements for engaging with
unions is equally important. Management may be able to negate any union
effects through the adoption of particular bargaining procedures. Two
findings are of particular note. Firstly, manufacturers may benefit from the
efforts of unions representing non-manual workers. Secondly, where unions
negotiated with management over staffing levels or recruitment, the chances
of closure were no different from those of non-unionised manufacturers. This
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44 Also note that high industry-level union density is associated with increased probabilities of
workplace closure in the private service sector, whereas it was not significant in private
manufacturing. It is not obvious why this should be so.
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may be because unions moderate their wage claims where their role in
bargaining over employment makes them more sensitive to the employment
consequences of those claims.
Worker voice had no effect on workplace closure in private services.
2.6 Analyses of workplace closure in the public sector
At 7 per cent, the incidence of workplace closure during the 1990s was much
lower in the public than the private sector. The nature of workplace closure is
also qualitatively different in the public sector. Compared with the private
sector, where the closure of a workplace indicates economic failure,
sometimes of a whole enterprise, workplace closure in the public sector is a
rather different phenomenon. Virtually all public sector workplaces (and all
of those in our sample) belong to larger organisations, so that workplace
closure is likely to be part of a larger picture of change within that organisa-
tion, rather than a winding-up of its affairs. Workplace closure in the public
sector is more likely to involve a change of location or a transfer of business,
rather than a discontinuation of the provision of services.
Furthermore, although the public sector was much more heavily
unionised than the private sector throughout the 1990s, negotiations about
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Table 2.8: The effect of union recognition in low and high market share
private service sector workplaces
M1: union M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M2 + 
variable only controls product workplace employment
market performance change, 
1989–90
No union, 
low share –0.012 (0.23) 0.108 (2.12)* 0.110 (1.74) 0.035 (0.46) 0.141 (258)**
No union, 
high share –0.031 (0.48) 0.048 (0.65) 0.172 (1.60) 0.105 (0.89) 0.089 (1.00)
Union, low 
share –0.002 (0.03) 0.112 (1.95) 0.173 (2.18)* 0.153 (1.80) 0.153 (2.18)*
Industry union 
density – 0.004 (2.28)* 0.006 (2.70)** 0.003 (0.97) .005 (2.61)**
Mean closure rate 0.152 0.152 0.153 0.158 0.148
Sample size 791 787 568 379 619
Notes: (1) the reference category is union recognition with high market share; (2) t-statistics for
significance of marginal effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%; (3) Models exclude log
employment size in 1990 since the market share variable uses this information to proxy market share
as employment share in the relevant 4-digit SIC. High market share is market share above –2.53 the
log of employment share.
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pay and employment conditions were conducted against a backdrop of spend-
ing limits and reviews, rather than what the market would bear. Consequently,
theories regarding the impact of unions on economic viability that inform our
understanding of workplace closure in the private sector have little relevance
for the public sector.45
Nevertheless, an analysis of workplace closure in the public sector is
appropriate for three reasons. Firstly, we are aware of no other studies which
have tackled the issue before. Secondly, since our primary concern is the effect
of worker voice on workplace closure, it would be odd to ignore the half (49
per cent) of all unionised workplaces that were in the public sector in 1990.
Thirdly, worker voice is likely to have some effect on the operation of public
sector workplaces because it is so pervasive. Whereas one-fifth of private
sector workplaces had no worker voice, worker voice was present in every
public sector workplace (Appendix Table A6). The nature of that voice also
differed in the public sector. Dual channel voice was much more prevalent,
and unionism was qualitatively different in the public sector. Public sector
unionism was characterised by multi-unionism, separate bargaining arrange-
ments, a high incidence of on-site union representation, high union density,
and high collective bargaining coverage. These features of public sector union-
ism might lead one to suspect that at the beginning of the 1990s, public sector
unionism was stronger than private sector unionism. However, this changed
in the course of the 1990s, when public sector unionism declined in strength
at a greater rate than private sector unionism (Millward et al, 2000: 180–3).
This analysis of workplace closure in the public sector is necessarily
exploratory, since there is no clear theory to guide us. This can make it diffi-
cult to interpret results. However, as noted in Section 2.1, voice may have
both positive and negative effects on employee performance, motivation and
commitment, as well as organisational performance. These voice effects are
just as pertinent in the public sector as they are in the private sector.
The modelling technique is identical to that described for the private
sector analysis in the previous section. We present ‘best fitting’ models for the
public sector, with five different specifications, described in Table 2.9. These
are not directly comparable with the private sector models because different
factors emerged as significant determinants of closure in the private sector.
Although the coefficient was positive throughout, union recognition was
not significantly associated with workplace closure in the public sector.
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45 Despite trends towards market-testing, contracting-out and public–private partnerships, it
remains the case that public sector workplaces do not face the rigours of the marketplace in the
way that private sector workplaces do. Many public-sector owned workplaces do not charge
customers for their goods or services or, if they do, they often hold a monopoly position.
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However, relative to single unionism, having three or more recognised unions
increased the likelihood of closure, confirming descriptive analyses in
Appendix Table A7. Without controls, the likelihood of closure among ‘like’
public sector workplaces with mean characteristics for the sample rose by 6
per cent if they had three or more recognised unions, compared to those with
none or one recognised union. Once basic controls were introduced, the
difference between no union and three or more unions became statistically
insignificant. However, relative to non-unionism, single unionism was associ-
ated with a reduced closure probability of 2 per cent. This was also the only
effect to emerge when we estimated the effect of alternative bargaining
arrangements on closure. The type of worker covered by the union also
mattered. In contrast to findings for the private sector (Table 2.3), unions
representing non-manual workers only were associated with higher closure
probabilities. Evaluated at the sample mean, the marginal increase in closure
probabilities for a workplace with a non-manual union rose by between 1
and 2 per cent, depending on the model specification.46 Once workforce
composition controls were added, both non-manual and manual unions were
found to increase the probability of closure by around 1 per cent for
workplaces with mean characteristics.47
Descriptive analyses show that closure rates were particularly high in the
public sector where management faced a strong worker voice, in the form of
a closed shop, or worker behaviour constraining management’s ability to
organise staff (Appendix Table A7).48 Formal agreements limiting manage-
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Table 2.9: Model specifications for public sector closure analysis
Model Controls used
Model 1 No controls
Model 2 Industry-level union density; log employment size in 1990; % non-manual
employees; region; six industry dummies
Model 3 As Model 2 plus age of workplace
Model 4 As Model 3 plus % female employees; % part-time workers
Model 5 As Model 4 plus if employment fell by at least 5% between 1989 and
1990
46 The effect is significant at a 99 per cent confidence level.
47 The emergence of this negative effect of manual unions, which was also apparent when
employment change in 1989–90 was introduced, was due to the addition of the new controls,
not to the reduction in sample size which their introduction entailed.
48 The closed shop and worker limitation differences are statistically significant at a 99 per
cent confidence level, whereas the formal agreement difference is significant at a 95 per cent
confidence level.
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ment ability to organise staff were also associated with higher closure rates.
Although the closed shop effect was not significant when controlling for other
factors, worker limitations on management’s ability to organise work
increased the chances of closure by between 1 and 3 per cent for workplaces
with mean characteristics for the sample (Table 2.9).49 These limitations –
which include actions by union members, union representatives, non-union
workers, and formal agreements between management and unions – might
increase the chances of closure where management view a particular
workforce as troublesome. Alternatively, managers facing potential closure
may have been more sensitive to the opposition of workers at the time of
interview, in which case the perception of worker limitations merely reflects
the ongoing closure process. This might explain why the effect loses its signif-
icance once we account for declining employment in the year prior to
interview (Model 5 in Table 2.9).
Non-union voice had no significant effect on public sector workplace
closure, either in isolation or in combination with union voice.
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49 Full models are appended in Appendix Table A9. Note that these models confirm that deter-
minants of closure differ markedly across the public and private sectors. For instance, closure is
associated with young workplaces in the public sector, whereas age is not significant in the
private sector; closure probabilities are higher in the public sector where there is a higher
percentage of female workers, and where there are fewer part-timers. Both factors are not
significant in the private sector. Equally, some effects are similar, notably the lower probability
of closure with size of workplace and employment growth in the preceding period.
Table 2.9: The effect of worker limitations on workplace closure in the
public sector
M1: limit M2: basic M3: M2 + M4: M3 + M5: M4 + 
dummy only controls workplace % female employment
age and % change, 
part-time 1989–90
Worker
limitations 0.074 (2.10)* 0.036 (2.54)* 0.027 (2.16)* 0.011 (1.81) 0.008 (1.35)
Mean closure 
rate 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Sample size 614 614 600 494 407
Notes: (1) t-statistics for significance of marginal effects in parentheses. * = sig at 5%, ** = sig at 1%;
(2) Full models are appended in Appendix Table A8; (3) Industry union density omitted from
summary table because always non-significant.
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Summary
On average, unionised public sector workplaces were no more likely to close
than their non-unionised counterparts. Perhaps this is not surprising, since
unionisation was pervasive in the public sector (88 per cent of public sector
workplaces recognised unions in 1990). Nevertheless, worker voice did affect
closure probabilities. Closure was more likely in the presence of non-manual
unions and, in some models, with the presence of manual unions. Closure
probabilities were also greater where unions were strong enough to limit
management’s ability to organise staff. It appears that public sector closures
in the 1990s were more likely to occur in workplaces with three or more
recognised unions.
Although these effects were statistically significant, they were small
relative to the worker voice effects recorded in the private sector. This might
be due to the smaller probability of workplace closure in the public sector.
2.7 Summary of findings on workplace closure
Broadly speaking, workplace closures during the period 1990 to 1998 were
little affected by whether workplaces had union representation in 1990. In
the private sector, workplace performance, market conditions, workforce
composition and structural features of the workplace, such as size and owner-
ship, were far more important. However, the impact of unions was clearly
discernible in private sector manufacturing. Closure in this sector was more
likely where there had been unions representing a section of the workforce,
such as only manual workers, and where unions were excluded from negoti-
ating with management about employment matters such as recruitment and
staffing levels. Where representation and negotiating arrangements were
comprehensive, the potential negative effects of unions were absent.
3 WORKPLACE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
In this section, we turn to the analysis of employment growth over the period
1990–98. Although, in theory – as we show in Section 3.1 – employee voice
may have both negative and positive effects on employment growth, a range
of studies have identified a negative effect of unions on employment growth.
Indeed, there has been a surprising degree of agreement about the magnitude
of the effect across countries and across time, using different methodologies to
analyse workplace-level data. For Britain, Blanchflower et al (1991) found
that, ceteris paribus, employment in the typical union workplace grew at
around three percentage points more slowly than in a typical non-union
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workplace in the early 1980s.50,51 They also report a 2.5 per cent per annum
reduction for the period 1976–80 using WIRS80 (1991: 827, footnote 13).52
Booth and McCulloch (1999) obtain very similar results for the late 1980s
with WIRS90, although they confine their analyses to private sector
workplaces. Long (1993), using private sector workplace-level data for Canada
over the period 1980 to 1985, shows that union firms grew 4 per cent more
slowly than non-union firms in both the manufacturing and non-manufactur-
ing sectors. Using a panel of Californian manufacturing plants, Leonard (1992)
finds average annual growth rates are 4 percentage points lower in union than
non-union plants over the period 1974–1980. Wooden and Hawke (2000),
using panel data for the private sector in Australia, found a negative union
effect on employment of 2.5 per cent per annum for the period 1989–95.
Our analysis lends further weight to this body of evidence showing that,
despite a decline in union strength during the 1990s, unions reduced employ-
ment growth by 3–4 per cent per annum in the private sector between 1990
and 1998. However, our analysis breaks new ground in three ways discussed
in a little more detail later:
• Unlike previous analyses for Britain, we use workplace-level panel data.
• As with our workplace closure analyses, we present analyses for the
private and public sectors separately, as well as for private manufacturing
and private services.
• Previous analyses have confined their exploration of worker voice effects
to union recognition, union density, and the existence of closed shops. We
use other dimensions of unionism, such as bargaining structures and the
number of recognised unions, plus measures of non-union voice.
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50 The authors readily admit that, although they prefer to interpret their analysis of employ-
ment levels with lagged dependent variables as an employment growth equation, their results
may also be interpreted as an autoregressive function of the level of employment.
51 These findings were disputed by Machin and Wadhwani (1991), who argued that any
negative impact of unions on employment was confined to workplaces which introduced organ-
isational change over the period 1980–84. Blanchflower et al responded to the criticism in an
appendix to their paper, showing that if one used union density as the union measure, negative
employment effects were apparent, irrespective of the presence of organisational change.
However, the differences in opinion are due to Blanchflower et al’s treatment of union density
as exogenous, whereas Machin and Wadhwani treat it as endogenous and use an instrumental
variables approach to allow for possible endogeneity bias. In any event, it seems likely that
organisational change captures part of the transmission mechanism by which unionism can lead
to employment decline – we test for this later in this section.
52 However, using firm-level panel data, Machin and Wadhwani (1991: 851) find employment
grew more quickly (2.2 per cent per annum) in unionised firms during 1977–78, but grew more
slowly in unionised firms during 1979–84 (1.8 per cent per annum). The authors conclude that
‘there is no systematic link between unions and employment growth’.
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3.1 Theory relating to employee influence over employment growth
There are at least three reasons for supposing that employment growth will
be slower in union workplaces than non-union workplaces. Firstly, it is
argued that by withholding labour supplies to raise wages, employees are
more costly for union firms than for non-union firms. Consequently, union
employers will tend to substitute capital for labour to a greater extent than
will non-union firms, thus depressing employment growth.53
Secondly, unions may impose costs on downward workforce adjustment
(through job security provisions and severance packages) which would make
union firms more reluctant than non-union firms to expand their labour
forces. The union wage effect may also discourage hiring by making new
recruits more costly for union than non-union firms. This effect is also
predicted by insider–outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986, 1987)
which maintains that employers, keen to avoid the costs of labour turnover,
are prepared to offer experienced incumbent employees (‘insiders’) a wage
premium above the market rate at which ‘outsiders’ offer themselves. This
premium is offered to induce employees to remain at the workplace. However,
by making a workplace more attractive to work in, insider (or union) bargain-
ing power, may also lengthen average job tenure, in which case the overall
effect on employment levels is ambiguous (since recruitment rates and
turnover rates may be lower).54
Thirdly, it is argued that unions may adversely affect sales growth, thus
inhibiting employment growth. This may occur where unions lower the incen-
tive to invest in new capital since unions expropriate a portion of the rents
arising from investment, thus lowering the returns to investment relative to
non-union firms (Hirsch, 1992). Even if the will to invest is there, lower
profitability in union firms will mean that there is less internally-generated
capital available for reinvestment than in non-union firms.55 Lower profitabil-
ity in union firms also reduces the scope for price cutting in an effort to
maintain sales (Voos and Mishel, 1986). Unions may also affect sales growth
where unionised workplaces are viewed as unreliable suppliers, either because
of work stoppages or the imposition of restrictive work rules and practices
(Machin and Wadhwani, 1991).
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53 Long (1993), reviewing the literature, suggests that, although there is evidence of a strong
relationship between the size of the union wage effect and employment growth, ‘there is no
conclusive evidence that this pattern reflects a capital substitution effect’ (p 692).
55 A number of studies have identified union effects in reducing voluntary quits (for example,
Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Bryson and McKay, 1997) and dismissal rates (Cully et al, 1999: 128).
56 Empirical studies for the United States (Hirsch, 1990, 1992) and Britain (Denny and
Nickell, 1991) suggest that unionised firms do make lower investments in capital than non-
union firms. This implies that lower employment growth through capital substitution is
unlikely to explain union effects on employment.
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There are arguments to the contrary, indicating that the presence of
unions may have no effects or even positive effects on the rate of employment
growth. The first is that, although unions can raise wages, they can also raise
productivity. They may do so directly by striking productivity-enhancing
deals with employers. Indirect effects may also arise through the ‘voice’ effects
discussed earlier (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) or their ability to improve skill
levels by raising recruitment standards and encouraging employer-funded or
industry-based training. Consequently, unit labour costs may be no higher, or
even lower, in the presence of unions.
Secondly, it is usually assumed that unions and employers bargain over
wages, whereas employers set employment unilaterally, conditional on the
wage. This is known as the ‘right to manage’ model. In Britain, wages are set
at discrete intervals whereas employment is adjusted continuously. Thus,
whenever employment is changed, this change generally takes place in the
context of a predetermined wage. This is consistent with the right to manage
model, and so it has been treated as a ‘stylised fact’ in the British case (Nickell
and Wadhwani, 1991; Machin, Manning and Meghir, 1991).56 Fortunately,
our data allow us to observe directly whether unions bargain over employ-
ment as well as wages. As Table 3.1 shows, they do so in around half of all
cases, according to the reports of workplace managers.
This is important because, at least in theory, if unions and employers
bargain simultaneously over wages and employment rather than over wages
alone, the outcome is a wage–employment package conditional on their
relative bargaining power (Leontief, 1946; McDonald and Solow, 1981). In
these circumstances, employment outcomes will be ambiguous. This is
because, where unions are absent, or the ‘right to manage’ scenario obtains,
employers are likely to set employment with a predetermined wage. As such,
they will choose an employment level which is profit maximising for a given
wage (that is, employment will lie along the labour demand curve). However,
where wages and employment are jointly determined, an efficient settlement
may entail an employment level that is not ‘on’ the labour demand curve.
How far it diverges from the demand curve depends, in part, on the weight
unions place on employment.57
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56 Machin, Manning and Meghir (1991) construct a dynamic ‘right to manage’ model based
on the insight that bargaining over wages occurs repeatedly, and that current employment
decisions will affect future outcomes of wage negotiation. In the absence of unions, employers
face costs adjusting employment and do so to maximise profits subject to a given time-path for
wage adjustment. However, where unions bargain over wages, and wages are likely to be
affected by past employment, the wage is endogenous with respect to employment growth. In
other words, wages at t1 are not independent of employment change over period t1 – t2.
57 There is some evidence that unions in the United States place relatively low weight on
employment compared to wages (MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986; Wessels, 1991), but we are
aware of no such evidence for Britain.
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Thirdly, as noted in Section 2.1, unions may operate in non-competitive
product or labour markets, in which case employers can respond to their
wage demands without necessarily affecting employment.
The literature indicates that employment growth is very heterogeneous,
even within narrowly defined industrial sectors. Blanchflower and Burgess
(1996) argue that ‘it is unlikely that idiosyncratic plant-level wage changes
can account for much of these large changes’ across workplaces (p 18). They
suggest that employment growth is better understood as the labour market
consequence of product market competition, including product and process
innovation, product life cycles, and firm entry and exit, all of which ‘will
influence the evolution of the firm’s demand and output and hence employ-
ment’. Of course, employee voice has a role to play in this broader theoretical
framework as well, since the cost of labour (and therefore firm entry rates),
available skills, and management’s ability to introduce innovative production
processes are all subject to worker influence.
3.2 The data
The chosen data for our employment change analysis are the 1990–98 WIRS
Panel. The survey traced a 63 per cent stratified random sample of the
workplaces that responded to the WIRS90 survey. They were re-interviewed
at the same time as the 1998 cross-section survey. The panel survey collected
detailed information about 846 surviving workplaces employing at least 25
employees, including the size of their workforce in 1998.58 Using information
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Table 3.1: Percentage of unionised workplaces where unions negotiated
over employment in 1990
Private sector Private sector Public All
manufacturing services sector
No employment negotiations 60 64 28 45
Negotiate staffing levels 13 16 20 18
Negotiate recruitment 4 1 2 2
Negotiate staffing levels
and recruitment 23 19 50 35
Weighted N 185 347 515 1049
Unweighted N 445 368 577 1392
Note: managers were asked whether negotiations took place with the largest bargaining group for
manual workers and the largest bargaining group for non-manual workers. This does not mean to
say that unions were successful in influencing outcomes. We combine the data for manuals and non-
manuals in our measure to give us a workplace measure, so that where we identify negotiations over
employment, this may relate to manual workers, non-manual workers or both.
58 Eighty-two per cent of eligible cases responded. For further information on the 1990–98
WIRS Panel see Millward et al, 2000: 248–55.
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from these 846 establishments, we are able to examine which features and
circumstances of the workplace in 1990 are statistically associated with a net
change in the numbers employed over the following eight-year period.
The 1990–98 panel survey followed previous panel surveys that were
either largely experimental, as in the case of the 1980–84 panel, or restricted
to workplaces in industry and commerce, as in 1984–90. As well as being
larger, the 1990–98 panel survey differed from its predecessors in using a
specially designed interview schedule. Panel surveys conducted at earlier
points in the series had simply used the questionnaire being employed in the
main cross-section survey at the time. Consequently, our data set is unencum-
bered by the needs of a cross-sectional survey, and is therefore more suited to
tracking change at the level of the workplace during the period.
The use of these data marks an important advance in the analysis of
employment change in Britain. While panel analyses have been used in the
United States (Leonard, 1992) and Australia (Wooden and Hawke, 2000),
the employment change literature for Britain is largely confined to analyses of
cross-sectional data, with change measures relying on retrospective data.59
This presents three problems avoided with panel data. First, explanatory
variables are collected at the end of the period in question, making it very
difficult to make causal inferences. Secondly, recall data are subject to recall
error.60 Thirdly, as Fernie and Metcalf note in relation to their analyses for
the period 1984–1990 (1995: 404):
there is an inherent upward bias in the employment figures because
workplaces that went out of business between 1984 and 1990 obviously
cannot appear in the sample in 1990.
This is a particularly serious problem when independent variables of interest
may influence workplace closure as well as employment growth. As
Blanchflower et al (1991: 820–821) readily admit with regard to their use of
the 1984 WIRS:
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59 Blanchflower and Burgess (1996, footnote 3) tried to use the WIRS 1984–90 panel data but
were insufficiently confident of their ability to identify true panel cases. In a largely
methodological paper, Machin, Manning and Meghir (1991) use firm-level panel data from the
Datastream databank of companies quoted on the UK Stock Exchange for the period 1977–86.
Machin and Wadhwani (1991) devote one page of their article to an analysis of firm-level panel
data from the Datastream databank.
60 We use some recall data to measure workplace performance over the period 1989–1990.
This includes a measure of employment growth over the period 1989–90. We also
experimented with a banded employment levels variable for 1987 that was taken from the
Census of Employment and used to stratify the sample. Using this administrative information
to compute employment change between 1987 and 1990 produced results consistent with those
generated with the continuous 1989–90 measure.
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The results in this paper should be seen strictly as an analysis of employ-
ment movements inside continuing establishments. It is a potentially
serious weakness of our analysis that we are unable to model the selec-
tion issue.
We are able to overcome this problem by modelling the probability that
workplaces sampled in 1990 survived to 1998. Through sample selection
modelling discussed in Section 3.6 we are able to adjust our estimates of
employment change in our 1990–98 panel of continuing workplaces to
account for survival probabilities. By doing this, we are able to show the
impact of particular workplace characteristics on employment change for all
workplaces in our original 1990 sample, irrespective of their situation in 1998,
and not just those that continued to operate with 25 or more employees.
The dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the annual rate of employment change over the 7.5
year period spanning the two survey interviews in 1990 and 1998.61 This is
obtained by dividing the 1998 employment level by the 1990 level, taking the
7.5th root, and subtracting 1 from the figure. This can be written as:
7.5 E98 – 1 x 100√ E90
Some analysts have recently followed Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) in using
an employment growth measure based on the change in employment as a
percentage of the average of employment in two periods – in our case, 1990
and 1998. This is written as:
(E98 – E90) x 100
(E98 – E90)/2
However, although this measure is superior to the conventional growth
measure (change in employment as a percentage of employment in the first
period) in that it is more normally distributed (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992;
Wooden and Hawke, 2000), it does not give an accurate per annum rate of
growth. Our measure, on the other hand, accounts for the compound effect
of taking an average annual growth rate from a 7.5 year period, and is also
approximately normally distributed (Table 3.2).
Between 1990 and 1998, one-fifth (18 per cent) of private sector
workplaces closed down, while around one in seven (15 per cent) survived to
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61 The 7.5 year period is the median difference in the two survey interview dates.
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employ between 1 and 24 employees in 1998. The remaining two-thirds
continued to operate with 25 or more employees. Using our preferred
measure, employment in this last category of private sector workplaces –
those having at least 25 employees in both 1990 and 1998 – grew at a very
modest rate of one third of one per cent per annum, on average (Table 3.3).
It is perhaps surprising to note that those in manufacturing grew at a slightly
faster rate than those engaged in service activities: 0.46 per cent per annum,
compared with 0.3 per cent. The well-documented decline in manufacturing
employment occurred because the number of new entrants to the sector was
smaller and less numerous than those leaving it through closure. The number
of manufacturing jobs lost through closures was almost treble that created by
new manufacturing workplaces over the 1990s. In contrast, in the services
sector, roughly two-thirds more jobs were created through start-ups than
were lost through closures.62
3.3 Descriptive analyses of employment growth in the private sector,
1990–9863
This section presents descriptive information on employment growth rates in
private sector workplaces surviving the period 1990–98 with at least 25
employees. Appendix Table A9 shows the correlation between mean growth
rates and their 1990 characteristics grouped as follows:
• Measures of employee voice;
• Workplace characteristics;
• Workforce characteristics;
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7.5 E98 –1 x 100
E98 (E98–E90)/2 √E90
Mean 33.6 4.4 1.0
Median 3.3 3.3 0.4
Skewness (s.e.) 13.8 (0.08) 0.52 (0.08) 2.6 (0.08)
Kurtosis (s.e.) 211.4 (0.17) 2.3 (0.17) 17.7 (0.17)
Minimum –97 –188 –37
Maximum 4028 191 64
62 These figures are based on the author’s own calculations using WIRS90 and WERS98 data
for workplaces with 25 or more employees.
63 All analyses are weighted to account for the probability of sample selection.
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• Nature of product market; and
• Workplace performance.64
Below we comment on some important findings using terms already familiar
from our discussion of workplace closure.
Measures of voice
The descriptive analysis indicates that employment change in the private
sector varied markedly with worker voice, with union voice generally associ-
ated with lower growth.
Union and non-union voice: employment fell in the presence of union voice,
with the fall most rapid where union and non-union voice were present
together (–1.84 per cent per annum). Where non-union voice was present
without union voice, employment grew. Although this might indicate positive
economic benefits deriving from non-union voice, employment grew most
rapidly where there was no worker voice present.
Representative and direct voice: the association between employment decline
and representative worker voice extended to non-union representative voice in
the form of joint consultative committees. It was non-union direct voice (brief-
ing groups, regular workforce meetings and problem-solving groups) that
underlay the less adverse non-union voice effect. Where direct and representa-
tive voice existed in combination, employment fell a little over the period.
Union presence: employment fell by 1.75 per cent per annum among
workplaces with recognised unions, whereas employment grew by 1.44 per
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Table 3.3: Change in workplace employment per annum, by sector,
1990–98
Change in All All private Private Private Public
workplace workplaces sector manufacturing services sector
employment 
(% per annum)
Mean 1.00 0.34 0.46 0.30 1.48
Median 0.44 0.00 0.48 –0.24 0.85
Source: WIRS 90 and WERS 98; workplaces with 25 or more employees
64 Appendix Table A10 and our discussion is not exhaustive: it does not include our 11-
category region variable, local unemployment and vacancy rates, or disaggregated standard
industrial classifications, all of which have been used in the modelling and are discussed in the
section presenting multivariate results.
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cent per annum among non-unionised workplaces. This effect was more
pronounced in the presence of a closed shop, on-site union representation,
higher union density and higher collective bargaining coverage, and where
management were constrained by workers in their ability to organise work.
This suggests a union effect stemming from union bargaining power and
organisational strength.65 A closer look at union density and bargaining
coverage shows that the links were not linear. Substantial negative employ-
ment growth is only apparent where union density exceeds 50 per cent, and
the effect tails off with 100 per cent membership, suggesting a qualitatively
different employer–union relationship where all workers are members. Where
bargaining coverage was between 1 and 19 per cent of the workforce, growth
rates were no different from zero coverage. Above this threshold, workplaces
with higher coverage had experienced employment decline, but the effect was
not linear.
Because we have a dedicated panel survey in 1998 which tracks
workplace change in the period 1990–98, inter alia, we can observe changes
in union status. Although the number of workplaces involved is small, private
sector workplaces derecognising their union(s) between 1990 and 1998 had a
small positive annual growth rate, in contrast to the negative growth rate
experienced by other workplaces with union recognition in 1990. Conversely,
the small number newly recognising unions had smaller positive growth rates
than workplaces which remained non-unionised throughout.66
The type of union was associated with differing employment growth rates.
Workplaces recognising unions representing only non-manual workers experi-
enced declining employment at a rate of 3.08 per cent per annum, compared
with rates of –1.95 per cent where they recognised unions containing manual
and non-manual workers, and –1.27 per cent where they recognised unions
representing manual workers only. Employment declined most rapidly where
the only unions present represented only non-manual workers: in these
workplaces, employment fell by 4.26 per cent per annum.
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65 Of course, even though our measures date from the start of the employment change period
we are analysing, one could argue that workers might respond to job insecurity through
increased (or decreased) unionisation, whereupon measures such as union density and on-site
representation are endogenous. This would be the case if employment decline in the period just
prior to 1990 resulted in workers responding by setting up a union, joining the union, or
appointing an on-site representative. To check this, we looked at the association between union
measures in 1990 and employment change over the period 1989–90. With the exception of
union density above 89 per cent, none of the union measures was associated with employment
decline in that period.
66 The unweighted number of private sector workplaces derecognising unions over the period
was 36, while the unweighted number which began recognising unions was 16.
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There was little difference in employment growth rates among private
sector workplaces located in low and high union density industries.
Bargaining arrangements: the rate at which employment fell increased with
the number of unions recognised for pay bargaining, and with the number of
bargaining units management negotiated with. If fragmented bargaining was
strengthening the hand of complementary workers, one would have expected
single-table bargaining to moderate the multi-union effect, but it did not. On
the contrary, employment fell more quickly in multi-union workplaces with
joint bargaining than it did where unions negotiated separately.
Following on from our comments in Section 3.1, it does indeed appear to
be the case that union effects differ where they bargain over employment
levels as well as wages. The rate of employment decline is arrested somewhat
where unions negotiate over staffing levels, or staffing levels and recruitment.
Workplace characteristics
Our descriptive analysis confirms the common finding in the literature that
employment growth rates are lower in larger workplaces and firms (Caves,
1998; Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald, 1991; Wooden and Hawke,
2000; Leonard, 1992; Long, 1993). Since unionisation rates are higher in
larger workplaces, it is important to control for this effect in our multivari-
ate analyses.
The association between larger workplaces and lower growth is
sometimes viewed as evidence of the autoregressive nature of employment
change, with a tendency for reversion to the mean. In fact, in line with previ-
ous analyses of WIRS (Blanchflower and Burgess, 1996) and some American
analyses (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992), our data are better characterised by
persistence than mean reversion. Workplaces growing over the period
1987–90 continued to grow in the period 1990–98, while those shrinking in
the first period did so in the second. This supports Blanchflower and Burgess’
(1996:10) contention that ‘establishments will typically continue to grow or
decline rather than fluctuate around a particular employment level’.
Firm-level data suggest firms grow quickly early in their lives, with
growth rates then declining with age (Caves, 1998; Troske, 1996). Since our
workplaces were in existence for at least three years before the first interview
in 1990, the growth rates we observe do not include the initial growth spurt
that many will have experienced. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of a
faster growth in the 1990s among workplaces aged under five years at the
time of the first survey in 1990.
Following Blanchflower and Burgess (1996), we account for the possibil-
ity that workplaces belonging to larger organisations may experience greater
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job turnover than single independent workplaces as the firm reallocates a
given set of jobs between its establishments. The net effect of this in the 1990s
appears to be a slightly lower rate of employment growth among branches of
larger organisations than that experienced by single independent workplaces,
but a much higher rate of growth in employment at head offices.
Two measures of performance-related pay, profit sharing and share
ownership schemes are included in our analyses because previous analyses of
WIRS suggest these forms of contingent pay affect employment change
(Fernie and Metcalf, 1995). These schemes may improve workplace perform-
ance through enhanced incentives (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990), thereby
facilitating employment growth. Weitzman also points out that if contingent
pay schemes permit downward wage adjustment, when the firm faces diffi-
cult periods it can avoid lay-offs, thus maintaining employment levels. In
fact, these schemes appear to have had little effect on employment change in
Britain in the 1990s.
Workforce characteristics
Although the use of short-term or fixed-term contracts can assist workplaces
to adjust to economic downturn without cutting the number of permanent
staff, users of such contracts had lower employment growth than those who
relied on permanent contracts. It could be that users of flexible labour prefer
to handle expansion as well as contraction through changes in the number of
non-permanent posts. Employment growth rates were higher among
workplaces employing mainly non-manual workers, mainly full-time workers,
and a mix of male and female staff.
Nature of the product market
Workplaces with a diversified range of products or services had higher employ-
ment growth rates. This supports the notion that those with diversified output
can cope better in a trade cycle downturn if they can switch away from less
profitable products.67 Those with a larger geographical market to operate in
also seem to fare better in employment terms than those whose fortunes are
tied to a specific locality. Although workplaces dominating their market may
have larger rents available to employ more staff, growth rates were lowest
where the workplace was a monopolist. This is consistent with the standard
theory of the firm, where profit-maximising monopolists restrict output (and
employment) below the levels that would obtain in a competitive market.
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67 Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald (1991) find evidence to support this contention in their
analysis of employment growth in the early 1980s.
Employee Voice 15/5  19/7/01  10:02 am  Page 51
Workplace performance
Although workplaces which were doing particularly badly in 1990 – those
operating ‘much below capacity’ and those with financial performance ‘a lot
below’ similar workplaces in the same industry – experienced employment
decline over the 1990s, those doing particularly well did not experience strong
employment growth.
3.4 Multivariate analyses of employment growth in the private sector,
1990–9868
Our descriptive findings are intriguing since they uncover a union effect which
was largely absent from our analyses of workplace closure. Whereas unions,
and worker voice in general, had little effect on workplace closure in the
private sector as a whole, union voice – and, in particular, unions with
substantial bargaining power – was associated with lower employment
growth among continuing workplaces. These findings are consistent with the
notion that unions will raise wages at the expense of potential new workers,
but not to the point where the firm is sufficiently unprofitable to go out of
business. However, since worker voice and other workplace characteristics
are associated with employment growth rates, it is necessary to control for
these other factors to establish whether there are independent voice effects.
Our employment growth variable is continuous, running from –37.21 to
+64.22 per cent per annum in our whole sample, and from –31.92 to +51.73
in the private sector. To estimate influences on this variable we estimate a set
of linear regression models that account for sample design in the way
described in Section 2.4. The coefficients for independent variables can be
interpreted directly as the marginal effects, that is, the per annum percentage
change in employment growth associated with that variable.69 Negative signs
represent an annual decline in employment, whereas positive signs indicate
positive growth.
In Section 3.6 we also present models that adjust for sample survival
using a two-stage Heckman selection procedure. We discuss this procedure in
that section.
Table 3.4 shows the basic model specifications for our analysis of private
sector employment growth, to which we add our voice measures. All variables
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68 Once again, all analyses are weighted to account for the probability of sample selection.
69 Of course, these annual percentage changes are the average changes over the 7.5 year
period. In reality, firm-level data suggest firms grow quickly early in their lives, with growth
rates then declining with age (Caves, 1998; Troske, 1996). Since our workplaces were in
existence for at least three years prior to the first interview in 1990, the growth rates we
observe do not include the initial growth spurt that many will have experienced.
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are as measured in 1990, with the exception of employment change over
1989–90. We have commented on the rationale for the inclusion of most of
these variables in the preceding section. We use industry dummies to account
for the fact that unions are most heavily represented in declining industries
where employment may be declining for exogenous technical reasons, rather
than through the presence of unions. Some have justified the use of region
dummies to account for higher rates of unionisation in areas of low income
which may, in itself, act as a constraint on jobs growth (Blanchflower,
Millward and Oswald, 1991). We also incorporate local labour market condi-
tions, which may capture constraints on growth associated with local labour
demand.
The equation can be written as follows:
Gi9098 = X’i90β + Gi8990 + U90 + V90 + ε,
where Gi9098 denotes employment growth per annum at workplace i in the
period 1990–98. X’i90 is a vector of observable attributes affecting employ-
ment adjustment at the workplace, measured in 1990 (including some
performance measures covering the period 1989–90) with β a vector of coeffi-
cients to be estimated. Gi8990 is a lagged dependent variable for employment
growth over the period 1989–90. U90 and V90 are measures of unemploy-
ment and vacancy rates for the travel-to-work area in which the workplace is
located, measured in 1990. Finally, ε is the error term.
As noted in our closure analyses, these models are predictive in the sense
that they use information collected in 1990 to predict workplace employment
growth subsequently. It is therefore reasonable to make causal inferences
about the variance in growth rates using these 1990 predictors. However, we
also report results from some models incorporating change variables for the
period 1990–98. Since we do not know the sequence of events linking changes
in independent variables to changes in employment, it is unwise to make
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Table 3.4: Basic model specifications for private sector employment
growth analysis
Model Controls used
Model 1 No controls
Model 2 Employment size in 1990; employment change, 1989–90; % non-manual
employees; whether workplace is single independent workplace or
belongs to larger organisation; whether non-executive share ownership
scheme; whether profit-related pay; region; travel-to-work
unemployment rate; travel-to-work vacancy rate; two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (1980) 
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causal inferences using these models. Instead, they may be thought of as
‘descriptive’ in the sense that they seek to ‘unpack’ processes accompanying
employment change.
Results
Union recognition: we begin our statistical investigation of worker voice
effects on employment growth with five models testing the effect of union
recognition in 1990 on employment growth during 1990–98. The full models
are presented in Appendix Table A10. The first model containing the union
recognition dummy without controls shows union recognition was associated
with a 3.2 per cent per annum reduction in employment growth over the
period, as indicated in our descriptive analysis. This becomes 4.0 per cent
when industry and regional dummies are added in the second model. The
figure falls marginally to 3.9 per cent when local labour market controls are
added in Model 3, and remains at this level when further workplace-level
controls are added. The fifth model incorporates workplace age and employ-
ment change over the period 1989–90. Missing information on these variables
brings the sample size down from 558 to 482. In this fully specified model,
the presence of recognised unions depressed the employment growth rate by
4.2 per cent per annum.70
We tested the sensitivity of these results to whether the effect of union
recognition differed with:
• other features of workplace unionism;
• industry;
• workplace age;
• capital investment and organisational change;
• product market circumstances;
• workplace performance; and
• changes in recognition status.
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70 Another way of establishing the effect of union recognition on employment growth is to
split the sample into workplaces with recognised unions and those without, then generate
predicted mean employment growth rates for each subsample using their respective models. We
find that the estimated mean employment growth rate among unionised workplaces is –1.61
per cent per annum, compared with +1.49 per cent among non-unionised workplaces. These
rates are very similar to the raw rates presented in the descriptive analyses (Appendix Table
A10). An advantage of this approach is that it allows the coefficients on independent variables
to vary across the two types of workplace. As Appendix Table A12 shows, determinants of
employment change differ markedly across the two sectors, resulting in greater explanatory
power for the two models than for the whole private sector model. In particular, regional and
industry effects are very different; and the vacancy rate and share ownership schemes are both
positive and significant in the non-union sector only.
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The union recognition effect was not significantly affected by the incorpora-
tion of other worker voice related measures such as the existence of a closed
shop or on-site union representation.71 It is also possible that unions engag-
ing in restrictive working practices might help to maintain artificially high
employment levels. A negative union effect might therefore represent the
outcome of removing such restrictions as unions became weaker in the 1990s.
If this were the case, one would expect the effect to be confined to workplaces
in which unions were limiting management’s ability to organise work in 1990.
But, in practice, the negative union effect on employment growth over the
1990s was also apparent in workplaces where recognised unions were not
limiting work organisation at the start of the period.72
Workplace unionisation is correlated with industry-level unionisation,
which may have an independent effect on employment growth in a sector.
When added to the fully specified model (Model 5 in Appendix Table A10),
industry-level union density was negative and significant, but the workplace-
level union recognition effect remained unchanged.73,74
Highly unionised sectors may be subject to employment decline for exoge-
nous technological reasons since unionisation is more prevalent in traditional,
declining industries. To see where these union effects were most in evidence,
we analysed employment growth in unionised and non-unionised workplaces
separately (Appendix Table A11). We found big differences in growth rates
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71 In each case, these other variables were negative but non-significant.
72 In WIRS90, managers were asked: ‘What limits the way management can organise the work
here?’ Respondents chose from a card of options. Worker limitations related to opposition from
groups of ordinary union members, workers who were not union members, shop stewards or
representatives, and formal agreements with unions. If managers reported limitations associated
with one or more of these responses, we said worker limitations on the organisation of work
were present. In the fully specified model, an interaction between union recognition and worker
limitations was positive but not significant (2.16, t=1.05); the worker limitation main effect
was negative and significant (–3.18, t=1.97); and the union recognition main effect was
negative and significant (–3.98, t=3.34).
73 Employment growth fell by 0.7 per cent per annum with a 10 per cent increase in industry-
level union density (t=2.27).
74 We might expect the union recognition effect to be more pronounced in lowly unionised
industries if a wage premium paid in unionised workplaces made them particularly uncompeti-
tive where most competitors did not face unions. Therefore, we interacted union recognition
and a dummy identifying workplaces located in industries with high union density (above 29
per cent). To our surprise, we found the workplace union recognition effect was most
pronounced in workplaces in high density industries. We investigated industry-level union
density effects further by adding the variable to our separate models for unionised and non-
unionised workplaces. Among workplaces with union recognition, high industry-level union
density was associated with lower employment growth whereas, among non-unionised
workplaces, higher industry-level unionisation was associated with positive employment
growth. This last finding indicates that non-unionised workplaces benefited from the high
unionisation of their competitors.
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between unionised and non-unionised workplaces within industries.
Compared with similar workplaces in retail distribution, employment growth
was significantly slower in food, drink and tobacco; textiles; leather, footwear
and clothing; timber, furniture, paper and printing, and transport, but only
among unionised workplaces. In all but textiles, the corresponding effect
among non-unionised workplaces was positive, but not statistically signifi-
cant. Employment growth was significantly higher in three manufacturing
sectors (chemicals and manufactured fibres; metal goods; and mechanical
engineering) compared to retail distribution, but only where the workplace
was non-unionised. There were also four sectors (banking, finance and insur-
ance; business services; wholesale distribution; and energy and water) where
employment growth was significantly faster than in retail distribution among
non-unionised workplaces, but significantly slower among unionised
workplaces. This is very strong evidence that the effect of unions is not simply
an industry effect, such as a decline in employment associated with tradi-
tional, heavily unionised industries.
Older workplaces are more likely to be unionised, with some suggesting
that the ‘golden age’ for union recognition was the 1940s and 1950s
(Millward et al, 2000). This raises the possibility that the union effect on
employment growth is really an age effect arising from capital depreciation.
Categorising younger workplaces as those in existence for 20 years or less in
1990, and older workplaces as those in existence for 21 years or more, there
were no significant differences in the union effect across the two age-groups.
Union recognition lowered employment growth in older and younger
workplaces by around 3 per cent per annum.
Regardless of workplace age, unionised workplaces may be subject to
lower employment growth through a loss of competitiveness associated with
capital depreciation if, as discussed in Section 2.1, unions inhibit the reinvest-
ment of capital. But this did not explain the negative association between
union recognition and employment growth. The negative union effect was
present in workplaces that had introduced new plant, machinery and equip-
ment over the period 1987–90, as well as in those that had not.75
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75 In WIRS90, managers were asked: ‘During the last three years have there been here any of
the following types of change directly affecting the jobs or working practices of any section or
sections of the workforce…the introduction of new plant, machinery or equipment (excluding
routine replacement)?’ We distinguished between workplaces with and without capital reinvest-
ment using this measure. An interaction between union recognition and capital reinvestment
was negative but not statistically significant, and the union recognition main effect was a 3–4
per cent per annum reduction in employment growth depending on the model specification.
Furthermore, the union effect did not differ significantly across workplaces with and without
capital reinvestment when we ran split models for the two groups. Very similar results were
obtained using a definition of capital reinvestment based solely on investment in
microelectronic technology.
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Employment change may also come through organisational changes not
associated with capital reinvestment, such as the removal of restrictive
working practices discussed above. Earlier research indicated that lower
employment growth in unionised workplaces in the first half of the 1980s
was confined to workplaces that underwent organisational change (Machin
and Wadhwani, 1991). However, the union effect in the 1990s is independent
of organisational change.76
Where employers operate in less competitive markets, they can command
excess profits, in which case unions’ rent-seeking behaviour may be accom-
modated without it being detrimental to employment growth. In fact, the
number of competitors in the market had no significant effect on employ-
ment growth, and interactions between unionisation and the number of
competitors were also non-significant. Product diversification was significant:
where workplaces produced a single product or service, or relied on a single
product or service for at least 25 per cent of their sales, employment growth
per annum was lower than in workplaces with diversified output, by 2.7 per
cent and 3.4 per cent respectively. This confirms that workplaces capable of
switching production towards more profitable lines during downturns in
demand are better able to maintain employment levels. However, interactions
between product diversification and unionisation were not significant.
We used two measures of workplace performance to test whether union
effects differed across high-performing and low-performing workplaces. Both
capacity utilisation and financial performance in 1990 had no significant
effect on subsequent employment growth, and interactions with unionisation
were not significant. This finding is at odds with WIRS analyses for the period
1980–90.77 It is possible that workplaces that were performing well in the
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76 In WIRS90, managers were asked: ‘During the last three years have there been here any of
the following types of change directly affecting the jobs or working practices of any section or
sections of the workforce…substantial changes in work organisation or working practices not
involving new plant, machinery or equipment?’ We distinguished between workplaces with and
without organisational change using this measure. In the fully specified model, an interaction
between union recognition and organisational change was negative but not statistically signifi-
cant (–1.12, t=0.60); the organisational change main effect was positive but not significant
(1.20, t=0.83); and the union recognition main effect was negative and significant (–4.16,
t=2.79). Running separate models on workplaces with and without organisational change, we
find strong negative union effects on employment growth for both groups. Among workplaces
which had experienced organisational change, the union recognition effect was –5.3 (t=3.1),
and among those without organisational change it was –3.5 (t=2.6).
77 Running analyses for the whole economy, Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald (1991) found
strong positive associations between employment growth in the early 1980s and good perform-
ance, as measured by operating at full capacity, higher product demand, and above average
financial performance. Estimating employment change in the private sector over the period
1987–1990 using WIRS90, Booth and McCulloch (1999) found a positive association between
employment growth and an increase in the value of sales, and a positive association between
employment growth and operating at full capacity. However, these analyses were unweighted.
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late 1980s chose to expand their employment, whereas those performing well
in the 1990s were doing so through profit-maximising methods which did
not entail employment expansion. For example, they may have preferred to
squeeze labour costs still further and invest surplus in capital, or return it to
shareholders.78 Whatever the reason, although workplace performance affects
workplaces’ subsequent fortunes, it does so through the process of workplace
closure, rather than employment growth.
Finally, we explored the effects of derecognition and new recognition. We
found that the growth rates of workplaces derecognising their union(s) were
not significantly different from the growth rates of those that remained non-
union throughout. Both had significantly higher growth rates than those
remaining unionised.79
In the remainder of this section, we turn to other measures of worker
voice and comment on their effects using the same control variables as those
used for the union recognition Model 5 in Appendix Table A10. The commen-
tary is confined to those worker voice measures with significant effects.80
Union type: compared to similar private sector workplaces without recog-
nised unions, those with recognised unions all experienced slower
employment growth, whatever combination of manual and non-manual
unions they had, though some effects were only on the margins of statistical
significance (Model 1, Appendix Table A12). However, the model confirms
the descriptive findings in showing that unions representing only non-manual
workers had the greatest impact. The annual rate of employment growth was
10.8 per cent lower among workplaces only recognising unions representing
non-manual workers, relative to non-unionised workplaces, ceteris paribus. It
seems that although workplaces recognising non-manual unions had lower
closure rates than other unionised workplaces, they also had lower growth
rates.
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78 There has been some debate about non-expansionary economic growth, that is, economic
growth which does not entail employment growth. This may be associated with more
widespread demands from shareholders for quick and profitable returns on investments
(Burchell et al, 1999: 5–9).
79 Under the model, the predicted growth rate for workplaces that had derecognised was 0.58
per cent per annum. This compares to 1.60 per cent among workplaces that had been non-
union since 1990, 0.66 per cent among those newly recognising unions, and –4.73 per cent
among those unionised in both 1990 and 1998.
80 Multi-unionism and bargaining arrangements appeared to be significantly associated with
employment growth in our descriptive analyses, but this was not the case once other factors
were controlled for.
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Collective bargaining coverage: if union recognition has a general, negative
effect on employment, one might also expect the magnitude of the effect to be
conditional upon the strength of the union at the workplace. A commonly
used measure of strength is the proportion of employees at the workplace
whose pay is set through collective bargaining. The multivariate analysis
confirms the descriptive findings: where bargaining coverage was between 1
and 19 per cent of the workforce, growth rates were no different from
workplaces in which no workers were covered (Model 2, Appendix Table
A12). Above this threshold, workplaces with higher coverage experienced
lower employment growth, but the effect did not increase significantly with
higher coverage above the 20 per cent threshold. It would seem that provided
a substantial proportion of workers have their pay set through pay bargain-
ing, unionisation can bring about lower employment growth. The union
penalty does not rise with the proportion of workers covered once this thresh-
old is exceeded.
Workplace-level negotiations over employment: union effects on employment
differed according to whether unions were involved in negotiating over
employment as well as wages. Ceteris paribus, where unions negotiated wages
but not employment, employment declined by 5.0 per cent per annum relative
to non-unionised workplaces (Model 3, Appendix Table A12). This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that managers, faced with setting employment with a
predetermined wage, set lower employment levels than would otherwise be
the case, due to the union wage premium. However, where unions negotiated
over staffing levels, growth rates were not significantly different from those
experienced in non-unionised workplaces.81 This finding is consistent with
the notion that unions curb their wage demands when able to exercise some
control over the level of employment at the workplace. However, where
unions negotiated over recruitment, employment fell by 3.85 per cent per
annum relative to growth among non-unionised workplaces. This finding is
more consistent with unions using their ‘insider’ power to restrict the supply
of labour to maintain current members’ terms and conditions at the expense
of potential workers. Where increased job tenure arising from worker satis-
faction with conditions does not offset this behaviour it will result in declining
employment over the longer term. Where unions negotiated both staffing
levels and recruitment, workplace employment declined by 3.51 per cent per
annum relative to non-unionised workplaces with similar characteristics. This
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81 Employment rises by 1.85 per cent per annum where unions negotiate staffing levels,
relative to employment change in similar non-unionised workplaces. However, the difference is
not statistically significant.
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might be because the recruitment effect dominates the staffing levels effect.
Alternatively, negotiation over both recruitment and staffing levels may
signify union bargaining strength. If, as other research suggests, unions attach
less weight to employment than wages, this strength would translate into a
higher wage premium at the expense of employment growth.82
Workplace-level union density: if the negative effect of unions on employ-
ment growth is due to their ability to push up wages at the expense of
employment, one might anticipate the effect to increase with union bargain-
ing power. Other research has identified such a relationship using union
density as a proxy for bargaining power.83 However, we find the relationship
between union density and employment growth is u-shaped: the negative
effect of union density on employment growth rises until density reaches 89
per cent, whereupon it declines again (Model 4, Appendix Table A12). At
very low (1–24 per cent) and very high (100 per cent) density levels, employ-
ment growth does not differ from workplaces in which there are no union
members. The union effect is strongest in workplaces with between 75 and
89 per cent of their workforce in union membership: employment growth
was 5.5 per cent per annum lower among this group of workplaces, relative
to employment growth in workplaces with no union members. As in the case
of low bargaining coverage, where there is low union density, unions may
have little leverage over employers (and employees), whereupon they have
little influence over employment-related matters. The fact that unions also
have no negative effect on employment where all workers are unionised
cannot be explained by the absence of bargaining power. There are two possi-
ble explanations. It may signal a qualitatively different relationship between
union and employer, one in which the union is actively supported by the
employer, with both sides working in concert, balancing the needs of labour
with the needs of capital. Alternatively, unions may only achieve full member-
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82 We use data on whether unions negotiated over employment in 1990 and 1998 to identify
workplaces where unions began negotiation over employment, and those where they ceased
negotiation over employment. Employment growth rose when unions ceased negotiation over
employment levels. This might arise if the cessation of negotiation over employment arose from
a decline in union bargaining power, leading to increased managerial freedom to deploy labour
as deemed appropriate. Alternatively, unions may only seek to negotiate over employment in
bad times, that is, when employment is declining. Switches in negotiating status with regard to
recruitment were not significantly associated with employment growth.
83 Using a continuous measure, Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald (1991) found employment
fell with higher union density and, when incorporated alongside the union recognition dummy,
the density variable dominated. Studies for other countries also find a negative effect of
workplace-level union density on employment growth (see, for example, Wooden and Hawke,
2000).
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ship where employers can afford to concede it, namely in organisations with
the market power to deliver better wages for workers without affecting
normal profits.
Union and non-union voice: union voice was associated with lower employ-
ment growth. In contrast to our descriptive findings, the effect was greatest
where union voice was present in isolation (Model 5, Appendix Table A12).
In contrast, there was no difference in the rate of employment growth between
workplaces without worker voice and those with non-union voice only. This
is clear evidence that the negative effects of worker voice on employment
growth are specific to union voice. This is consistent with the possibility that
the union effect comes through collective bargaining, although other research
has also indicated that union voice may be less effective as voice, that is, as
an effective means of communication between workers and employers
(Bryson, 2000).
Summary
On average, workplace union recognition reduced annual employment
growth in the private sector by 3–4 per cent in the 1990s, ceteris paribus. The
employment effect is still apparent once we account for workplace organisa-
tional and technical change, the concentration of unions in declining
industries, and the age of unionised workplaces. Non-union worker voice
had no significant effect, suggesting that the union effect arose through wage
bargaining, or because union voice is less effective than non-union voice in
communicating with management.
The union effect was only apparent where they had a substantial presence
at the workplace, as signalled by bargaining coverage or union density. Below
certain thresholds, there was no union effect. This suggests unions required a
certain degree of bargaining strength to affect employment growth. However,
the effect did not rise with union strength above these coverage and density
thresholds. Indeed, where there was full union membership, union effects
were absent, perhaps pointing to a qualitatively different relationship with
employers. Union effects on growth also varied according to the nature of
workers covered by the union and whether the union negotiated over employ-
ment issues. Doubt is cast over the theory that union wage effects are less
likely to inhibit growth where market conditions are propitious, by the
finding that union effects did not differ significantly according to the compet-
itive environment or workplace performance.
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3.5 Analyses of employment growth in private manufacturing and
private services
We are only aware of one study that analyses employment growth separately
for private manufacturing and private services. In this study for Canada,
Long (1993) found unions had a similar negative effect on employment across
the two sectors. This surprised him since he anticipated higher unionisation
in the manufacturing sector would limit the damage to competitiveness
wrought by a union wage premium, for reasons similar to those outlined with
respect to workplace closure in Section 2.5. A cursory glance at the descrip-
tive information in Appendix Table A9 suggests that in our sample, union
effects on employment growth were apparent in manufacturing and services,
but they appear more pronounced in the service sector, a finding that
conforms to the theory. However, as Appendix Table A9 illustrates, since
other workplace characteristics are also associated with employment growth,
we use multivariate techniques to establish whether there are any independ-
ent voice effects in either of the sectors. The manufacturing and service sector
models only differ with respect to the industry dummies they contain.
Employment growth in private manufacturing
Union recognition: the average employment growth rate in manufacturing
over the period 1990–98 was 0.5 per cent per annum. However, non-unionised
manufacturers grew by an average of 1.4 per cent per annum between 1990
and 1998, whereas unionised workplaces shrank by 0.7 per cent per annum.
This is reflected in our model without controls (Model 1 in Appendix Table
A13) where unionisation depressed employment growth by 2.3 per cent per
annum. With the introduction of controls, the negative effect of unionisation
rises to –3.4 per cent per annum, and is more precisely specified.84
Switches in the union status of manufacturing workplaces did not alter
the impact of union status at the start of the period. Workplaces derecognis-
ing their union(s) since 1990 experienced an annual decline in employment of
4.1 per cent relative to workplaces that remained non-unionised throughout.
Although those who started recognising unions over the period experienced
an employment decline of 1.93 per cent per annum relative to workplaces
remaining non-unionised throughout, this was not a statistically significant
difference.
The union recognition effect in Model 2 of Appendix Table A13 was not
affected by the addition of a closed shop dummy or worker limitations on
management’s ability to organise work for non-managerial staff (both of
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84 The effect is significant at a 95 per cent confidence level, compared with the 90 per cent
confidence level for the model without controls.
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which had negative but non-significant effects on employment growth).85
Although the union effect was much more pronounced where there was no
on-site representation, only 6 per cent of unionised private manufacturing
workplaces had no on-site representative in 1990.86 This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis that, where on-site representatives are present, the more
positive effects of worker voice stressed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) come
to the fore, although they do not offset the negative effects of unions associ-
ated with their rent-seeking behaviour.
Earlier studies for Canada and the United States have found that the
negative effect of unionisation on employment growth in manufacturing is
confined to larger workplaces and firms, although there is no obvious expla-
nation for this finding (Long, 1993; Leonard, 1992). We split our private
manufacturing sample according to whether or not the workplace had at
least 410 workers, the median number of workers in our private manufactur-
ing sample. We found no evidence of a differential union effect across small
and large manufacturing workplaces.87
Union recognition effects remained negative and significant in the presence
of product market and workplace performance variables.88 Consistent with
the notion that the rent-seeking behaviour of unions need not affect employ-
ment growth where the employer has access to excess profits, there was a
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85 When added to the fully specified model (Model 2 in Appendix Table A14), industry-level
union density was significantly associated with positive employment growth, but the
workplace-level union recognition effect remained unchanged.
86 The effect of union recognition without on-site representation was to reduce employment
growth by 9.5 per cent per annum relative to similar workplaces without union recognition.
Where the union had an on-site representative, the effect was smaller, though still large at 3.2
per cent per annum. The first effect was significant at a 99 per cent confidence level, and the
second was significant at a 5 per cent confidence level. Put another way, annual employment
growth rates in manufacturing were 6.4 per cent higher in unionised workplaces with on-site
representation than they were among unionised workplaces without on-site representation.
87 In fact, workplaces below median size had a negative but non-significant union coefficient,
whereas those above median size had a positive non-significant coefficient.
88 Manufacturing workplaces with a monopoly position in their market place had lower rates
of employment growth than those competing with six or more competitors (–3.31 per cent per
annum, t=2.11). This is consistent with the standard theory of the firm, whereby profit-
maximising monopolists restrict output and employment below levels that would be seen in a
competitive market. Having financial performance above average for the industry was associ-
ated with lower growth rates than average performance (–3.68 per annum, t=3.30). It may be
that there is no simple relationship between having a good market position, or performing well,
and using that position to expand employment. Output may grow without employment
through capital investment, of course, or else workplaces may choose to return surplus to
shareholders. Alternatively, our subjective measures of market position and workplace perform-
ance may have limitations.
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positive significant interaction between union recognition and the workplace
having above average financial performance for the industry.89
In the remainder of this section we turn to other measures of worker
voice and comment on their effects using the same control variables as those
used for the union recognition Model 2 in Appendix Table A13. The commen-
tary is confined to those worker voice measures with significant effects.90
Collective bargaining coverage: the lower growth rate associated with union-
isation is confined to manufacturing workplaces with at least 80 per cent of
their workers covered by collective bargaining (Model 3, Appendix Table
A13). Below this threshold, although having some workers whose pay was
set by collective bargaining lowered growth rates, the effects were not statis-
tically significant relative to workplaces with no collective bargaining
coverage.
Workplace-level negotiations over employment: the pattern of union effects
on employment differed according to whether unions negotiated over
employment. Ceteris paribus, where unions negotiated over wages but not
employment in 1990, employment declined by 3.8 per cent per annum relative
to ‘like’ workplaces without unions (model 4, Appendix Table A13). Where
they negotiated over staffing levels or recruitment, growth rates were not
significantly different from those in non-unionised workplaces. However,
negotiation over staffing levels and recruitment resulted in an employment
decline of 4.8 per cent per annum.
Workplace-level union density: in contrast to the whole private sector model
(Model 4, Appendix Table A12), there is evidence that employment growth
declined most rapidly with low and high union density (Model 5, Appendix
Table A13). However, the results are not as precisely determined as they are
for the private sector as a whole.
Number of recognised unions: there was a big employment penalty attached
to having three or more unions: employment declined by 7.40 per cent per
annum in these workplaces compared to similar non-union workplaces
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89 The coefficient is 4.58 (t=2.32). However, the overall net effect of union recognition in
manufacturing workplaces performing above average was negative: the effect is the product of
the interaction (+4.58), the union recognition main effect (–5.2, t=2.70) and the above average
performance main effect (–5.0, t=3.56), giving an overall net effect of –5.6.
90 Voice measures which appeared significant in the descriptive analyses in Appendix Table
A10 but were not significant on introducing control variables included our union/non-union
voice measure, our representative/direct voice measure, joint versus separate bargaining, and
number of bargaining units.
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(Model 6, Appendix Table A13). Although employment declined in manufac-
turing workplaces with one or two unions, employment growth was not
significantly different from growth in comparable non-union workplaces once
other factors had been controlled for.
Employment growth in private services
Union recognition: according to our descriptive analysis (Appendix Table
A9) non-unionised workplaces in the private service sector grew by an average
of 1.4 per cent per annum between 1990 and 1998, whereas unionised
workplaces shrank by 2.4 per cent per annum. This 3.8 per cent deficit is
indicated in our model without controls presented as Model 1 in Appendix
Table A14. The effect is significant at a 99 per cent level of confidence. With
the introduction of controls in Model 2, the negative effect of unionisation
rises to –4.7 per cent per annum.
In contrast to private manufacturing, switches in union status were impor-
tant. There was no significant difference between growth rates of private
service sector workplaces that had derecognised unions and those that were
non-union throughout.91 This might imply that derecognitions occurred early
on in the 1990s, so that workplaces were non-union for most of the period.
Alternatively, derecognition may signal the demise of already weak unions
which may have little impact at the workplace even before derecognition.
The union recognition effect in Model 2 of Appendix Table A14 was
largely unaffected by the addition of a closed shop dummy, on-site union
representation, industry-level union density, or worker limitations on manage-
ment’s ability to organise work for non-managerial staff, all of which were
statistically non-significant themselves.92
Long (1993) found that unions in Canada were only associated with
slower employment growth in private services among larger workplaces. In
contrast, when we split our private services’ sample into smaller and larger
workplaces (the division being made at the median employment size of 142
employees) we found that the union recognition effect was only statistically
significant among smaller workplaces. Among these smaller workplaces,
unionised workplaces grew 5.4 per cent per annum more slowly than similar
non-unionised workplaces. Among larger private sector workplaces, although
the union coefficient was negative, it was not statistically significant (–1.75,
t=1.03).
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91 The predicted growth rates under the model were 1.7 and 1.6 per cent per annum respec-
tively.
92 The union recognition dummy remained statistically significant throughout, ranging in size
from –4.8 with the closed shop dummy to –3.6 with the on-site union representative dummy.
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Union recognition effects remained negative and significant in the
presence of product market and workplace performance variables. There was
only one significant union interaction with product market characteristics.
Among workplaces reliant on a single service for at least 25 per cent of sales,
employment grew 5.8 per cent per annum more slowly where that workplace
was unionised. However, if it was unionised and had a diverse range of
services, its growth rate was actually 3.0 per cent per annum faster than the
non-unionised workplace without diversified services.
In the remainder of this section we turn to other measures of worker
voice and comment on their effects using the same control variables as those
used for the union recognition Model 2 in Appendix Table A14. The models
are directly comparable to those for private manufacturing, with the excep-
tion of the industry dummies. The commentary is confined to those worker
voice measures with significant effects.
Collective bargaining coverage: unions had a negative effect on employment
growth rates in private services at all levels of bargaining coverage above 19
per cent (Model 3, Appendix Table A14). This suggests a more pervasive
effect than that noted for the private manufacturing sector, where effects were
confined to workplaces with at least 80 per cent of their workers covered by
collective bargaining (Model 3, Appendix Table A13).
Workplace-level negotiations over employment: as in private manufacturing,
the pattern of union effects on employment differed according to whether
unions negotiated over employment at workplace-level. Ceteris paribus,
where unions negotiated over wages but not employment in 1990, employ-
ment declined by 6.96 per cent per annum relative to ‘like’ workplaces
without unions (Model 4, Appendix Table A14). Where they negotiated over
staffing levels only, growth rates were not significantly different from those in
non-unionised workplaces. Where there was negotiation over staffing levels
and recruitment there was a weak negative employment growth effect.93
Workplace-level union density: in contrast to private manufacturing, employ-
ment growth declined most rapidly where a majority, but by no means all
workers, were union members (Model 5, Appendix Table A14).
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93 In an alternative model, we used a simplified variable which distinguishes workplaces with
recognised unions which do not negotiate over staffing or recruitment, from those negotiating
over staffing, recruitment or both. Where there was no negotiation over staffing or recruitment,
employment growth rates were 6.1 per cent per annum lower than in similar non-unionised
workplaces. Where there was negotiation over staffing levels or recruitment (or both) the
employment growth rate was 1.4 per cent per annum lower, but this was not statistically signif-
icant.
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Union and non-union voice: union voice was associated with lower employ-
ment growth, whether in isolation or in combination with non-union voice.
However, the effect was much larger in the absence of non-union voice
(Model 6, Appendix Table A14). Growth rates among workplaces with non-
union voice only were not significantly different from growth rates where
there was no union voice at all.
Union type: finally, there is evidence that the union effect differed with the
type of worker covered by the union. It seems that unions representing only
manual workers did not significantly affect employment growth (Model 7,
Appendix Table A14). Workplaces with non-manual unions experienced
growth rates of 4.7 per cent per annum less than workplaces without non-
manual unions.
Summary
In both private services and private manufacturing, non-union worker voice
had no significant effect on employment growth. Both sectors experienced
lower growth in the presence of recognised unions. The effect was a little
more pronounced in private services, with unionised workplaces experiencing
annual growth rates 4–5 per cent lower than comparable non-union
workplaces, whereas the average effect in manufacturing was 3 per cent.
It was not simply the magnitude of the union employment effect that
differed across the two sectors. The pattern of union effects also differed, and
in ways that are not always easily interpreted with the theoretical framework
outlined at the start of Section 3. In both sectors, union effects were not all
pervasive. In private manufacturing, they were confined to workplaces with
high bargaining coverage, three or more recognised unions, and instances in
which unions bargained over staffing levels and recruitment, or neither. In
private services, the effect was confined to smaller workplaces, and unions
representing non-manual workers.
3.6 Accounting for workplace survival in the analysis of private sector
employment growth
In this section we take forward our analysis of union recognition effects on
employment growth in the private sector as a whole. We want to extrapolate
from our results to discuss the impact of worker voice on employment growth
in the population of workplaces as a whole. However, we might draw the
wrong conclusions if we rely on models that analyse employment change
among that subset of workplaces that survived in our sample for the period
1990–98. This is because worker voice can affect workplace survival, as well
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as employment growth among surviving workplaces. In other words, selec-
tion into the sample in 1998 is not a random process, and may be related to
worker voice. Consequently, failure to take account of this selection process
could result in biased estimates of workers’ impact on employment change.
For example, we would be underestimating the overall impact of union recog-
nition on employment growth if we focused solely on continuing workplaces,
if union recognition also significantly reduced the likelihood of workplace
survival, and thus survival in the sample.
We adopt a procedure that adjusts results based solely on continuing
workplaces for the likelihood of workplace survival. The procedure involves
estimating workplace survival first. This model identifies influences on
workplace survival. It also generates a selection term based on the likelihood
of each 1990 workplace surviving into the sample in 1998. This selection
term is then carried forward into a second stage model estimating employ-
ment change over the period 1990–98. These second stage results relating to
employment change are ‘selection adjusted’, since the procedure eliminates
any bias in the estimates caused by tendencies for unmeasured characteristics,
which influence workplace survival, to be correlated with unmeasured charac-
teristics which influence employment growth.
Results from our preferred model are presented in Appendix Table A15.94
The lower half of the table headed ‘Survive’ shows the estimates of sample
survival. The dependent variable is a 0–1 discrete variable in which 1 is
survival into the panel population for 1998, and 0 is non-survival arising
through workplace closure or shrinkage below the 25-employee threshold for
inclusion in the panel. It confirms that union recognition in 1990 does indeed
lower survival probabilities significantly (t=2.10). The top half of the table
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94 For a description of the variable names see Appendix Table A2. We use maximum
likelihood estimation weighted for the probability of sample selection. The technique relies on
being able to construct survival and employment growth equations which are independent of
one another, something which is quite difficult to do given the expectation that factors influenc-
ing survival should also influence employment growth. We use industry-level union density to
identify the equations. We argue that industry-level union density can be expected to have an
effect on workplace survival, over and above the effect of workplace-level unionisation, because
it captures the probability of closure arising from location in industries which are in decline for
exogenous technical reasons. However, there is no logical reason for the inclusion of industry-
level union density when seeking to explain employment growth conditional on survival, since
this should be accounted for by workplace-level unionisation. As it turns out, industry-level
unionisation is not statistically significant for survival, although it has the correct sign. (It does
prove to be statistically significant at a 95 per cent confidence level when running the
procedure with unweighted data using Heckman’s two-step efficient estimator.) Nevertheless,
there is strong confirmation that the selection procedure is required statistically, since the Wald
test of independence across the two equations is highly significant. The LAMBDA summarising
the estimated magnitude of the unmeasured influences on growth is also highly significant.
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contains the estimates for employment growth per annum. Note that the
estimates are based on 872 workplaces, of which 314 are censored, that is,
non-survivors. We find that, having adjusted for sample selection, private
sector workplaces with union recognition grew at an annual rate that was 4.4
per cent slower than like workplaces without union recognition. This
compares with 3.9 per cent per annum for the equivalent unadjusted
estimates. The union effect rises a little once we account for sample selection.
3.7 Employment growth in the public sector
The public sector accounts for roughly one-third of all employment in Britain.
For this reason alone, analysis of employment change in the sector is merited.
However, there are no studies of employment growth in the sector for Britain.
Indeed, Wooden and Hawke’s (2000) panel analysis for Australia contains
the only analysis of public sector employment growth that we are aware of.
Workers can influence employment change in the public sector through
negotiation over wages and employment in much the same way as occurs in
the private sector, but the scope for influence may be more limited, despite
the higher incidence of negotiation over employment (Table 3.1) and recogni-
tion for pay bargaining (Appendix Table A6). Centralised wage determination
through national collective bargaining and Pay Review Bodies limits the scope
for worker influence over pay at workplace-level in large parts of the public
sector (Millward et al, 2000: 193–196; Forth and Millward, 2000: 18–19).
More fundamentally, perhaps the politics of resource allocation is a more
appropriate framework for thinking about employment change in the public
sector than, say, the theory of rent-sharing, which seems more applicable in
the private sector. Staffing levels in the public sector are set within predeter-
mined cash limits, with resources allocated according to the political priorities
of central and local government. Employment growth is only likely to occur
when improving the service is a high political priority, as in the case of the
health service in the 1990s. Although public sector managers can contribute
to debate during negotiations over budget setting, the decision-making
process is highly centralised so that management scope for radically altering
staff allocations is heavily prescribed by predetermined cash limits. That said,
ceteris paribus, resources are targeted at ‘best performers’, as signalled by the
culture of league tables. Thus, to the extent that workers influence workplace
performance, they can affect resource allocation which, in the heavily labour-
intensive public sector, often means employment growth.
Table 3.5 shows the basic model specifications for our analysis of public
sector employment growth, to which we add our voice measures. All variables
are as measured in 1990. Model 2 is similar to the one used for the private
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sector, but we drop those variables which are only meaningful in the private
sector (share ownership and profit-related pay), and employment change in
1989–90, which remains negative and non-significant throughout. We also
add in the age of the workplace, as proxied by the years the workplace has
been located at the current address.95
Union recognition and union strength: across the public sector, employment
grew at a rate of 1.5 per cent per annum, well above the rate for the private
sector (0.34 per cent). The 12 per cent of public sector workplaces without a
recognised union grew at more than twice the rate at which unionised
workplaces grew (2.9 per cent per annum, versus 1.3 per cent). However, this
difference was not statistically different on entering control variables. The
union recognition effect remained non-significant with the introduction of
other voice variables, such as worker limitations on management’s ability to
organise work (itself negative and non-significant), and the closed shop.
However, the presence of a closed shop in 1990 was associated with stronger
employment growth: workplaces with a closed shop grew by 4.1 per cent
more than ‘like’ workplaces without a closed shop. Another measure of
organisational strength – the presence of an on-site representative – was
associated with lower employment growth: those with an on-site union repre-
sentative and union recognition grew by 2.1 per cent per annum less than
‘like’ workplaces without recognition and on-site representation.96 Other
measures of union strength, such as bargaining coverage and union density,
were not significantly associated with employment growth.97
Changes in workplace union status arising from derecognition and new
recognition were not associated with employment growth.
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Table 3.5: Basic model specifications for public sector employment
growth analysis
Model Controls used
Model 1 No controls
Model 2 Employment size in 1990; % non-manual employees; years workplace has
been at current address; region; travel-to-work unemployment rate;
travel-to-work vacancy rate; six industry dummies based on two-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (1980) 
95 Four observations with employment growth of more than four standard deviations from the
mean were excluded from analyses.
96 The effect was only significant at a 90 per cent confidence level. The pure union recognition
effect remained insignificant.
97 Union recognition and union density were not significant determinants of employment
growth in the Australian public services in the first half of the 1990s (Wooden and Hawke,
2000).
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Bargaining arrangements: single-table bargaining was much more common in
the public than the private sector, occurring in 13 per cent of public sector
workplaces (Appendix Table A6). It was associated with lower employment
growth than other forms of bargaining (Appendix Table A17 contains the full
model). Relative to ‘like’ workplaces, those with single-table bargaining grew
around 3 per cent more slowly per annum. This effect was associated with
single-table bargaining per se, not multi-unionism, which was not a signifi-
cant factor.
Summary
In general, worker voice was not associated with employment growth in the
public sector. No consistent story emerges when analysing union strength: the
closed shop was associated with faster growth, on-site union representation
with slower growth, while other measures were not significant.
4. CONCLUSION
For the first time in Britain, we have estimated the effect of different worker
voice measures on workplace closure and employment growth using panel
data. Also for the first time, we estimate closure and growth rates across the
three broad sectors of the economy: private manufacturing, private services,
and the public sector. What did we find?
In general, worker voice had little effect on workplace closure in the
private sector as a whole, a finding consistent with Machin’s (1995) analysis
for the 1980s. Workplace performance, market conditions, workforce compo-
sition and structural features of the workplace, such as size and ownership,
were more important. However, union voice – and, in particular, unions with
substantial bargaining power – was associated with lower employment
growth among continuing workplaces, the growth rate being roughly 3–4 per
cent lower than similar non-unionised workplaces. The employment effect is
still apparent once we account for workplace organisational and technical
change, the concentration of unions in declining industries, and the age of
unionised workplaces. The findings are consistent with the notion that unions
will raise wages at the expense of potential new workers, but not to the point
where the firm is sufficiently unprofitable to go out of business. Non-union
worker voice had no significant effect, suggesting that the union effect arose
through collective bargaining.
Union recognition did reduce the likelihood of workplace survival broadly
defined to include both closure and shrinkage below our 25-employee thresh-
old for inclusion in the panel in 1998. Once this is taken into account, the
union effect on employment growth rises a little.
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Union effects differed markedly across the three broad sectors of the
economy: private manufacturing, private services and the public sector.
On average, unions increased the probability of closure in private
manufacturing, the average impact being to increase the chances of closure
by 15 per cent relative to similar workplaces that were not unionised.
However, the effect varied with the nature of union representation. Unions
representing only manual workers at the workplace were the only ones that
increased the chances of closure. This effect can be mitigated by broadening
the occupational scope of union representation at the workplace. Having a
recognised union representing non-manual workers reduced the likelihood of
closure, while those representing the broad spectrum of occupations, both
manual and non-manual, were neutral in their impact. Chances of closure
were only higher where there was a single union: multi-unionism had no
effect. Again, this suggests that it is unions representing a narrow range of
occupations that increase the chances of plant closure in manufacturing,
perhaps through the pursuit of sectional interests to the detriment of the plant
as a whole. The scope of bargaining was also important in determining
closure chances. Where unions had no role in determining staffing levels or
recruitment the likelihood of closure was higher. But where managements did
allow unions a role in determining these aspects of employment the chances
of closure were no different from those of non-unionised plants. This may be
because unions become more sensitive to the employment consequences of
their wage claims where management involve them in decisions over employ-
ment. Or it may be that an involvement in the broader set of issues affecting
the future of the plant engenders a more constructive relationship between
unions and management.
Unionisation reduced employment growth rates by 3 per cent per annum
in private manufacturing workplaces relative to non-unionised workplaces.
The effect was only apparent where at least 80 per cent of workers had their
pay set through collective bargaining. Below this threshold there was no union
effect. This suggests unions required a certain degree of bargaining strength
to affect employment growth in manufacturing.
Worker voice had no effect on workplace closure in private services.
However, the annual growth rate of unionised workplaces in private services
was 4–5 per cent less than comparable non-unionised workplaces. This effect
was not apparent where bargaining coverage was low and among unions
representing manual workers. Furthermore, union effects were confined to
unions negotiating over wages but not employment. Where they negotiated
over staffing levels, growth rates were not significantly different from those
in non-unionised workplaces. This suggests unions modify their wage claims
where management involves them in decisions over employment. Non-union
worker voice had no effect on employment growth in private services.
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In the highly unionised public sector, closure probabilities were greater
where workers were able to limit management’s ability to organise work, and
where there were unions representing non-manual workers at the workplace.
However, public sector workplaces with a single union were less likely to
close than workplaces without unions. Employment growth rates were not
generally affected by worker voice in the public sector. However, public sector
workplaces with single-table bargaining grew at a rate of 3 per cent per
annum less than other comparable workplaces.
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Appendix
Table A1: Closure, shrinkage and survival rates in the private sector in
1998, by characteristics in 1990
Closure Shrinkage Survival
Measures of voice
Union and non-union voice:
Union voice only (union rec or choose JCC rep) 0.20 0.08 0.72
Non-union voice only (non-union appointment 
to JCC, briefing group, regular workforce 
meetings, problem solving group, or presence 
of non-union reps where no union members) 0.15 0.14 0.71
Union and non-union voice 0.20 0.18 0.62
None 0.20 0.16 0.64
Representative and direct voice:
Representative voice only (union rec or 
functioning JCC) 0.17 0.12 0.71
Direct voice only (briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group) 0.15 0.16 0.70
Representative and direct voice 0.20 0.15 0.65
None 0.20 0.16 0.64
Joint consultative committee 0.18 0.09 0.73
Functioning JCC (meets at least once a month) 0.18 0.08 0.74
No JCC 0.18 0.16 0.65
Management ability to organise work of 
non-managerial staff limited by workers 
(union members, representatives, or non-union 
workers, or formal agreement) 0.19 0.22 0.59
Management ability to organise not limited 0.18 0.14 0.68
Measures of union presence:
Union recognition 0.20 0.16 0.64
No recognised union 0.17 0.14 0.69
Union members, no recognition 0.20 0.10 0.71
No recognition, no members 0.16 0.15 0.68
1 recognised union 0.19 0.15 0.66
2 recognised unions 0.16 0.26 0.58
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3+ recognised unions 0.30 0.04 0.66
Recognised union, manual members only 0.26 0.08 0.65
Recognised union, non-manual members only 0.15 0.27 0.58
Recognised union, both manual and 
non-manual members 0.20 0.09 0.71
Closed shop 0.20 0.13 0.67
Pre-entry closed shop 0.14 0.16 0.70
No closed shop 0.18 0.15 0.67
Union chooses JCC reps 0.27 0.02 0.71
Union representative at workplace 0.22 0.10 0.68
No on-site union representative 0.17 0.17 0.66
Full-time on-site union representative 0.17 0.16 0.68
On-site union representative, not full-time 0.22 0.10 0.68
Recognition, but no on-site representation 0.17 0.28 0.55
External union representation only 0.23 0.42 0.35
Recognition, but no representation on or 
off-site 0.14 0.15 0.72
Union density, zero 0.16 0.15 0.68
Union density 0.01–24% 0.15 0.12 0.73
Union density 25–49% 0.33 0.04 0.64
Union density 50–74% 0.15 0.22 0.63
Union density 75–89% 0.22 0.15 0.63
Union density 90–99% 0.26 0.09 0.66
Union density 100% 0.18 0.26 0.56
Don’t know workplace union density 0.18 0.16 0.66
Joint bargaining (ie single-table with 
multi-unions) 0.34 0.06 0.60
Separate bargaining 0.20 0.18 0.62
Only a single recognised union 0.19 0.15 0.66
N bargaining units:
0 0.17 0.14 0.69
1 0.20 0.14 0.66
2 0.18 0.24 0.58
3+ 0.22 0.12 0.67
Bargaining over employment where recognition:
No bargaining over employment 0.20 0.15 0.65
Bargaining over staffing levels 0.20 0.20 0.60
Bargaining over recruitment 0.41 0.00 0.59
Bargaining over staff levels and recruitment 0.17 0.16 0.67
Union formal agreement limits management 
ability to organise non-managerial employees 0.19 0.22 0.59
Management not limited by formal agreement 0.18 0.14 0.68
Industry-level union density:
Under 36 per cent 0.18 0.13 0.69
More than or equal to 36 per cent 0.18 0.20 0.62
Workplace characteristics
N employees, 1990
25–49 0.18 0.24 0.58
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50–99 0.20 0.06 0.75
100–199 0.15 0.06 0.78
200–499 0.18 0.03 0.78
500–999 0.13 0.01 0.86
1000+ 0.12 0.04 0.84
N employees, 1987
25–49 0.17 0.23 0.61
50–99 0.24 0.07 0.69
100–199 0.15 0.04 0.81
200–499 0.16 0.03 0.81
500–999 0.11 0.03 0.87
1000+ 0.11 0.01 0.89
Manufacturing/extraction 0.25 0.12 0.63
Services 0.15 0.16 0.69
Single workplace 0.15 0.15 0.70
Branch 0.20 0.15 0.65
HQ 0.13 0.16 0.71
Admin office or HQ 0.17 0.12 0.71
Sells goods/services 0.17 0.16 0.67
UK-owned 0.19 0.15 0.66
Foreign-owned 0.12 0.10 0.78
Ownership missing 0.23 0.16 0.61
Age, < 5 yrs 0.20 0.10 0.70
Age, 5–9 yrs 0.18 0.14 0.69
Age, 10–20 yrs 0.19 0.13 0.69
Age, 21+ yrs 0.18 0.17 0.65
Age, DK/NA 0.12 0.37 0.51
Workforce characteristics
Uses short-term or fixed term contracts 0.09 0.10 0.81
Doesn’t use short-term or fixed-term contracts 0.19 0.15 0.65
Percentage non-manual:
<50% 0.21 0.13 0.66
>=50% 0.14 0.18 0.68
Percentage part-time:
0% 0.26 0.13 0.61
1–24% 0.19 0.16 0.65
25+% 0.12 0.12 0.76
DK 0.07 0.32 0.61
Percentage female:
0–24% 0.22 0.11 0.66
25–74% 0.17 0.17 0.66
75+% 0.13 0.18 0.69
DK 0.16 0.13 0.70
Nature of product market
Number of competitors:
None 0.12 0.13 0.75
<6 0.18 0.13 0.69
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6+ 0.19 0.17 0.61
DK/NA 0.18 0.09 0.73
Product diversity:
Single product 0.23 0.10 0.67
Single product/service does 25%+ sales 0.16 0.18 0.66
Diversified range 0.10 0.23 0.67
DK/NA 0.16 0.13 0.70
Location of market:
Local 0.13 0.21 0.67
Regional 0.24 0.15 0.61
National 0.18 0.13 0.69
International 0.20 0.13 0.67
DK/NA 0.22 0.08 0.69
Workplace performance
Financial performance relative to others in the industry:
A lot better 0.09 0.15 0.76
A little better 0.14 0.15 0.70
Average 0.25 0.15 0.60
A little below 0.20 0.20 0.59
A lot below 0.16 0.05 0.79
DK/NA 0.21 0.14 0.65
Capacity utilisation:
Full 0.16 0.16 0.68
Below capacity 0.20 0.15 0.65
Much below capacity 0.41 0.11 0.48
DK/NA 0.16 0.15 0.69
Trend in value of sales, 89–90:
Rose 0.16 0.16 0.68
Fell 0.26 0.12 0.62
Stable 0.25 0.14 0.61
DK/NA 0.16 0.15 0.69
Employment change, 89–90:
<5%+ 0.26 0.13 0.61
>=5%+ 0.12 0.15 0.73
Stable 0.19 0.12 0.69
Missing 0.18 0.30 0.52
Employment change, 87–90:
<5%+ 0.25 0.15 0.60
>=5%+ 0.15 0.12 0.73
Stable 0.16 0.13 0.71
Missing 0.19 0.21 0.60
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Table A2: Workplace closure in the private sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union recognition 0.124 0.096 0.141 0.232 0.072
(1.08) (0.67) (0.92) (1.21) (0.47)
Industry-level union density (%) 0.032 0.032 0.047 0.000
(2.46)* (2.08)* (2.01)* (0.01)
Log number employees in 1990 –0.161 –0.157 –0.172 –0.153
(2.36)* (1.98)* (1.80) (2.07)*
% of employees non-manual –0.004 –0.002 –0.004 –0.003
(1.55) (0.74) (0.95) (1.27)
Single independent workplace –0.424 –0.603 –0.297 –0.454
(2.61)** (3.46)** (0.72) (2.64)**
North –0.073 0.141 0.004 –0.159
(0.29) (0.52) (0.01) (0.58)
North West –0.265 –0.216 –0.386 –0.226
(1.22) (0.88) (1.32) (0.97)
Yorks and Humberside –0.610 –0.355 –0.279 –0.590
(2.43)* (1.36) (0.82) (2.25)*
W Midlands –0.300 –0.099 0.032 –0.297
(1.28) (0.38) (0.10) (1.13)
E Midlands –0.349 –0.226 –0.151 –0.255
(1.25) (0.74) (0.42) (0.89)
East Anglia 0.244 0.475 0.118 0.302
(0.69) (1.15) (0.24) (0.78)
South West –0.340 –0.185 –0.864 –0.390
(1.28) (0.64) (2.08)* (1.34)
Greater London 0.106 0.220 0.145 0.024
(0.50) (0.96) (0.46) (0.10)
Wales –0.267 –0.020 –0.162 –0.226
(0.76) (0.06) (0.36) (0.62)
Scotland –0.450 –0.386 –0.374 –0.444
(1.87) (1.47) (1.13) (1.73)
Metals and Mineral Products –0.410 –0.706 –0.501 –0.502
(1.01) (1.62) 1.547 (1.21)
Chemicals and Manufactured Fibres –0.293 –0.941 0.251 –0.953
(0.51) (1.34) (0.21) (1.56)
Metal Goods 0.566 0.514 0.731 0.279
(1.16) (0.98) (0.85) (0.54)
Mechanical Engineering 0.379 0.092 0.842 –0.271
(0.73) (0.16) (0.86) (0.48)
Electrical and Instrument Engineering 1.085 0.869 1.617 0.189
(1.83) (1.33) (1.41) (0.28)
Vehicles and Transport Equipment 0.368 0.361 0.335 0.046
(0.67) (0.57) (0.40) (0.08)
Food, Drink and Tobacco 0.632 0.548 1.479 –0.145
(1.25) (0.99) (1.55) (0.27)
Textiles 1.076 0.611 1.783 0.055
(1.52) (0.81) (1.38) (0.07)
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Leather, Footwear and Clothing 1.653 1.505 2.271 0.840
(2.78)** (2.24)* (2.02)* (1.28)
Timber and Furniture, Paper 0.693 0.470 0.523 0.291
and Printing (1.59) (0.98) (0.63) (0.62)
Rubber, Plastics and Other 0.791 0.606 (0.74) –0.044
Manufacturing (1.20) (0.85) (1.29) (0.06)
Energy and Water 0.815
(1.41)
Construction 0.317 0.071 1.424 –0.151
(0.74) (0.15) (1.65) (0.33)
Wholesale Distribution 1.046 0.686 1.926 0.037
(1.79) (1.05) (1.68) (0.06)
Retail Distribution 0.318 0.153 0.976 –0.609
(0.53) (0.23) (0.84) (0.88)
Hotels, Catering, Repairs 0.609 0.261 1.266 –0.800
(0.77) (0.30) (0.84) (0.84)
Transport 0.073 –0.430 0.286 0.093
(0.19) (0.97) (0.43) (0.23)
Post and Telecommunications –0.919 –1.136 –1.357
(2.02)* (2.17)* (1.82)
Banking, Finance, Insurance –1.102 –1.758 –1.101 –0.949
(2.97)** (3.76)** (1.99)* (1.80)
Business Services 0.818 0.553 1.642 –0.358
(1.22) (0.73) (1.22) (0.45)
School Education –0.235 –0.297 –0.159
(0.50) (0.59) (0.30)
Other Education –0.168 –0.514 –0.358
(0.22) (0.62) (0.43)
Medical Services –1.996 –2.290 –2.114
(4.52)** (4.77)** (4.64)**
Employment rose 5%+, 1989–90 –0.256
(1.74)
Uses short-term/fixed-term contracts –0.297 –0.569
(1.37) (2.59)**
No good/service accounts for –0.580 –0.662
25%+ sales (3.10)** (2.78)**
No competitors –0.739 –0.866
(2.95)** (3.06)**
Financial performance better –0.668
than average (4.06)**
Operating considerably below 0.535
capacity (1.91)
Constant –0.959 –1.152 –0.913 –1.603 0.413
(12.09)** (1.34) (0.96) (1.00) (0.40)
Observations 1417 1413 1132 776 1223
Note: reference categories: South East; Other Services.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A3: Closure rates in the private sector, by worker voice in 1990
All Manufacturing Services
Union and non-union voice:
Union voice only (union rec or choose JCC rep) 0.20 0.21 0.18
Non-union voice only (non-union appointment 
to JCC, briefing group, regular workforce 
meetings, problem solving group, or presence 
of non-union reps where no union members) 0.15 0.18 0.14
Union and non-union voice 0.20 0.33 0.16
None 0.20 0.31 0.16
Representative and direct voice:
Representative voice only (union rec or 
functioning JCC) 0.17 0.20 0.15
Direct voice only (briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group) 0.15 0.12 0.15
Representative and direct voice 0.20 0.31 0.15
None 0.20 0.31 0.16
Joint consultative committee 0.18 0.26 0.13
Functioning JCC (meets at least once a month) 0.18 0.26 0.13
No JCC 0.18 0.24 0.16
Management ability to organise work of 
non-managerial staff limited by workers (union 
members, representatives, or non-union 
workers, or formal agreement) 0.19 0.28 0.13
Management ability to organise not limited 0.18 0.24 0.15
Measures of union presence:
Union recognition 0.20 0.28 0.16
No recognised union 0.17 0.23 0.15
Union members, no recognition 0.20 0.31 0.13
No recognition, no members 0.16 0.20 0.15
1 recognised union 0.19 0.33 0.13
2 recognised unions 0.16 0.21 0.14
3+ recognised unions 0.30 0.24 0.34
Recognised union, manual members only 0.26 0.29 0.23
Recognised union, non-manual members only 0.15 0.16 0.15
Recognised union, both manual and 
non-manual members 0.20 0.22 0.19
Closed shop 0.20 0.24 0.16
Pre-entry closed shop 0.14 0.19 0.00
No closed shop 0.18 0.25 0.15
Union chooses JCC reps 0.27 0.25 0.29
Union representative at workplace 0.22 0.27 0.17
No on-site union representative 0.17 0.24 0.15
Full-time on-site union representative 0.17 0.18 0.16
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On-site union representative, not full-time 0.22 0.27 0.18
Recognition, but no on-site representation 0.17 0.24 0.14
External union representation only 0.23 0.66 0.22
Recognition, but no representation on or 
off-site 0.14 0.39 0.07
Union density, zero 0.16 0.20 0.15
Union density 0.01–24% 0.15 0.25 0.11
Union density 25–49% 0.33 0.39 0.27
Union density 50–74% 0.15 0.25 0.10
Union density 75–89% 0.22 0.24 0.21
Union density 90–99% 0.26 0.31 0.23
Union density 100% 0.18 0.68 0.09
Don’t know workplace union density 0.18 0.23 0.15
Joint bargaining (ie single-table with 
multi-unions) 0.34 0.34 0.35
Separate bargaining 0.20 0.18 0.21
Only a single recognised union 0.19 0.33 0.13
N bargaining units:
0 0.17 0.23 0.15
1 0.20 0.33 0.14
2 0.18 0.16 0.20
3+ 0.22 0.21 0.22
Bargaining over employment where recognition:
No bargaining over employment 0.20 0.31 0.15
Bargaining over staffing levels 0.20 0.28 0.17
Bargaining over recruitment 0.41 0.27 0.71
Bargaining over staff levels and recruitment 0.17 0.21 0.15
Union formal agreement limits management 
ability to organise non-managerial employees 0.19 0.26 0.18
Management not limited by formal agreement 0.18 0.25 0.15
Industry-level union density:
Under 36 per cent 0.18 0.26 0.15
More than or equal to 36 per cent 0.18 0.22 0.16
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Table A4: Workplace closure in the private manufacturing sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union recognition 0.168 0.486 0.439 0.362 0.497
(0.92) (2.11)* (1.78) (1.20) (2.08)*
Industry-level union density (%) –0.028 –0.025 –0.062 –0.024
(1.45) (1.33) (2.59)** (1.13)
Log number employees in 1990 –0.194 –0.188 –0.197 –0.195
(1.70) (1.57) (1.47) (1.60)
% of employees non-manual –0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.39) (0.10) (0.13) (0.01)
Single independent workplace –0.158 –0.354 –0.453 –0.144
(0.70) (1.48) (0.64) (0.62)
North 0.321 0.594 0.794 0.386
(0.72) (1.25) (1.36) (0.84)
North West –0.376 –0.325 –0.148 –0.334
(1.04) (0.83) (0.31) (0.90)
Yorks and Humberside –0.548 –0.335 –0.211 –0.530
(1.37) (0.82) (0.35) (1.30)
W Midlands 0.060 0.192 0.740 0.105
(0.18) (0.55) (1.70) (0.30)
E Midlands –0.574 –0.458 –0.122 –0.518
(1.51) (1.11) (0.26) (1.32)
East Anglia 0.195 –0.186 0.710 0.105
(0.40) (0.35) (1.12) (0.21)
South West –0.089 0.115 –0.065 –0.040
(0.20) (0.24) (0.10) (0.09)
Greater London –0.024 –0.088 –0.027 –0.106
(0.06) (0.20) (0.05) (0.25)
Wales –0.582 –0.329 –1.879 –0.541
(1.03) (0.57) (3.53)** (0.96)
Scotland –1.146 –1.042 –0.353 –1.582
(3.06)** (2.65)** (0.78) (3.53)**
Chemicals and Manufactured Fibres –0.844 –1.129 –0.906 –0.852
(1.73) (1.92) (0.97) (1.63)
Metal Goods 0.513 0.763 0.473 0.493
(1.14) (1.63) (0.81) (1.03)
Mechanical Engineering –0.116 –0.064 –0.514 –0.122
(0.30) (0.16) (1.05) (0.28)
Electrical/Instrument Engineering 0.208 0.314 –0.119 0.257
(0.42) (0.64) (0.19) (0.46)
Vehicles and Transport Equipment 0.496 0.758 0.026 0.433
(1.11) (1.45) (0.04) (0.92)
Food, Drink and Tobacco 0.285 0.574 0.419 0.121
(0.74) (1.39) (0.81) (0.29)
Leather, Footwear and Clothing 0.974 1.192 0.642 1.070
(2.22)* (2.59)** (1.13) (2.20)*
Timber/Furniture, Paper/Printing 0.535 0.659 0.041 0.579
(1.63) (1.92) (0.10) (1.62)
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Rubber, Plastics and Other Manuf –0.132 0.027 –0.656 –0.068
(0.25) (0.05) (1.12) (0.12)
Uses short-term/fixed-term contracts –0.345 –0.387
(1.06) (1.16)
Employment rose 5%+, 1989–90 –0.056
(0.25)
No good/service accounts for 
25%+ sales –0.495 –0.711
(1.92) (2.25)*
No competitors –0.578 –0.376
(1.58) (0.89)
Financial performance better than 
average –1.004
(3.84)**
Operating considerably below 
capacity –0.157
(0.50)
Constant –0.755 0.764 0.611 2.322 0.585
(5.44)** (0.83) (0.65) (1.94) (0.58)
Observations 626 626 536 381 569
Note: reference categories: South East; Metal and Mineral Products and Textiles
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A5: Workplace closure in the private service sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union recognition 0.058 –0.104 0.005 0.334 –0.183
(0.38) (0.54) (0.02) (1.28) (0.87)
Industry-level union density (%) 0.020 0.028 0.018 0.024
(2.13)* (2.66)** (1.09) (2.41)*
Log 1990 employment –0.184 –0.136 –0.227 –0.185
(2.04)* (1.26) (1.55) (1.84)
% of employees non-manual –0.004 –0.002 –0.004 –0.005
(1.56) (0.72) (0.96) (1.45)
Single independent workplace –0.597 –0.794 –0.089 –0.721
(2.56)* (3.14)** (0.14) (2.80)**
North –0.249 –0.023 –0.343 –0.429
(0.78) (0.07) (0.77) (1.14)
North West –0.273 –0.179 –0.577 –0.265
(0.99) (0.55) (1.58) (0.86)
Yorks and Humberside –0.690 –0.432 –0.235 –0.679
(2.06)* (1.20) (0.56) (1.96)
Midlands –0.556 –0.476 –0.415 –0.582
(1.64) (1.14) (0.84) (1.51)
East Anglia 0.314 0.738 –0.239 0.401
(0.71) (1.51) (0.36) (0.79)
South West –0.461 –0.362 –1.567 –0.695
(1.42) (1.00) (2.41)* (1.91)
Greater London 0.140 0.323 0.210 0.062
(0.57) (1.20) (0.56) (0.22)
Wales –0.097 0.074 0.033 –0.113
(0.22) (0.16) (0.06) (0.26)
Scotland –0.229 –0.115 –0.388 –0.123
(0.82) (0.37) (0.94) (0.42)
Energy and Water 0.456 0.236 0.967 0.079
(0.76) (0.35) (0.86) (0.12)
Construction 0.252 0.126 1.319 0.025
(0.74) (0.32) (1.98)* (0.07)
Wholesale Distribution 0.699 0.603 1.046 0.526
(2.55)* (1.95) (2.73)** (1.85)
Retail Distribution –0.061 0.029 0.080 –0.103
(0.23) (0.10) (0.23) (0.36)
Transport 0.119 –0.415 0.331 –0.013
(0.27) (0.81) (0.44) (0.03)
Post and Telecommunications –0.536 –1.052 –0.417 –0.825
(0.86) (1.51) (0.34) (1.18)
Banking, Finance and Insurance –0.865 –1.641 –0.837 –1.285
(1.79) (2.85)** (1.00) (2.19)*
Business Services 0.331 0.370 0.662 0.332
(1.11) (1.09) (1.42) (0.98)
School Education –0.068 –0.212 –0.539
(0.12) (0.34) (0.92)
90 / Alex Bryson
Employee Voice 15/5  19/7/01  10:02 am  Page 90
Other Education –0.159 –0.476 –0.314
(0.19) (0.52) (0.32)
Medical Services –2.016 –2.296 –2.281
(4.34)** (4.56)** (4.55)**
Uses short-term/fixed-term contracts –0.332 –0.939
(1.10) (2.59)**
Employment rose 5%+ 1989–90 –0.471
(2.46)*
No service accounts for 25%+ sales –0.716 –0.538
(2.44)* (1.51)
No competitors –0.800 –1.032
(2.41)* (2.60)**
Financial performance above 
average for industry –0.538
(2.34)*
Operating considerably below 
capacity 1.311
(3.09)**
Constant –1.048 –0.377 –0.728 –0.087 –0.120
(10.77)** (0.77) (1.36) (0.12) (0.21)
Observations 791 787 596 395 654
Note: Reference categories: South East; Other Services
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Union and non-union voice:
Union voice only (union rec. or choose JCC rep) 0.17 0.06 0.16
Non-union voice only (non-union 
appointment to JCC, briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group, 
or presence of non-union reps where no 
union members) 0.37 0.43 0.11
Union and non-union voice 0.27 0.29 0.72
None 0.19 0.20 0.00
Representative and direct voice:
Representative voice only (union rec. or 
functioning JCC) 0.22 0.11 0.16
Direct voice only (briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group) 0.22 0.32 0.09
Representative and direct voice 0.36 0.36 0.74
None 0.19 0.20 0.00
Measures of union presence:
Union recognition 0.44 0.36 0.88
1 recognised union 0.22 0.22 0.12
2 recognised unions 0.11 0.08 0.34
3+ recognised unions 0.10 0.05 0.43
Recognised union, manual members only 0.34 0.15 0.48
Recognised union, non-manual members only 0.09 0.17 0.75
Recognised union, both manual and 
non-manual members 0.17 0.13 0.30
Closed shop 0.07 0.03 0.04
Union representative at workplace 0.39 0.20 0.58
Joint bargaining (ie. single-table with 
multi-unions) 0.05 0.01 0.13
Separate bargaining 0.16 0.13 0.63
Only a single recognised union 0.22 0.22 0.12
Mean workplace-level union density 0.33 0.26 0.77
Mean workplace-level collective bargaining 
coverage 0.30 0.27 0.66
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Table A7: Closure rates in the public sector, by worker voice in 1990
Closure Shrinkage Survival
Union and non-union voice:
Union voice only (union rec or choose JCC rep) 0.04 0.12 0.84
Non-union voice only (non-union 
appointment to JCC, briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group, 
or presence of non-union reps where no 
union members) 0.01 0.00 0.99
Union and non-union voice 0.08 0.11 0.81
None 0.18 0.00 0.82
Joint consultative committee 0.08 0.08 0.85
Functioning JCC (meets at least once a month) 0.08 0.08 0.82
No JCC 0.06 0.12 0.82
Management ability to organise work of 
non-managerial staff limited by workers 
(union members, representatives, or 
non-union workers, or formal agreement) 0.12 0.10 0.78
Management ability to organise not limited 0.04 0.10 0.86
Measures of union presence:
Union recognition 0.07 0.11 0.81
No recognised union 0.01 0.00 0.99
1 recognised union 0.01 0.22 0.77
2 recognised unions 0.11 0.08 0.81
3+ recognised unions 0.06 0.11 0.83
Recognised union, manual members only 0.09 0.12 0.80
Recognised union, non-manual members only 0.09 0.09 0.82
Recognised union, both manual and 
non-manual members 0.07 0.05 0.88
Closed shop 0.24 0.14 0.63
No closed shop 0.06 0.10 0.84
Union chooses JCC reps 0.06 0.09 0.85
Union representative at workplace 0.07 0.08 0.85
No on-site union representative 0.06 0.13 0.81
Full-time on-site union representative 0.04 0.17 0.78
Union density, zero 0.11 0.00 0.89
Union density 0.01–24% 0.07 0.00 0.93
Union density 25–49% 0.10 0.06 0.83
Union density 50–74% 0.01 0.14 0.85
Union density 75–89% 0.09 0.04 0.87
Union density 90–99% 0.02 0.11 0.86
Union density 100% 0.09 0.10 0.81
Don’t know workplace union density 0.09 0.17 0.74
Joint bargaining (ie single-table with 
multi-unions) 0.08 0.14 0.78
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Separate bargaining 0.08 0.09 0.83
Only a single recognised union 0.01 0.22 0.77
N bargaining units:
0 0.01 0.00 0.99
1 0.05 0.19 0.76
2 0.11 0.08 0.82
3+ 0.05 0.10 0.85
Union formal agreement limits management 
ability to organise non-managerial employees 0.11 0.11 0.77
Management not limited by formal agreement 0.05 0.10 0.86
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Table A8: Workplace closure in the public sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Worker limitations on 0.519 0.753 0.627 0.597 0.459
management (2.09)* (2.53)* (2.16)* (1.81) (1.35)
Industry-level union density (%) –0.011 –0.009 0.004 0.009
(0.75) (0.58) (0.16) (0.41)
Log employment in 1990 –0.019 0.001 0.266 0.357
(0.18) (0.01) (2.30)* (2.73)**
% non-manuals –0.008 –0.008 –0.010 –0.009
(1.98)* (1.93) (1.66) (1.50)
North –0.714 –0.738 –0.630 –0.623
(1.15) (1.20) (1.05) (0.88)
North West –0.187 –0.075 –0.270 –0.134
(0.39) (0.16) (0.60) (0.32)
Yorks and Humberside –1.024 –0.960 –0.971 –0.973
(2.10)* (1.98)* (1.96) (1.94)
Midlands –1.245 –1.273 –2.803 –2.699
(2.43)* (2.40)* (4.20)** (3.89)**
East Anglia –0.577 –0.585 –0.763 –0.877
(0.93) (0.95) (1.14) (1.20)
South West –0.394 –0.469 –0.449 –0.152
(0.86) (1.03) (0.93) (0.33)
Greater London 0.211 0.264 0.009 –0.001
(0.46) (0.57) (0.02) (0.00)
Wales –1.462 –1.267 –0.948 –1.111
(2.32)* (2.15)* (1.98)* (1.76)
Scotland –0.196 –0.209 –0.464 –0.416
(0.41) (0.43) (0.84) (0.74)
Education 0.117 0.196 –0.220 –0.251
(0.26) (0.43) (0.36) (0.42)
Central government 2.076 2.125 2.065 1.954
(3.88)** (3.84)** (3.27)** (3.36)**
Local government 1.897 1.884 1.662 1.454
(3.55)** (3.57)** (2.43)* (2.33)*
Medical services 1.837 1.890 1.098 0.914
(3.52)** (3.46)** (1.46) (1.28)
Other public sector services 1.673 1.798 1.480 1.591
(4.17)** (4.27)** (2.61)** (2.82)**
Operating at address 5–9 years –1.052 –1.304 –1.198
(2.22)* (2.37)* (2.05)*
Operating at address 10–20 years –0.625 –0.638 –0.813
(1.55) (1.21) (1.50)
Operating at address over 20 yrs –0.449 –0.375 –0.175
(1.15) (0.82) (0.37)
% of employees female 0.026 0.024
(3.27)** (3.05)**
None of workforce work part-time 1.793 1.706
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(3.81)** (3.21)**
25%+ workforce work part-time –0.174 –0.026
(0.37) (0.05)
Employment fell 5%+ in 1989–90 0.703
(2.15)*
Constant –1.700 –1.832 –1.555 –4.597 –5.335
(10.48)** (1.98)* (1.70) (3.55)** (3.55)**
Observations 614 614 600 494 407
Note: Reference categories: South East; Other public sector industries (largely Post and
Telecommunications, Transport); Operating at address for under 5 years; 1–24% workforce work part-
time.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A9: Employment growth per annum in the private sector,
1990–1998, by 1990 characteristics
All Manufacturing Services
Whole sector 0.34 0.46 0.30
Measures of voice
Union and non-union voice:
Union voice only (union rec or choose JCC rep) –1.49 0.26 –2.96
Non-union voice only (non-union appointment 
to JCC, briefing group, regular workforce 
meetings, problem solving group, or presence 
of non-union reps where no union members) 1.08 1.25 1.04
Union and non-union voice –1.84 –1.17 –2.20
None 2.37 2.22 2.41
Representative and direct voice:
Representative voice only (union rec or 
functioning JCC) –1.35 0.45 –2.42
Direct voice only (briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group) 1.04 .059 1.15
Representative and direct voice –0.58 –0.18 –0.78
None 2.37 2.22 2.41
Joint consultative committee –0.46 –0.42 –0.48
Functioning JCC (meets at least once a month) –0.40 –0.43 –0.39
No JCC 0.62 0.83 0.54
Management ability to organise work of 
non-managerial staff limited by workers 
(union members, representatives, or non-union 
workers, or formal agreement) –2.28 –2.28 –2.28
Management ability to organise not limited 0.63 0.81 0.56
Measures of union presence
Union recognition –1.75 –0.71 –2.40
No recognised union 1.44 1.53 1.41
Derecognition by 1998 0.34 –0.99 1.23
New recognition by 1998 0.06 2.44 –0.62
1 recognised union –1.17 –0.40 –1.56
2 recognised unions –1.42 1.15 –3.08
3+ recognised unions –3.88 –3.48 –4.26
Types of union at workplace:
Manuals-only union –0.51 0.29 –1.52
Non-manuals only union –4.26 12.83 –4.57
Manuals and non-manuals union –1.41 –0.70 –1.68
Manuals only and non-manuals only –1.33 –1.74 –0.80
Manuals only and manual/non-manual –1.54 –1.70 –3.22
Non-manuals only and manual/non-manual –3.06 –3.18 –3.03
All 3 types of union –3.84 –3.75 –3.87
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 97
Employee Voice 15/5  19/7/01  10:02 am  Page 97
Any recognised union with manual members 
only –1.27 –0.75 –1.90
Any recognised union with non-manual 
members only –3.08 –1.97 –3.50
Any recognised union with both manual and 
non-manual members –1.95 –1.49 –2.17
Closed shop –2.48 –2.99 –1.98
No closed shop 0.45 0.71 0.36
Union chooses JCC reps –2.67 –2.52 –2.84
Union representative at workplace –1.70 –0.39 –2.90
No on-site union representative 1.06 1.15 1.03
Union density:
0% 1.57 0.69 1.79
1–24% –0.25 0.94 –0.64
25–49% –0.22 2.20 –1.87
50–74% –1.68 0.81 –3.54
75–89% –2.08 –0.62 –3.75
90–99% –2.24 2.00 –2.37
100% –0.92 –13.57 –0.55
Joint bargaining (ie single-table with 
multi-unions) –3.03 –2.17 –4.69
Separate bargaining –2.34 –0.74 –3.43
Only a single recognised union –1.17 –0.40 –1.56
N bargaining units:
0 1.44 1.53 1.41
1 –1.34 –0.69 –1.72
2 –1.62 1.10 –4.11
3+ –3.23 –4.18 –2.79
Collective bargaining coverage:
0% 1.44 1.52 1.41
1–19% 1.40 11.30 1.04
20–49% –2.80 –1.44 –2.91
50–79% –1.23 –0.31 –2.34
80–99% –2.54 –1.83 –3.19
100% –2.13 –0.24 –2.62
Bargaining over employment where recognition:
No bargaining over employment –1.94 –0.01 –2.93
Bargaining over staffing levels –1.36 –3.63 –0.74
Bargaining over recruitment –1.92 –0.50 –4.31
Bargaining over staff levels and recruitment –1.17 –0.87 –1.45
Industry-level union density:
Under 25 per cent 0.52 –1.20 –0.49
More than or equal to 25 per cent 0.16 1.15 0.85
Workplace characteristics
N employees, 1990:
25–49 1.32 –0.12 1.57
50–99 0.65 2.71 –0.44
100–199 –0.56 –0.48 –0.60
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200–499 –2.30 –1.75 –2.69
500–999 –5.47 –5.89 –4.94
1000+ –4.41 –5.97 –1.31
Manufacturing/extraction 0.46 NA NA
Services 0.30 NA NA
Single workplace 0.98 0.98 0.99
Branch –0.44 –0.20 –0.52
HQ 6.48 8.72 6.17
Admin office or HQ 3.94 0.28 3.67
Sells goods/services 0.04 6.11 –0.01
UK-owned 0.15 0.30 0.10
Foreign-owned 2.64 1.73 3.38
Ownership missing –2.13 –5.27 –1.52
Age, < 5 yrs 1.55 0.73 1.74
Age, 5–9 yrs –0.11 0.44 –0.44
Age, 10–20 yrs 0.49 1.17 0.27
Age, 21+ yrs 0.00 0.00 –0.00
Non-executive share ownership scheme 0.20 0.66 0.01
No non-executive share ownership scheme 0.38 0.40 0.37
Profit sharing scheme 0.44 0.59 0.40
No profit sharing scheme 0.24 0.39 0.17
Workforce characteristics
Uses short-term or fixed term contracts –0.28 2.02 –0.96
Doesn’t use short-term or fixed term contracts 0.52 0.26 0.62
Percentage non-manual
<50% –0.04 0.32 –0.28
>=50% 0.83 1.16 0.79
Percentage part-time:
0% 1.53 2.27 1.12
1–24% 0.01 0.01 –0.00
25+% 0.56 –9.32 0.63
Percentage female:
0–24% –0.05 0.17 –0.21
25–74% 1.23 2.02 1.00
75+% –0.16 –2.34 0.01
Nature of product market
Number of competitors:
None –1.43 –0.01 –1.84
<6 0.43 –0.02 0.72
6+ –0.05 0.59 –0.27
Don’t know 0.18 0.17 0.18
Product diversity:
Single product –0.25 –0.27 –0.25
Single product/service does 25%+ sales –0.62 –0.00 –0.91
Diversified range 2.11 1.72 2.32
DK/NA 2.72 3.80 2.54
Employee Voice, Workplace Closure and Employment Growth / 99
Employee Voice 15/5  19/7/01  10:02 am  Page 99
Location of market:
Local –0.78 –2.19 –0.72
Regional –0.00 –0.88 0.14
National 0.63 0.29 1.00
International 0.88 0.46 1.50
Workplace performance
Financial performance relative to others in 
the industry:
A lot better 0.03 –1.03 0.34
A little better –0.68 –1.56 –0.43
Average 0.25 2.61 –1.06
A little below –0.18 1.09 –4.43
A lot below –2.24 –2.20 –2.27
Capacity utilisation:
Full –0.06 –0.90 0.17
Below capacity 0.14 –0.19 0.26
Much below capacity –1.89 –1.31 –2.21
Trend in value of sales, 89–90:
Rose 0.06 –0.00 0.01
Fell 0.92 –0.67 1.97
Stable –1.21 –1.54 –1.05
Employment change, 89–90:
<5%+ 0.32 0.93 –0.00
>=5%+ 1.81 1.83 1.80
Stable –1.15 –0.93 –1.26
Missing –1.20 –0.24 –1.44
Employment change, 87–90:
<5%+ –0.50 –0.19 –0.78
>=5%+ 1.52 2.08 1.32
Stable 0.59 –1.58 –1.17
Missing –0.70 –1.56 –0.53
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Table A10: Employment growth in the private sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union recognition –3.188 –3.964 –3.861 –3.871 –4.171
(4.40)** (3.64)** (3.55)** (3.69)** (3.59)**
North 2.463 2.779 1.502 2.088
(1.83) (1.48) (0.76) (1.01)
North West –0.343 –0.457 –1.270 0.000
(0.24) (0.24) (0.67) (0.00)
Yorks and Humberside 1.544 1.778 0.974 1.753
(1.29) (1.22) (0.65) (1.21)
West Midlands 1.925 2.356 1.623 3.775
(1.02) (1.21) (0.84) (1.76)
East Midlands 0.194 0.233 –0.434 –1.034
(0.10) (0.12) (0.21) (0.55)
East Anglia –0.248 –0.460 –0.942 –1.309
(0.19) (0.35) (0.67) (0.84)
South West 1.075 0.619 0.052 –0.564
(0.62) (0.36) (0.03) (0.32)
Greater London 2.173 2.344 1.782 2.326
(1.51) (1.63) (1.39) (1.65)
Wales 1.245 0.881 –0.395 0.739
(0.89) (0.52) (0.21) (0.36)
Scotland 0.589 0.731 –0.635 0.510
(0.46) (0.45) (0.34) (0.28)
Metals and Mineral Products 2.272 2.399 1.972 2.531
(1.63) (1.62) (1.33) (1.55)
Chemicals and Manufactured Fibres 2.578 2.749 2.887 3.307
(1.29) (1.40) (1.47) (1.90)
Metal Goods 6.526 6.727 6.081 5.866
(2.54)* (2.55)* (2.34)* (2.46)*
Mechanical Engineering 1.035 1.408 1.369 1.364
(0.67) (0.91) (0.84) (0.90)
Electrical & Instrument Engineering 0.875 0.753 1.067 1.677
(0.68) (0.56) (0.76) (1.26)
Vehicles & Transport Equipment –2.525 –2.491 –1.889 –2.370
(2.19)* (2.17)* (0.93) (1.26)
Food, Drink, Tobacco 0.026 –0.240 –0.296 –0.755
(0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.17)
Textiles –1.372 –1.511 –1.841 –1.293
(1.21) (1.27) (1.44) (0.51)
Leather, Footwear, Clothing –0.725 –0.646 –1.751 0.122
(0.55) (0.50) (1.17) (0.08)
Timber/Furniture, Paper/Printing 1.291 1.422 0.976 2.251
(0.53) (0.58) (0.47) (0.97)
Rubber, Plastics & Other –1.876 –1.890 –2.487 –1.856
Manufacturing (1.04) (1.09) (1.38) (1.13)
Energy and Water –5.694 –5.598 –5.402 –4.410
(2.31)* (2.22)* (2.73)** (2.24)*
Construction –1.152 –0.897 –2.178 –1.518
(0.81) (0.62) (1.28) (0.77)
Wholesale Distribution 2.893 3.024 2.443 2.937
(1.38) (1.46) (1.16) (1.36)
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Hotels, Catering & Repairs –2.693 –2.752 –3.259 –3.215
(1.78) (1.86) (2.20)* (2.19)*
Transport –1.303 –1.378 –2.107 –2.109
(0.91) (0.91) (1.32) (1.31)
Post and Telecommunications –0.966 –0.977 –1.005 –1.054
(0.58) (0.59) (0.62) (0.74)
Banking, Finance and Insurance 3.143 3.255 3.489 6.205
(0.79) (0.81) (1.06) (1.60)
Business Services 0.911 0.998 0.848 1.794
(0.64) (0.72) (0.60) (1.27)
Higher Education –1.262 –0.982 –0.294 0.018
(0.85) (0.69) (0.18) (0.01)
School Education 1.994 2.190 2.082 2.504
(1.28) (1.35) (1.13) (1.41)
Other Education –2.872 –2.874 –1.408 –2.064
(2.14)* (2.12)* (0.93) (1.22)
Medical Services 0.056 –0.518 –0.504 0.715
(0.03) (0.25) (0.24) (0.34)
Other Services –0.772 –0.830 –0.467 –0.798
(0.78) (0.83) (0.43) (0.71)
% unemployed in TTWA, 1990 –0.138 –0.065 –0.261
(0.70) (0.33) (1.30)
Vacancy rate in LLMA, 1990 1.654 2.365 2.418
(1.46) (1.82) (1.98)*
Number employed in 1990 –0.003 –0.003
(4.09)** (3.88)**
% non-manuals –0.026 –0.028
(1.75) (1.80)
Single independent workplace 0.254 0.325
(0.32) (0.41)
Head office 5.472 4.933
(1.85) (1.63)
Non-executive share option scheme 0.737 0.659
(1.21) (0.96)
Profit sharing scheme –0.236 –0.157
(0.36) (0.22)
Employment change, 1989–90 0.031
(1.19)
At address for 5–9 years –1.719
(1.11)
At address for 10–20 years 0.674
(0.46)
At address for over 20 years 0.193
(0.14)
Constant 1.437 0.485 –0.490 0.464 0.611
(2.59)** (0.47) (0.29) (0.24) (0.28)
Observations 558 558 558 558 482
R-squared 0.05 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.27
Note: Reference categories: South East, Retail Distribution; branch of larger organisation; at address
for under 5 years.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A11: Employment growth in unionised and non-unionised private
sector workplaces
Unionised Non-unionised
Employment change, 1989–90 –0.029 0.061
(1.53) (1.68)
At address 5–9 years 0.240 –1.384
(0.12) (0.81)
At address 10–20 years 2.666 –0.600
(1.49) (0.36)
At address over 20 years 2.323 0.821
(1.56) (0.53)
Number of employees in 1990 –0.003 –0.011
(4.59)** (4.81)**
% non-manuals –0.019 –0.015
(1.21) (0.91)
Single independent workplace 1.037 –0.154
(1.16) (0.19)




North West 2.279 –0.510
(1.42) (0.22)
Yorks and Humberside 3.675 0.078
(2.54)* (0.05)
West Midlands –1.980 6.253
(1.19) (2.98)**
East Midlands 0.376 –0.625
(0.15) (0.37)
East Anglia 0.416 –1.697
(0.26) (0.83)
South West –0.271 1.669
(0.17) (0.81)






% economically active unemployed in TTWA 0.155 –0.309
(0.69) (1.30)
Jobcentre vacancies as % eco. Active in LLMA 0.016 4.830
(0.02) (2.97)**
Non-executive share option scheme –1.011 1.716
(1.52) (2.48)*
Profit sharing scheme 0.872 0.717
(1.14) (0.97)
Metals and mineral products –2.060 1.778
(1.25) (0.67)
Chemicals and Manufactured Fibres 0.249 4.342
(0.15) (2.16)*
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Metal Goods –2.893 12.931
(1.56) (6.92)**
Mechanical Engineering 0.123 3.741
(0.04) (2.67)**
Electrical and Instrument Engineering –0.604 1.590
(0.41) (1.13)
Vehicles and Transport Equipment –0.328 –1.468
(0.18) (0.84)




Leather, Footwear and Clothing –3.173 2.708
(2.31)* (1.62)
Timber and Furniture, Paper and Printing –4.379 6.703
(2.72)** (1.53)
Rubber, Plastics, and Other Manufacturing –2.922 –1.655
(1.20) (1.01)




Wholesale Distribution –6.594 8.067
(3.55)** (3.41)**




Post and Telecommunications –6.000 0.000
(3.49)** (.)
Banking, Finance and Insurance –2.216 18.713
(1.07) (7.27)**
Business Services –4.618 4.229
(2.13)* (3.18)**
Higher Education 5.909 3.651
(2.61)** (2.22)*
School Education –1.475 4.111
(0.67) (1.45)
Other Education 0.000 0.324
(.) (0.15)
Medical Services –1.173 –0.503
(0.64) (0.20)






Note: Reference categories: at address under 5 years; branch of larger organisation; South East;
Retail Distribution.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A12: Employment growth in the private sector using different
worker voice measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees in 1990 –0.004 –0.003 –0.004 –0.004 –0.003
(4.52)** (3.88)** (4.31)** (4.11)** (4.09)**
% non-manuals –0.014 –0.028 –0.027 –0.037 –0.024
(0.95) (1.81) (1.79) (2.15)* (1.68)
Single independent workplace 0.507 0.069 0.317 0.641 0.351
(0.62) (0.09) (0.41) (0.80) (0.44)
Head office 3.816 4.821 4.968 4.922 4.861
(1.47) (1.64) (1.67) (1.72) (1.67)
North 2.241 1.970 2.274 1.693 2.281
(1.12) (0.96) (1.11) (0.78) (1.06)
North West –0.068 –0.074 0.274 0.224 –0.334
(0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.12) (0.18)
Yorkshire and Humberside 1.695 1.429 2.125 1.471 1.668
(1.22) (1.02) (1.56) (1.00) (1.17)
West Midlands 3.918 3.899 4.256 3.807 3.838
(1.80) (1.91) (2.08)* (1.67) (1.89)
East Midlands –0.895 –1.075 –0.903 –1.490 –1.328
(0.48) (0.58) (0.53) (0.76) (0.74)
East Anglia 0.276 –1.106 –0.873 –2.186 –1.307
(0.16) (0.68) (0.57) (1.33) (0.88)
South West –0.088 –0.528 –0.217 –0.661 –0.415
(0.05) (0.30) (0.13) (0.34) (0.24)
Greater London 2.738 2.276 2.674 2.393 1.962
(2.00)* (1.69) (1.97)* (1.75) (1.42)
Wales 1.351 0.520 0.310 –0.114 0.893
(0.69) (0.25) (0.15) (0.05) (0.43)
Scotland 1.215 0.265 0.993 0.168 0.621
(0.74) (0.15) (0.56) (0.09) (0.34)
% unemployed in TTWA –0.263 –0.241 –0.293 –0.255 –0.293
(1.38) (1.21) (1.47) (1.24) (1.50)
Vacancy rate in LLMA 2.285 2.624 2.522 2.234 2.223
(1.89) (2.07)* (2.13)* (1.74) (1.82)
Non-executive share scheme 0.600 0.359 0.554 0.616 0.671
(0.86) (0.50) (0.83) (0.86) (1.01)
Profit sharing scheme –0.169 –0.182 0.000 –0.308 0.002
(0.24) (0.26) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00)
Metal & Mineral Products 2.124 1.891 3.094 2.243 3.086
(1.19) (1.08) (1.81) (1.38) (1.78)
Chemicals & Manuf. Fibres 2.932 3.359 3.696 3.633 3.066
(1.63) (1.93) (1.97)* (2.02)* (1.63)
Metal Goods 5.672 6.153 6.112 5.724 7.267
(2.17)* (2.45)* (2.69)** (2.27)* (3.02)**
Mechanical Engineering 1.236 1.544 0.894 2.723 1.237
(0.85) (1.03) (0.64) (1.49) (0.77)
Elec. & Instrument Eng. 1.340 1.962 1.651 1.397 1.441
(1.04) (1.36) (1.21) (1.04) (0.97)
Vehicles & Trans. Equipment –2.182 –2.479 –2.800 –2.392 –2.456
(1.19) (1.36) (1.60) (1.18) (1.38)
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Food, Drink & Tobacco –0.524 –0.882 –1.117 –0.705 –1.384
(0.12) (0.20) (0.25) (0.13) (0.32)
Textiles –1.093 –1.409 –2.086 –3.256 –1.423
(0.45) (0.53) (0.87) (1.00) (0.66)
Leather Footwear & Clothing 0.119 0.268 0.202 –0.229 1.000
(0.08) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.63)
Timber/Furniture, Paper/Print. 1.695 2.158 1.650 2.567 2.003
(0.68) (0.91) (0.69) (1.02) (0.87)
Rubber, Plastics, Other Manuf –1.815 –1.942 –2.038 –2.587 –1.552
(1.08) (1.23) (1.23) (1.53) (0.99)
Energy and Water –3.416 –3.526 –3.979 –5.132 –5.275
(1.36) (1.65) (1.84) (2.60)** (2.87)**
Construction –1.465 –1.663 –1.505 –2.762 –2.035
(0.77) (0.83) (0.76) (1.60) (0.99)
Wholesale Distribution 2.730 3.107 2.787 2.676 2.986
(1.24) (1.47) (1.29) (1.21) (1.36)
Hotels, Catering & Repairs –3.043 –3.478 –3.798 –3.631 –3.054
(2.14)* (2.70)** (3.02)** (2.73)** (2.11)*
Transport –1.938 –1.831 –2.304 –1.573 –2.868
(1.15) (1.13) (1.44) (0.94) (1.65)
Post and Telecommunications –0.456 0.153 –0.411 –1.711 –1.961
(0.21) (0.08) (0.28) (0.84) (1.37)
Banking, Finance & Insurance 8.727 7.113 6.392 7.943 5.857
(2.42)* (1.75) (1.69) (1.87) (1.57)
Business Services 1.236 1.784 1.502 2.157 1.893
(0.85) (1.26) (1.08) (1.52) (1.37)
Higher Education –0.302 0.045 –0.057 –0.602 0.624
(0.19) (0.03) (0.04) (0.36) (0.40)
School Education 2.785 2.111 2.615 2.647 2.270
(1.39) (1.05) (1.48) (1.44) (1.23)
Other Education –2.246 –2.298 –2.371 –2.576 –1.506
(1.35) (1.37) (1.46) (1.51) (0.88)
Medical Services –0.085 0.415 0.177 0.416 0.563
(0.04) (0.20) (0.08) (0.19) (0.27)
Other services –1.073 –0.845 –0.981 –2.115 –0.768
(0.93) (0.69) (0.88) (1.76) (0.64)
Employment change, 1989–90 0.038 0.028 0.036 0.032 0.035
(1.43) (1.05) (1.35) (1.15) (1.37)
At address 5–9 yrs –1.461 –1.737 –1.878 –1.448 –1.964
(0.92) (1.07) (1.23) (0.88) (1.30)
At address 10–20 yrs 0.452 0.700 0.562 1.692 0.534
(0.31) (0.48) (0.39) (1.08) (0.38)
At address 21+ years 0.107 0.219 0.103 0.454 0.153
(0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.32) (0.12)
Union voice only –6.951
(3.57)**
Dual channel voice –4.282
(2.80)**
Non-union voice only –1.442
(1.18)
Voice, don’t know type –8.933
(1.44)
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1–24% union density –1.231
(0.85)
25–49% union density –3.385
(2.01)*
50–74% union density –4.075
(2.84)**
75–89% union density –5.521
(2.84)**
90–99% union density –2.556
(1.79)
100% union density –0.533
(0.26)
Union, no employment negs. –5.026
(4.02)**
Union, neg. staffing levels 1.849
(0.70)
Union, neg. recruitment –3.851
(2.31)*
Union, neg. levels and rec. –3.506
(2.88)**
100% col. barg. coverage –5.297
(2.81)**
80–99% col. barg. coverage –3.925
(2.62)**
50–79% col. barg. coverage –3.433
(2.62)**
20–49% col. barg. coverage –5.551
(2.40)*
1–19% col. barg. Coverage –0.368
(0.11)
Manual only union –3.202
(1.63)




M and NM only unions –2.799
(1.85)
M and M+NM unions –3.372
(1.82)
NM and M+NM unions –5.627
(2.07)*
All 3 types of union present –4.054
(2.11)*
Constant –0.089 0.578 0.650 1.099 1.900
(0.04) (0.25) (0.30) (0.49) (0.78)
Observations 482 481 482 453 482
R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28
Note: Reference categories: branch of larger organisation; South East; Retail Distribution; at address
< 5 yrs. Then for voice measures: (1) no recognised union; (2) no collective bargaining coverage; (3)
no recognised union; (4) no union members; (5) no worker voice.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A13: Employment growth in private manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number employees –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.003
in 1990 (3.76)** (3.82)** (3.67)** (3.15)** (2.76)**
% non-manuals –0.001 –0.008 0.001 –0.018 0.006
(0.02) (0.28) (0.03) (0.63) (0.22)
Single independent –0.106 –0.033 0.209 1.078 –0.162
estab (0.08) (0.03) (0.16) (0.78) (0.13)
Head office 7.433 7.478 7.603 –11.812 7.557
(1.15) (1.21) (1.20) (3.79)** (1.26)
North 8.010 7.152 8.801 10.467 9.294
(1.87) (1.75) (2.14)* (2.40)* (2.31)*
North West 5.775 5.546 5.701 6.084 5.417
(2.32)* (2.34)* (2.28)* (2.32)* (2.30)*
Yorks and Humberside 6.897 5.921 6.962 8.193 6.468
(3.32)** (3.06)** (3.40)** (3.95)** (3.26)**
West Midlands 12.412 12.369 12.551 13.971 12.516
(4.62)** (4.69)** (4.61)** (5.10)** (4.74)**
East Midlands 5.051 4.431 5.031 4.884 4.778
(2.00)* (1.70) (2.06)* (1.81) (1.89)
East Anglia 7.331 7.685 7.653 8.182 7.692
(3.77)** (3.97)** (4.09)** (3.81)** (3.84)**
South West 6.445 6.919 6.503 8.070 5.743
(2.72)** (2.73)** (2.73)** (4.00)** (2.56)*
Greater London 3.426 2.998 3.704 4.214 3.206
(1.71) (1.51) (1.94) (2.57)* (1.65)
Wales 5.913 5.992 5.554 7.224 6.078
(2.72)** (2.70)** (2.54)* (2.44)* (2.83)**
Scotland 6.978 5.773 7.263 7.592 7.392
(3.23)** (2.84)** (3.34)** (3.39)** (3.46)**
% unemployed in TTWA –0.153 –0.037 –0.173 –0.372 –0.046
(0.49) (0.12) (0.56) (1.07) (0.16)
Vacancy rate in LLMA 1.622 1.724 1.841 –0.194 2.480
(1.00) (1.15) (1.09) (0.11) (1.57)
Non-exec share scheme 0.439 0.718 0.351 –0.454 1.249
(0.39) (0.64) (0.33) (0.44) (1.14)
Profit sharing scheme 0.404 0.505 0.354 0.723 –0.236
(0.44) (0.56) (0.41) (0.88) (0.27)
Metals & Mineral Prods. 3.371 2.042 3.340 0.984 3.884
(1.21) (0.70) (0.99) (0.38) (1.67)
Chemicals & Manu. Fibres 4.971 3.927 4.854 5.677 5.846
(1.61) (1.18) (1.34) (2.16)* (2.11)*
Metal Goods 5.937 6.044 5.907 6.043 7.446
(1.94) (1.71) (1.69) (1.98)* (2.55)*
Mechanical Engineering 2.777 2.219 2.120 5.771 4.132
(0.97) (0.69) (0.66) (2.24)* (1.68)
Elec. & Instr. Eng. 4.106 3.540 3.856 4.420 5.446
(1.49) (1.16) (1.20) (1.77) (2.18)*
Vehicles & Trans. Equip. 2.175 1.888 1.947 2.999 4.411
(0.64) (0.53) (0.51) (0.84) (1.35)
Food, Drink, Tobacco 2.436 2.238 1.890 6.088 4.370
(0.57) (0.51) (0.41) (1.30) (1.06)
Leather, Footwear, 2.299 0.886 2.029 3.209 2.712
Clothes (0.75) (0.25) (0.58) (0.99) (1.01)
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Timber etc. 3.387 2.623 3.143 2.105 4.067
(1.13) (0.80) (0.96) (0.77) (1.41)
Rubber etc. –0.380 –1.684 –0.407 –0.146 0.583
(0.14) (0.54) (0.13) (0.06) (0.24)
Employment change, 89–90 0.040 0.031 0.050 –0.038 0.038
(1.25) (0.98) (1.68) (1.23) (1.27)
5–9 yrs at address –2.518 –1.178 –2.502 –0.691 –1.352
(0.95) (0.46) (0.98) (0.25) (0.49)
10–20 yrs at address 0.640 1.298 0.992 1.744 0.938
(0.25) (0.53) (0.40) (0.60) (0.36)
21+ yrs at address 0.428 1.186 1.034 –0.360 1.442
(0.18) (0.52) (0.45) (0.14) (0.60)
Union recognition –2.235 –3.377
(1.72) (2.23)*
1 recognised union –2.228
(1.43)
2 recognised unions –2.276
(1.14)
3 recognised unions –7.398
(3.31)**
1–24% union density –2.715
(1.09)
25–49% union density 1.694
(1.03)
50–74% union density 0.020
(0.01)
75–89% union density –1.942
(0.96)
90–100% union density –1.642
(0.82)
Union, no emp negs –3.782
(2.47)*
Union neg staffing level –0.308
(0.10)
Union neg recruitment –1.075
(0.47)
Union neg stf and rec –4.802
(2.31)*
100% col barg coverage –5.603
(2.55)*
80–99% col barg coverage –4.194
(1.84)
50–79% col barg coverage –2.032
(1.29)
1–49% col barg –2.025
coverage (1.05)
Constant 1.527 –7.184 –7.614 –7.514 –6.277 –10.646
(1.34) (1.83) (1.90) (1.83) (1.92) (2.88)**
Observations 248 224 224 224 184 224
R-squared 0.03 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.50 0.44
Note: Reference categories: branch of larger organisation; South East; Textiles; at address less than 5
years. Voice reference category is no recognised union in Models (1), (2)< (4), (6). In M(3) ref is no
coverage. In M(5) reference is no union members.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A14: Employment growth in private services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N employees ‘90 –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.004
(2.72)** (2.45)* (3.08)** (2.18)* (2.75)** (2.76)**
% non-manual –0.037 –0.043 –0.038 –0.025 –0.033 –0.029
(2.21)* (2.53)* (2.33)* (1.47) (2.13)* (1.71)
Single estab 0.804 0.466 0.586 0.845 0.645 1.095
(0.77) (0.44) (0.58) (0.79) (0.63) (0.95)
HQ 4.792 4.878 4.715 0.282 4.553 4.738
(1.50) (1.60) (1.55) (0.09) (1.53) (1.52)
North –0.141 –0.356 –0.250 0.305 0.430 0.092
(0.06) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.04)
North West –2.161 –2.339 –2.114 –2.095 –2.712 –1.789
(0.89) (0.94) (0.88) (0.92) (1.12) (0.73)
Yorks/Humber –0.746 –0.979 –0.561 0.060 –0.840 –0.715
(0.42) (0.58) (0.32) (0.03) (0.50) (0.41)
W Mids –1.256 –0.855 –0.455 –1.874 –0.858 –1.488
(0.50) (0.39) (0.20) (0.73) (0.39) (0.54)
E Mids –3.057 –3.192 –2.591 –3.359 –3.417 –2.669
(1.23) (1.33) (1.07) (1.90) (1.58) (1.14)
E Anglia –3.346 –3.357 –2.785 –2.931 –3.365 –2.995
(1.93) (1.78) (1.67) (1.78) (2.14)* (1.80)
South West –3.195 –3.457 –2.598 –1.545 –2.394 –3.753
(1.62) (1.79) (1.41) (0.80) (1.23) (1.81)
Gtr London 1.181 1.129 1.702 0.455 0.789 1.107
(0.75) (0.75) (1.13) (0.31) (0.51) (0.74)
Wales 2.130 –0.558 1.232 2.895 2.827 0.003
(0.44) (0.10) (0.23) (0.71) (0.49) (0.00)
Scotland –1.969 –2.279 –1.475 0.060 –1.841 –1.718
(0.87) (1.00) (0.67) (0.03) (0.82) (0.79)
% unemp –0.196 –0.189 –0.185 –0.334 –0.226 –0.230
(0.78) (0.76) (0.74) (1.47) (0.93) (0.92)
% vacancies 2.807 3.148 3.103 2.425 2.674 2.603
(1.78) (1.89) (2.03)* (1.60) (1.70) (1.55)
Share scheme 0.205 –0.282 0.185 0.060 0.265 –0.124
(0.26) (0.34) (0.24) (0.08) (0.35) (0.15)
Profit share 0.267 0.336 0.451 –0.403 0.501 0.276
(0.31) (0.40) (0.54) (0.48) (0.59) (0.32)
Energy & Water –1.370 –1.309 –0.820 –2.078 –2.765 2.559
(0.54) (0.46) (0.29) (0.83) (1.15) (0.72)
Construction –1.501 –1.732 –1.388 –1.327 –2.025 –1.732
(0.71) (0.82) (0.67) (0.66) (0.91) (0.84)
Whole. Dist. 3.445 3.631 3.376 3.707 3.720 3.024
(1.75) (1.90) (1.70) (1.68) (1.80) (1.43)
Hotels etc –2.782 –3.260 –3.549 –3.092 –2.615 –2.438
(1.85) (2.42)* (2.67)** (2.26)* (1.77) (1.72)
Transport –1.253 –1.293 –1.676 –0.463 –2.323 –0.900
(0.71) (0.72) (0.96) (0.28) (1.23) (0.46)
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Post & Tel. –0.263 0.283 0.986 –0.613 –1.324 2.767
(0.15) (0.10) (0.51) (0.24) (0.70) (1.04)
Banking etc 7.335 8.094 7.875 3.095 6.990 7.674
(1.88) (1.91) (2.10)* (1.15) (1.84) (1.91)
Business 1.863 1.880 1.544 1.305 2.070 1.728
(1.25) (1.28) (1.06) (0.87) (1.41) (1.13)
Higher educ 0.019 0.008 –0.248 –0.750 1.097 –0.331
(0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.41) (0.58) (0.17)
School educ 2.464 2.593 2.977 1.836 2.115 2.617
(1.46) (1.42) (1.75) (1.07) (1.14) (1.52)
Other educ –1.752 –2.037 –2.005 –1.675 –0.811 –2.145
(0.81) (0.94) (0.96) (0.74) (0.37) (1.00)
Medical 0.737 0.709 –0.183 –3.714 0.546 1.130
(0.32) (0.31) (0.08) (1.23) (0.25) (0.48)
Other serv. –0.295 –0.425 –0.632 –2.104 –0.009 –0.798
(0.23) (0.32) (0.54) (1.35) (0.01) (0.62)
Emp chg 89–90 0.033 0.027 0.037 0.094 0.036 0.033
(1.03) (0.82) (1.10) (2.45)* (1.14) (0.97)
Age 5–9 yrs –2.299 –2.437 –2.366 –5.182 –2.748 –1.911
(1.30) (1.30) (1.37) (2.71)** (1.62) (1.04)
Age 10–20 yr 0.691 0.828 0.578 –0.492 0.295 0.811
(0.41) (0.49) (0.35) (0.28) (0.18) (0.47)
Age 21+ yr –0.058 –0.093 –0.329 –1.884 –0.257 –0.187
(0.04) (0.05) (0.20) (1.06) (0.17) (0.11)
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100% density 2.422
(1.01)


















Constant 1.411 2.042 2.402 1.902 4.082 3.578 1.566
(2.23)* (0.84) (0.88) (0.80) (1.56) (1.31) (0.60)
Observations 310 258 257 258 197 258 258
R-squared 0.06 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.28
Note: Reference categories: branch of larger organisation; South East; Retail Distribution; age under
5 years. For voice measures: (1) no recognition (2) no recognition (3) no bargaining coverage (4) no
recognition (5) no union members (6) no worker voice (7) each union type dummy is evaluated
against no having that sort of union at the workplace. Note: there was only one case in which a
unionised private sector service workplace negotiated over recruitment but not staffing levels, so the
coefficient should be ignored.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
112 / Alex Bryson
Employee Voice 15/5  19/7/01  10:02 am  Page 112
Table A15: Selection adjusted estimates of employment growth in the
private sector, 1990–1998
Heckman selection model Number of obs = 872
(regression model with sample selection) Censored obs = 314
Uncensored obs = 558
Wald chi2(42) = 175.89
Log likelihood = –1919.689 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
empgpa
unionrec –4.36291 1.468378 –2.971 0.003 –7.240878 –1.484942
xaallemp 0.0022557 0.0010325 2.185 0.029 0.000232 0.0042793
pcnman 0.0030598 0.0165265 0.185 0.853 –0.0293316 0.0354512
Ixbsin_1 0.6661478 0.9917225 0.672 0.502 –1.277592 2.609888
Ixbsin_3 3.403587 2.322865 1.465 0.143 –1.149144 7.956318
north 2.995093 2.295249 1.305 0.192 –1.503512 7.493698
nwest 2.461774 2.129872 1.156 0.248 –1.712698 6.636246
yandh 4.430638 1.851207 2.393 0.017 0.8023391 8.058937
wmids 5.19324 2.33264 2.226 0.026 0.6213496 9.76513
emids 0.0729959 1.937477 0.038 0.970 –3.72439 3.870381
eastang –2.82794 2.014707 –1.404 0.160 –6.776693 1.120812
swest 1.495072 2.029545 0.737 0.461 –2.482763 5.472908
gtrlon 2.495453 1.458133 1.711 0.087 –0.3624341 5.353341
wales 1.926769 2.171255 0.887 0.375 –2.328812 6.182351
scotland 2.869087 2.273895 1.262 0.207 –1.587665 7.32584
uttwa –0.1572378 0.2340242 –0.672 0.502 –0.6159168 0.3014413
vacancy 1.625502 0.8974568 1.811 0.070 –0.1334805 3.384485
xshare 0.709736 0.5557327 1.277 0.202 –0.37948 1.798952
xprofit –0.2759869 0.5532013 –0.499 0.618 –1.360242 0.8082678
Ixbsi_1 4.655586 1.632452 2.852 0.004 1.456039 7.855133
Ixbsi_2 4.674 1.955575 2.390 0.017 0.8411443 8.506856
Ixbsi_3 2.476628 2.41961 1.024 0.306 –2.26572 7.218976
Ixbsi_4 0.1316017 1.802672 0.073 0.942 –3.40157 3.664774
Ixbsi_5 0.5234148 1.684532 0.311 0.756 –2.778206 3.825036
Ixbsi_6 –4.292558 1.875445 –2.289 0.022 –7.968362 –0.6167539
Ixbsi_7 –6.490438 4.606192 –1.409 0.159 –15.51841 2.537532
Ixbsi_8 –1.979814 1.9688 –1.006 0.315 –5.838591 1.878962
Ixbsi_9 –1.262834 2.06151 –0.613 0.540 –5.303319 2.777652
Ixbsi_10 –1.937816 2.790693 –0.694 0.487 –7.407474 3.531843
Ixbsi_11 –5.095829 1.853387 –2.749 0.006 –8.728401 –1.463258
Ixbsi_12 –8.164625 3.360924 –2.429 0.015 –14.75192 –1.577334
Ixbsi_13 –1.092976 2.078235 –0.526 0.599 –5.166242 2.98029
Ixbsi_14 1.613595 2.085323 0.774 0.439 –2.473563 5.700752
Ixbsi_15 0.9535411 1.28213 0.744 0.457 –1.559387 3.466469
Ixbsi_16 –1.851661 1.862248 –0.994 0.320 –5.5016 1.798278
Ixbsi_17 –3.647711 2.677951 –1.362 0.173 –8.896399 1.600976
Ixbsi_18 –3.625907 2.271474 –1.596 0.110 –8.077915 0.826101
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Ixbsi_19 –2.960453 3.137604 –0.944 0.345 –9.110044 3.189137
Ixbsi_20 0.4660452 1.68764 0.276 0.782 –2.841667 3.773758
Ixbsi_23 2.58376 1.785791 1.447 0.148 –0.9163257 6.083846
Ixbsi_24 4.471855 2.122782 2.107 0.035 0.3112798 8.632431
Ixbsi_25 –1.433627 1.306651 –1.097 0.273 –3.994617 1.127362
Ixbsi_26 0.656911 2.031952 0.323 0.746 –3.325642 4.639464
_cons –7.720522 2.073011 –3.724 0.000 –11.78355 –3.657495
survive
unionrec –0.2170981 0.1032634 –2.102 0.036 –0.4194907–0.0147055
induden2 –0.0065557 0.0050637 –1.295 0.195 –0.0164805 0.003369
lgemp90 0.6964611 0.0610813 11.402 0.000 0.5767441 0.8161782
pcnman 0.0024801 0.0014928 1.661 0.097 –0.0004458 0.005406
single 0.1636449 0.1030671 1.588 0.112 –0.038363 0.3656528
north 0.0547008 0.2305712 0.237 0.812 –0.3972104 0.5066121
nwest 0.3578048 0.181459 1.972 0.049 0.0021518 0.7134578
yandh 0.3602587 0.1763587 2.043 0.041 0.014602 0.7059154
wmids 0.5068414 0.2066328 2.453 0.014 0.1018486 0.9118342
emids 0.1592128 0.1895604 0.840 0.401 –0.2123187 0.5307443
eastang –0.4663819 0.2968815 –1.571 0.116 –1.048259 0.1154952
swest 0.1556087 0.1680387 0.926 0.354 –0.1737411 0.4849585
gtrlon 0.170864 0.1709238 1.000 0.317 –0.1641405 0.5058685
wales –0.0249386 0.1880248 –0.133 0.894 –0.3934605 0.3435833
scotland 0.2347649 0.2105447 1.115 0.265 –0.1778951 0.647425
uttwa 0.0066332 0.0220552 0.301 0.764 –0.0365942 0.0498607
Ixbsic_1 –0.8941497 0.3176854 –2.815 0.005 –1.516802 –0.2714978
Ixbsic_2 0.2794264 0.1740542 1.605 0.108 –0.0617135 0.6205663
Ixbsic_3 –0.6793125 0.1991858 –3.410 0.001 –1.06971 –0.2889155
Ixbsic_4 –0.7376363 0.2070303 –3.563 0.000 –1.143408 –0.3318644
Ixbsic_5 –0.1031124 0.1928424 –0.535 0.593 –0.4810766 0.2748519
Ixbsic_6 –0.1949818 0.2190706 –0.890 0.373 –0.6243524 0.2343888
Ixbsic_7 –0.3677549 0.2089097 –1.760 0.078 –0.7772104 0.0417006
Ixbsic_8 –0.2862309 0.2195168 –1.304 0.192 –0.716476 0.1440142
_cons –2.672011 0.3879788 –6.887 0.000 –3.432435 –1.911586
/athrho 2.055116 0.6237078 3.295 0.001 0.8326709 3.277561
/lnsigma 2.177178 0.1220226 17.842 0.000 1.938018 2.416338
rho 0.9677215 0.0396148 0.68190750.9971584
sigma 8.821376 1.076407 6.94497211.20475
lambda 8.536636 1.36051 5.87008511.20319
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 10.86 Prob > chi2 = 0.0010
Key to variable names:
UNIONREC Union recognition
INDUDEN2 Industry-level union density
XAALLEMP Number of employees at workplace in 1990
LGEMP90 Log of 1990 workplace employment
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PCNMAN % of employees non-manual
XSHARE Non-executive share ownership scheme
XPROFIT Profit-related pay scheme
Ixbsin_1 Single independent workplace
Ixbsin_3 Head office
SINGLE Single independent workplace
VACANCY Vacancies at Jobcentres as % of economically active in the local labour market area
UTTWA % persons unemployed out of economically active in travel-to-work area
NORTH North
NWEST North West








Ixbsi_1 Metals & mineral products
Ixbsi_2 Chemicals and manufd fibres
Ixbsi_3 Metal goods
Ixbsi_4 Mechanical engineering
Ixbsi_5 Electrical & instrument engineering
Ixbsi_6 Vehicles and transport equipment
Ixbsi_7 Food, drink & tobacco
Ixbsi_8 Textiles
Ixbsi_9 Leather, footwear & clothing
Ixbsi_10 Timber & furniture, paper & printing
Ixbsi_11 Rubber, plastics & other manufg




Ixbsi_16 Hotels, catering, repairs
Ixbsi_17 Transport
Ixbsi_18 Post and telecommunications









Ixbsic_1 Energy and water supply industries
Ixbsic_2 Extraction of minerals/ores; manuf of metals, minerals & chems
Ixbsic_3 Metal goods, engineering & vehicles industries
Ixbsic_4 Other manufacturing industries
Ixbsic_5 Construction
Ixbsic_6 Distribution, hotels & catering, repairs
Ixbsic_7 Transport and communications
Ixbsic_8 Banking, finance, insurance, bus. services & leasing
Ixbsic_9 Other services
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Table A16: Employment growth per annum in the public sector, 1990–98,
by 1990 characteristics
Public sector Private sector
Whole sector 1.48 0.34
Measures of voice
Union and non-union voice:
Union voice only (union rec or choose JCC rep) –0.27 –1.49
Non-union voice only (non-union appointment 
to JCC, briefing group, regular workforce 
meetings, problem solving group, or presence 
of non-union reps where no union members) 3.07 1.08
Union and non-union voice 1.58 –1.84
None –7.62 2.37
Representative and direct voice:
Representative voice only (union rec or 
functioning JCC) –0.65 –1.35
Direct voice only (briefing group, regular 
workforce meetings, problem solving group) 2.72 1.04
Representative and direct voice 1.75 –0.58
None –7.62 2.37
Joint consultative committee 1.87 –0.46
Functioning JCC (meets at least once a month) 2.08 –0.40
No JCC 1.12 0.62
Management ability to organise work of 
non-managerial staff limited by workers 
(union members, representatives, or 
non-union workers, or formal agreement) 0.53 –2.28
Management ability to organise not limited 1.81 0.63
Measures of union presence:
Union recognition 1.26 –1.75
No recognised union 2.89 1.44
Derecognition by 1998 3.57 0.34
New recognition by 1998 2.51 0.06
1 recognised union 1.20 –1.17
2 recognised unions 2.40 –1.42
3+ recognised unions 0.16 –3.88
Types of union at workplace:
Manuals-only union 3.13 –0.51
Non-manuals only union 3.24 –4.26
Manuals and non-manuals union –0.07 –1.41
Manuals only and non-manuals only 1.01 –1.33
Manuals only and manual/non-manual 0.76 –1.54
Non-manuals only and manual/non-manual 0.34 –3.06
All 3 types of union –0.38 –3.84
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Any recognised union with manual members 
only 0.90 –1.27
Any recognised union with non-manual 
members only 1.32 –3.08
Any recognised union with both manual and 
non-manual members 0.16 –1.95
Closed shop 2.80 –2.48
No closed shop 1.44 0.45
Union chooses JCC reps 1.21 –2.67
Union representative at workplace 0.40 –1.70









Joint bargaining (ie single-table with 
multi-unions) –0.32 –3.03
Separate bargaining 1.66 –2.34













Bargaining over employment where recognition:
No bargaining over employment 1.19 –1.94
Bargaining over staffing levels 2.73 –1.36
Bargaining over recruitment 0.63 –1.92









Education sector 1.79 NA
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Local government 4.13 NA
Central government 6.18 NA
Public sector medical services 7.38 NA
Other public services –0.48 NA
Other public sector 0.29 NA
Single workplace 5.02 0.98
Branch 1.52 –0.44
HQ –2.02 6.48
Admin office or HQ 2.57 3.94
Sells goods/services 1.40 0.04
Age, < 5 yrs 1.50 1.55
Age, 5–9 yrs –1.47 –0.11
Age, 10–20 yrs 1.28 0.49
Age, 21+ yrs 1.84 0.00
Workforce characteristics
Uses short-term or fixed term contracts 0.02 –0.28
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Table A17: Employment growth per annum in the public sector
No negotiations with unions 2.739 (1.50)
Separate bargaining arrangements 2.814 (2.20)*
Single union 3.668 (2.05)*
Log employment level in 1990 –2.530 (5.57)**
At current address for 5–9 years –3.432 (1.29)
At current address for 10–20 years –1.087 (0.52)
At current address for 21+ years –0.753 (0.36)
% non-manual workers 0.024 (1.17)
North 2.016 (0.72)
North West 2.445 (1.04)
Yorkshire and Humberside 2.955 (1.32)
West Midlands 3.649 (2.05)*
East Midlands 3.178 (0.91)
East Anglia 1.581 (0.81)
South West 2.103 (1.34)
Greater London –0.498 (0.38)
Wales –0.260 (0.12)
Scotland 4.130 (1.49)
% unemployed in TTWA –0.471 (1.35)
Vacancy ratio in LLMA 1.701 (0.86)
Education sector –1.441 (0.67)
Central government 3.778 (1.18)
Local government –0.711 (0.29)
Medical services 2.097 (0.84)




Note: Reference categories are: single-table bargaining; at current address for under 5 years; South
East; Other public sector (largely consisting of post and telecommunications and transport).
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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